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ABSTRACT
Essays on Financial Structure, Managerial Compensation and the Product Market
BY
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April 25, 2012
Committee Chair: Ajay Subramanian
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance
This thesis consists of three chapters on financial structure, managerial compensation,
and product markets. The unifying theme of these chapters is to examine how the financial
decisions of firms are affected by market imperfections. Chapter 1 places emphasis on the
impact of internal imperfections arising from asymmetric beliefs (or behavioral biases) and
agency conflicts by examining how these internal imperfections affect managerial compen-
sation and corporate financial structure. On the other hand, Chapters 2 and 3 incorporate
external market imperfections especially arising from imperfect product market competition.
More specifically, these two chapters develop market equilibrium frameworks to examine how
the matching market for CEOs and firms interacts with the product market to affect the
distributions of CEO compensation and firm size.
In Chapter 1, we develop a dynamic model to examine the effects of asymmetric beliefs
of a firm’s manager and blockholders regarding the profitability of the firm’s projects, and
differing attitudes towards their risk, on its capital structure. The firm’s capital structure
reflects the tradeoff between the positive incentive effects of managerial optimism that in-
creases the manager’s output and blockholders’ private benefits against the negative effects
of risk-sharing costs. We provide several testable implications for the effects of the degree
of managerial optimism as well as permanent and transitory components of the firm’s risk
on different components of capital structure. In our calibration of the model, performed
separately for different industries, we show that while optimism and risk have qualitatively
similar effects on capital structure in different industries, their quantitative effects are sig-
nificantly different. The interactive effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts could
potentially explain a significant portion of the substantial inter-industry variation in capital
structure.
Chapter 2 studies how the distributions of CEO talent and compensation vary across
industries, and how product market characteristics affect these distributions. We develop a
market equilibrium model that incorporates the competitive assignment of CEOs to firms in
a framework in which firms engage in imperfect product market—specifically, monopolistic—
competition. Using the distributions of CEO pay and firm value in each of twelve Fama-
French industries, we calibrate the parameters of our structural model, and indirectly infer
the unobserved distributions of CEO talent and firm quality that together determine firm
output. We then conduct several counterfactual experiments using the calibrated models
corresponding to each of the industries. We find that the distribution of CEO talent does,
indeed, vary dramatically across industries. More importantly, contrary to the conclusions
of earlier studies that abstract away from the effects of the product market (Tervio¨, 2008
and Gabaix and Landier, 2008), the impact of CEO talent on firm value appears to be quite
significant. Our estimates of the effect of CEO talent on firm value for the industries in
our sample are two orders of magnitude higher than those obtained by the aforementioned
studies. Further, our estimates suggest that the compensation of CEOs is quantitatively
in line with their contributions to firms. Broadly, our study shows that it is important
to incorporate the product market environment in which firms operate when assessing the
contributions of CEOs to firms.
Chapter 3 builds a market equilibrium framework in which the CEO-firm matching
process is affected by the product market. We show that under reasonable assumptions
there is a unique equilibrium in which only managers with ability above a unique cutoff level
are matched to firms. This very simple screening process endogenizes the distribution of
active managers who match with firms. Our calibration of the model using a parametric
approach, which is in contrast with the empirical analysis performed in Chapter 2, strongly
supports the principle arguments on the importance of CEO talent and appropriate CEO
talent levels (on average) in Chapter 2. In addition, due to the law of demand and supply,
which is a key feature of the extended model, we obtain somewhat different influence of
some of product market characteristics on CEO pay. Furthermore, our parametric approach
allows us to draw some implications for the effects of CEO talent distribution on the market
equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
ASYMMETRIC BELIEFS, LEARNING AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
1.1 Introduction
There is growing evidence to suggest that managers and investors have differing beliefs
about the profitabilities of firms’ projects in addition to having asymmetric attitudes towards
their risks (Malmendier and Tate (2005), Baker et al. (2007)). We develop a dynamic model
to show how asymmetric beliefs and costs of risk-sharing interact to affect capital structure.
We derive novel, testable implications that link the degree of asymmetry in beliefs about a
firm’s profitability as well as permanent and transitory components of its risk to different
components of its capital structure: long-term debt, short-term debt, inside equity, and
outside equity. Managerial optimism has sharply contrasting effects on long-term debt and
short-term debt. While long-term debt declines with optimism, short-term debt increases.
Permanent and transitory components of a firm’s risk have differing effects on its debt
structure. Long-term debt increases with a firm’s intrinsic risk, but varies in a U-shaped
manner with its transient risk. Short-term debt decreases with intrinsic risk and increases
with transient risk. We calibrate the model to match the distributions of capital structure in
different industries. While the qualitative effects of optimism and risk on capital structure
are similar across industries, their quantitative effects are significantly different. Our results
suggest that asymmetric beliefs are an important determinant of firms’ financial policies,
xviii
and the interactive effects of managerial optimism and agency conflicts could potentially
rationalize a significant portion of the observed inter-industry variation in firms’ capital
structures.
In our discrete-time, finite horizon framework, an all-equity firm approaches the capital
markets to finance a positive NPV project. The firm’s shareholders comprise of “large” share-
holders or blockholders and “small” atomistic, dispersed shareholders. The firm finances the
project through equity and long-term debt that is non-callable and completely amortized,
and then hires a manager to operate the firm. The firm’s small shareholders (hereafter
“shareholders”) are competitive, while blockholders derive pecuniary private benefits in ad-
dition to the payout flows they receive from their equity stake in the firm (see Chapter V
of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Dyck and Zingales (2004)). Apart from equity and long-term
debt, the firm’s capital structure also consists of non-discretionary short-term (single-period)
debt associated with the financing of the firm’s working capital requirements.1 The firm’s
earnings in each period are distributed among its stakeholders—the manager, blockholders,
shareholders, debtholders, and the government (through corporate taxes). In reality, ma-
jor strategic decisions such as financing and investment decisions require the approval of
corporate boards. Boards are significantly influenced by large shareholders, such as ven-
ture capitalists and angel investors before a firm goes public, and institutional investors as
well as other significant blockholders after a firm goes public (e.g. see Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), Tirole (2006)). Accordingly, we assume that all decisions—financing, investment,
1The modeling of working capital does not affect the model’s qualitative implications, but is important for
its calibration because the financing of working capital forms a significant component of a firm’s short-term
debt in the data.
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and managerial contracts—are made in the interests of blockholders subject to ensuring
that competitive shareholders receive fair returns on their investments.
The firm’s total gross earnings in each period consist of two components: the normally
distributed base earnings, and the deterministic discretionary earnings that are generated
by the firm’s incremental capital investments and the manager’s effort. All agents have im-
perfect information about the true mean of the project’s base earnings that we refer to as its
intrinsic quality or profitability. While the firm’s investors—blockholders, shareholders, and
debtholders—share a common normally distributed prior about the project’s profitability,
the manager could have a different prior. The manager’s and investors’ priors have the same
variance, but possibly different means. Investors and the manager “agree to disagree” about
their respective mean assessments, the difference of which is the degree of managerial opti-
mism. The true variance of the project’s earnings in each period is its intrinsic risk, which is
invariant through time. The common variance of investors’ and the manager’s assessments
of the project’s base earnings is its transient risk. The transient risk is resolved over time as
agents learn about the project’s profitability through observations of the project’s earnings.
Investors are risk-neutral, while the manager is risk-averse with multiplicative CARA
preferences. The manager receives dynamic incentives through a sequence of explicit single-
period contracts contingent on the firm’s earnings. The contracts must be incentive compat-
ible for the manager, and meet her participation constraints, that is, her expected utility at
each date must be at least as great as her expected utility if she were to receive her constant
reservation wage in each period. Because the firm’s dispersed shareholders are competitive,
the surplus generated by the manager—the discretionary earnings—are shared by blockhold-
xx
ers and the manager, that is, only the firm’s base earnings flow is pledgeable to the firm’s
dispersed and atomistic shareholders. In addition to receiving their stake in the firm’s base
earnings, blockholders also obtain a portion of the firm’s discretionary earnings that repre-
sent their private benefits, that is, pecuniary benefits that blockholders enjoy and that do
not accrue to shareholders. The market or “outside” value of the firm’s equity—hereafter,
the firm’s equity value—at any date is the net present value of the total payout flows to
equityholders—shareholders and blockholders—excluding the private benefits that accrue to
blockholders. Blockholder value equals the market or “outside” value of blockholders’ equity
stake plus the net present value of blockholders’ private benefits.
As in Leland (1994), debt is serviced entirely in financial distress by the additional
issuance of equity and bankruptcy is declared when the equity value falls to zero. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the firm is liquidated if it goes bankrupt after deadweight bankruptcy
costs are incurred and the absolute priority of debt is enforced. Blockholders choose the firm’s
capital structure and the manager’s contracts to maximize their value subject to ensuring
that shareholders receive fair (risk-adjusted) returns on their investments.
We first derive the manager’s explicit contracts for a given long-term debt structure. We
implement the risky component of the manager’s compensation in each period through an
inside equity stake in the firm, and the performance-invariant or “cash” component through
a cash reserve. The cash reserve offsets the short-term debt financing of the firm’s working
capital. In our implementation of the manager’s contracts, therefore, the firm’s capital
structure consists of inside equity, outside equity, long-term debt, and dynamic short-term
xxi
borrowing or lending that reflects the financing of working capital requirements and the
manager’s cash compensation.
The manager’s inside equity stake is a deterministic function of time, but her cash
compensation depends on the project’s earnings history through its effect on the players’
posterior assessments of the project’s profitability. The manager’s inside equity stake in
each period increases with the initial degree of managerial optimism. When the manager
is optimistic, she overvalues the project’s future earnings relative to investors. The optimal
contract exploits the manager’s optimism by providing the manager with more powerful
incentives, that is, by increasing her equity compensation relative to her cash compensation.
Blockholders choose the firm’s long-term debt structure at date zero to maximize their
value that is the sum of two components. The first component is the market or “outside”
value of the blockholders’ equity stake that includes the net surplus from financing the
positive NPV project. The second component is the net present value of blockholders’
private benefits. Long-term debt has conflicting effects on the two components of blockholder
value. Because debt interest payments are shielded from corporate taxes, blockholders can
potentially increase the market value of their stake by choosing greater long-term debt.
Choosing greater long-term debt, however, makes bankruptcy more likely, which lowers the
second component of blockholder value; the value of their future private benefits.
We analytically show that long-term debt declines with the degree of managerial opti-
mism. As discussed earlier, an increase in the manager’s optimism increases the manager’s
inside equity stake in each period. The discretionary earnings the manager generates and,
therefore, the blockholders’ private benefits increase with managerial optimism. Because
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the manager’s beliefs and actions affect the firm’s discretionary earnings, but not its base
earnings, managerial optimism has a much bigger impact on blockholders’ private benefits
than on the market value of their stake. Consequently, in choosing the firm’s long-term debt,
blockholders assign relatively more weight at the margin to their private benefits. As man-
agerial optimism increases, therefore, blockholders choose lower long-term debt to decrease
the likelihood of bankruptcy and, thereby, increase their private benefits.
To obtain additional implications of the model, we calibrate it to data. The key pa-
rameters of the model—the expected profitability, the degree of managerial optimism, the
intrinsic and transient risks, and the technology parameters—are likely to vary significantly
across different industries. Consequently, we calibrate the model to capital structure data
“industry by industry.” For brevity, we report the results for three representative industries
where the level and effects of asymmetric beliefs are likely to be quite different: the food
industry, the software industry, and the entertainment industry. We calibrate the model’s
parameters to match quantiles of the distribution of firms’ capital structures—the ratios of
long-term debt, short-term debt, and firm market value relative to asset value—in each of
the industries.
For these industries, the permanent and transitory components of risk—the intrinsic and
transient risks—have sharply contrasting effects on long-term debt. Long-term debt increases
with intrinsic risk, but varies non-monotonically in a U-shaped manner with transient risk.
The intuition for the contrasting effects of the project’s intrinsic and transient risks on long-
term debt hinges on their differing effects on the probability of bankruptcy. An increase in the
transient risk increases the project’s “signal to noise ratio,” that is, intermediate observations
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of the project’s earnings are more informative about its profitability. Consequently, the
standard deviation of the evolution of posterior assessments of the project’s quality increases.
As a result, the “option value” of continuing to service long-term debt interest payments
increases, which delays bankruptcy and, thereby, has a positive impact on the present value
of blockholders’ private benefits. An increase in the transient risk, however, also increases
the costs of risk-sharing and lowers the discretionary earnings the manager generates in
each period, which negatively affects the blockholders’ private benefits. At low transient
risk levels, the latter effect dominates so that blockholders choose lower long-term debt to
increase the value of their private benefits. At high transient risk levels, the costs of risk-
sharing are so high that the value of blockholders’ private benefits is very low. Consequently,
they increase long-term debt to exploit its tax advantages. In contrast with the effects of
the transient risk, an increase in the intrinsic risk decreases the “signal to noise ratio and
the option value of delaying bankruptcy. Further, an increase in the intrinsic risk increases
the costs of risk-sharing between the manager and investors, which weakens the manager’s
incentives and the output she generates in each period. As a result, an increase in the intrinsic
risk unambiguously lowers the value of blockholders’ private benefits and its marginal impact
on their long-term debt choice. They, therefore, choose greater long-term debt to exploit its
tax advantages.
Next, we explore the effects of project characteristics on short-term debt. In sharp
contrast with the negative effect of managerial optimism on long-term debt, short-term debt
increases with optimism. As the manager’s degree of optimism increases, she receives more
powerful incentives so that her cash compensation declines relative to her equity compen-
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sation. Because cash offsets the firm’s short-term debt (see DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)),
the firm’s short-term debt increases with managerial optimism. As in the case of the firm’s
long-term debt, the project’s intrinsic and transient risks also have conflicting effects on
short-term debt. Short-term debt increases with the project’s transient risk, but declines
with its intrinsic risk.
Our results for the different industries suggest that, while the qualitative effects of opti-
mism and risk on capital structure are similar for the three industries, the quantitative effects
are quite different. Long-term debt decreases only slightly with managerial optimism in the
software industry, but much more substantially in the other two industries. The intuition
for the contrasting variations is that, unlike the food and the entertainment industries, the
software industry is characterized by relatively high levels of managerial optimism and very
low levels of long-term debt financing so that the quantitative effects of managerial optimism
on long-term debt are small. The sharply contrasting quantitative effects of optimism and
risk on capital structure in different industries suggests that the presence of differing levels
of asymmetric beliefs could play an important role in reconciling the significant variation in
firms’ capital structure distribution across industries.
1.2 Related Literature
We contribute to the literature by showing how asymmetric beliefs affect different com-
ponents of capital structure—inside equity, outside equity, long-term debt and short-term
debt—in a dynamic setting. Landier and Thesmar (2009) present a two-period framework in
which contracts are exogenously restricted to be debt contracts. They show that optimistic
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entrepreneurs choose short-term debt, whereas realists opt for long-term debt. In their setup,
optimistic entrepreneurs prefer short-term debt because they believe that they can refinance
it at more favorable terms in the second period by taking a bet on the project’s success.
Dittmar and Thakor (2007) develop a three-period model and show that a manager chooses
equity financing if there is greater agreement between the manager and investors.
We complement the above studies by considering a framework in which capital structure
reflects the dynamic tradeoff between the positive incentive effects of managerial optimism
and the negative effects of risk-sharing costs on managerial output and blockholders’ payoffs.
The mechanisms that drive the effects of managerial optimism on capital structure are quite
different from the above studies. As discussed earlier, a higher degree of optimism offsets
the costs of risk-sharing and increases the power of incentives that can be provided to the
manager. Consequently, the discretionary earnings generated by the manager increase that,
in turn, increase the blockholders’ private benefits. Blockholders, therefore, assign relatively
greater weight to their private benefits than the market value of their stake in choosing the
firm’s long-term debt. At the same time, the tradeoff between the benefits of optimism and
risk-sharing costs makes it optimal for a more optimistic manager to hold a higher inside
equity stake in the firm and receive lower cash compensation, which has a positive effect on
short-term debt.
The interplay between asymmetric beliefs and costs of risk-sharing among blockholders
and managers, therefore, plays a central role in generating the differing impacts of optimism
on long-term and short-term debt. Further, we derive implications for how permanent and
transitory components of risk affect capital structure. To the best of our knowledge, the
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contrasting effects of the intrinsic and transient risks on long-term and short-term debt,
which again arise from the interaction between asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts,
are novel predictions of our study. Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010) show that different
components of risk have contrasting effects on capital structure in a very different setting
with no imperfect information or asymmetric beliefs.
Adrian and Westerfield (2009) and Giat et al. (2010) develop general dynamic, principal-
agent models to study the impact of asymmetric beliefs on optimal dynamic contracts. They
abstract away from capital structure choices. Hackbarth (2008) incorporates managerial
traits, such as growth and risk perception biases, into a dynamic tradeoff model of capital
structure (e.g. see Fischer et al. (1989), Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein et al. (2001),
Hennessy and Whited (2005), Strebulaev (2007)). In his framework, which abstracts away
from the effects of Bayesian learning and contracting and where all debt is long-term, a
more optimistic manager chooses higher (rather than lower) long-term debt. In a contem-
poraneous study, Yang (2010), also builds a dynamic tradeoff model of capital structure
with asymmetric beliefs. He shows that the presence of asymmetric beliefs can explain debt
conservatism and market timing. He too abstracts away from the effects of contracting. We
complement the above studies by building a dynamic tradeoff model in which asymmetric
beliefs, Bayesian learning, and agency conflicts interact to affect different components of
capital structure.
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1.3 The Model
We consider a finite horizon framework with equally spaced dates, 0, 1, . . . , T . At date
0, an all-equity firm has access to a positive net present value project that requires an
initial investment outlay, K. The firm has “large” shareholders or blockholders who hold
a combined equity stake g and “small” or “atomistic” dispersed shareholders who hold an
equity stake 1− g. The firm raises the initial investment K for the project from public debt
and equity markets, and hires a manager to operate the project. For simplicity, we assume
that blockholders continue to hold an equity stake g in the firm after date zero.2
Small shareholders are competitive, while blockholders derive pecuniary private benefits
in addition to the payout flows they receive from their equity stake in the firm, that is,
blockholders obtain additional payoffs that do not accrue to small shareholders (see Chap-
ter V of Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). All decisions—financing, investment, and managerial
contracts—are made in the interests of blockholders subject to ensuring that competitive
small shareholders receive fair returns on their investments. In reality, major strategic de-
cisions such as financing and investment decisions require the approval of corporate boards.
Boards are significantly influenced by large shareholders, such as venture capitalists and
angel investors before a firm goes public, and institutional investors as well as other signif-
icant blockholders after a firm goes public (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Tirole (2006)).
2Note that we do not require or assume that the identities of blockholders remains the same through
time, that is, a blockholder can sell its stake to another blockholder. We can use arguments analogous to
those in Bolton and von Thadden (1998) (see Section II.A of their paper) to show that, as long as trading
is non-anonymous, it is sub-optimal for a blockholder to sell its ownership stake to several dispersed buyers,
that is, the blockholders either hold onto their shares or sell them as a block. Consequently, the combined
equity stake of blockholders persists through time. Since these considerations fall well outside the scope of
this paper, we simply assume here that blockholders’ ownership stake is g through time.
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Because blockholders play a key role in driving firms’ decisions in reality, the incorporation
of blockholders in the model is also important for its calibration to data. For simplicity, we
ignore strategic behaviors among different blockholders, that is, they behave as a monolithic
unit in their collective interest. We hereafter refer to the firm’s group of blockholders by a
single “representative” blockholder, and its small shareholders as simply its “shareholders.”
The equity stake held by the representative blockholder is the firm’s block equity while the
equity held by shareholders is the firm’s public equity.
The total earnings from the project are distributed among all the firm’s claimants
- the manager, the blockholder, shareholders, debt-holders, and the government (through
corporate taxes). We ignore personal taxes for simplicity and assume that the corporate tax
rate is a constant, τ ∈ (0, 1). Security issuance costs are negligible, and the risk-free interest
rate, r, is a constant and the same for all market participants.
1.3.1 Total Earnings Flow
In any period [i, i + 1] , the total earnings from the project are affected by physical
capital investments by the blockholder and shareholders as well as human capital investments
(effort) by the manager. The total earnings flow in any period has two components: the
base earnings—a stochastic component that is unaffected by the physical and human capital
investments, and the discretionary earnings—a deterministic component that depends on the
incremental capital investment by equity holders as well as the manager’s effort. Specifically,
if the capital investment and effort over period [i, i+ 1] are ki and ηi, respectively, the total
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earnings flow is
Ei+1 =
Base Earnings︷ ︸︸ ︷
Θ +Ni+1 +
Discretionary Earnings︷ ︸︸ ︷
Akαi η
β
i . (1.1)
The first component of the base earnings, Θ, represents the project’s intrinsic quality
or profitability. The manager and the firm’s investors—the blockholder, shareholders and
debtholders—have imperfect information and possibly asymmetric beliefs about Θ. Their
respective beliefs are, however, common knowledge, that is, they agree to disagree (see Morris
(1995), Allen and Gale (1999)). Their respective priors on Θ at date zero are normally
distributed as follows:
Θ ∼ N (µS0 , σ20) ; Investors’ Prior, (1.2)
Θ ∼ N (µM0 , σ20) ; Manager’s Prior.
Note that all investors—the blockholder, shareholders, and debtholders—share the same
beliefs about Θ. We make no assumptions about the true project quality distribution because
the equilibrium only depends on how the manager’s and investors’ assessments of project
quality relate to each other, and not on the true project quality distribution. Although we
could consider the general scenario in which the manager is optimistic or pessimistic relative
to investors, we simplify the exposition by considering the (empirically relevant) scenario in
which the manager is optimistic. It is important to mention here that, when we calibrate
the model to data in Section 1.6, we do not assume a priori that the manager is optimistic,
and indirectly infer the average level of managerial optimism (or pessimism) implied by the
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data. We define
∆0 := µ
M
0 − µS0 (1.3)
as the degree of managerial optimism at date zero.
The second component of the base earnings in (1.1), Ni+1, is a normal random variable
with mean 0 and variance s2. The random variables {Ni+1, i ≥ 0} are independent of each
other, and are also independent of Θ. The parameter s2 is the intrinsic risk of the firm’s
earnings because it is present even when there is perfect information about Θ. The intrinsic
risk is invariant through time.
The discretionary earnings are described by a Cobb-Douglas production function, in
which the total factor productivity, A, and the parameters, α, β ∈ (0, 1), are known constants.
The discretionary earnings are observable but non-verifiable, and, therefore, non-contractible.
As we discuss later, the discretionary earnings are the source of pecuniary private benefits
for the blockholder.
All agents—the manager and investors—update their prior beliefs of the project’s prof-
itability Θ over time based on intermediate observations of the project’s earnings. Define
the random variable
ξi+1 := Ei+1 − Akαi ηβi = Θ +Ni+1, i = 0, 1, . . . (1.4)
The posterior distribution on Θ for each date i ≥ 1 is normally distributed under the beliefs
of the manager (denoted by N(µMi , σ
2
i )) and investors (denoted by N(µ
S
i , σ
2
i )), where
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σ2i =
s2σ2i−1
s2 + σ2i−1
=
s2σ20
s2 + iσ20
, (1.5)
µ`i =
s2µ`i−1 + σ
2
i−1ξi
s2 + σ2i−1
=
s2µ`0 + σ
2
0(
∑i
t=1 ξt)
s2 + iσ20
, ` = M, S. (1.6)
Note that σi tends to zero as i → ∞. The parameter, σ2i , is the project’s transient risk
because it represents the degree of uncertainty about the project’s quality that is resolved
through time due to Bayesian learning. Define
∆i := µ
M
i − µSi =
s2∆0
s2 + iσ20
=
σ2i
σ20
∆0, i = 0, 1, . . . (1.7)
We refer to ∆i as the degree of managerial optimism at date i. By (1.7), the degree of man-
agerial optimism declines deterministically over time as the manager and investors update
their priors on Θ in a Bayesian manner based on observations of the project’s earnings.
1.3.2 Capital Structure
All long-term debt issued at date zero matures at date T and is non-callable. Further,
if the time horizon T is sufficiently long, we can follow Leland (1994) by assuming that long-
term debt is completely amortized so that long-term debtholders (hereafter, bondholders)
receive a constant coupon payment, d, in each period as long as the firm remains solvent.
The debt coupon payment d, which determines the firm’s long-term debt structure, is later
determined endogenously.
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In addition to long-term debt, the firm also has non-discretionary working capital re-
quirements such as inventories, accounts payable and receivable, employee wages, etc. that
are financed through single-period, risk-free short-term debt. Although it does not quali-
tatively alter the main implications of our study, the incorporation of working capital re-
quirements is necessary for the calibration of the model because the financing of working
capital is an important component of a firm’s short-term debt in the data. Consistent with
empirical evidence (e.g. Fazzari and Petersen (1993)), working capital requirements increase
with the firm’s total earnings. For simplicity, we assume that working capital requirements
are a constant proportion ν of the firm’s total earnings flow, where ν is observable. Hence
the firm’s total earnings net of working capital requirements in period [i, i+ 1] is
Qi+1 = (1− ν)Ei+1. (1.8)
We hereafter refer to the process Qi+1 as the EBITM (earnings before interest, taxes, and the
manager’s compensation) because it will be distributed among bondholders, the government
(through taxes), the manager, the blockholder, and shareholders.
For now, the firm’s capital structure consists of block equity, public equity, long-term
debt, and short-term debt financing of working capital. In Section 1.4.4, we implement
the manager’s contract through an inside equity stake and a cash reserve that offsets the
firm’s short-term debt because cash is effectively negative short-term debt (see DeMarzo and
Fishman (2007)). In the calibrated model, therefore, the firm’s capital structure consists of
inside equity, outside equity (block + public equity), long-term debt, and short-term debt,
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where short-term debt reflects the financing of working capital and the manager’s cash
compensation.
1.3.3 Contracting and Bankruptcy
Investors are risk-neutral, while the manager is risk-averse with multiplicatively separa-
ble CARA preferences. If the manager’s compensation and her effort in period [j, j + 1] are
cMj and ηj, respectively, and the firm remains solvent until date T , her total expected utility
at date i < T is
U(c, η) = EMi
[
− exp
(
−λ
( T−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(cMj − κηγj )
))]
. (1.9)
In the above, r is the risk-free interest rate, λ is the manager’s absolute risk aversion, and
κηγj (κ > 0 is a constant) is the manager’s disutility of effort in period [j, j + 1].
The manager receives dynamic incentives through contracts that could be explicitly con-
tingent on the EBITM process Qi+1 defined in (1.8). We consider an incomplete contracting
environment in which only single-period contracts are enforceable. The manager receives a
contract in each period, which specifies the division of the firm’s earnings (net of corporate
taxes and interest payments) between the manager, the blockholder, and shareholders.
Following Leland (1994), debt payments are serviced entirely as long as the firm is
solvent. In financial distress, debt payments are serviced through the additional issuance of
public equity. Bankruptcy, therefore, occurs endogenously when the value of public equity
falls to zero. We can extend the model to allow for the firm to continue servicing debt even
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after the public equity value falls to zero with bankruptcy occurring when it is no longer
optimal to continue servicing debt. The implications of the extended model do not differ
from those of the simpler model presented here in which bankruptcy occurs when the public
equity value falls to zero.
For simplicity, we assume that the firm is liquidated upon bankruptcy. The absolute
priority of debt is enforced at bankruptcy. The total payoff to bondholders upon bankruptcy
is
Bondholders’ Bankruptcy Payoff = LD(Tb)
= ESTb
[
T−1∑
i=Tb
e−r(i−Tb)(1− τ)(1− ρ)(Θ +Ni+1)
]
,
(1.10)
where the expectation is with respect to investors’ beliefs at the bankruptcy time, Tb. Because
the manager leaves the firm at bankruptcy, its “liquidation value” is determined by the net
present value of its base earnings flow, that is, the earnings flow in the absence of the
manager’s human capital inputs (see (1.1)). As in Leland (1994), the firm incurs bankruptcy
costs so that the payoff to bondholders upon bankruptcy is the present value of the base
earnings flow, Θ + Ni+1, net of corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs. The parameter ρ ∈
(0, 1) in (1.10) represents the firm’s (proportional) bankruptcy costs.
As in traditional principal-agent models with moral hazard (see Laffont and Martimort
(2002)), it is convenient to augment the definition of the manager’s contract to also include
the manager’s effort choices and the incremental capital investments. We then require that
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the manager’s contract be incentive compatible with respect to her effort. Further, we can
simplify notation by viewing the sequence of single-period contracts for the manager as a
single long-term contract that is implemented by the sequence.
Formally, a contract Γ ≡ [cM(·), η, k] is a stochastic process describing the manager’s
compensation cMi (·), her effort choice ηi, and the capital investment ki in each period [i, i+1].
If Fi denotes the information filtration generated by the history of the firm’s base earnings
and discretionary earnings, the process Γ is Fi-adapted. The bankruptcy time Tb is an
Fi-stopping time (recall that the bankruptcy time is determined by the contract).
As in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), the manager has multiplicatively separable CARA
preferences as specified in (1.9), and the firm’s earnings flow evolves as a Gaussian process, as
specified in (1.1). Following Gibbons and Murphy (1992), therefore, we restrict consideration
to contracts in which the manager’s compensation in each period has the affine form
cMi =
cash compensation︷︸︸︷
ai +
equity compensation︷ ︸︸ ︷
bi(1− τ)(Qi+1 − d), i < Tb. (1.11)
The component ai of the manager’s compensation is determined at the beginning of period
[i, i+1] and could, therefore, be interpreted as her cash compensation for the period. The sec-
ond component bi(1−τ)(Qi+1−d) of the manager’s compensation is contingent on the firm’s
earnings Qi+1 that are realized at the end of the period and could, therefore, be interpreted
as her equity compensation. We express the manager’s compensation in terms of the earnings
net of interest payments and taxes because it clarifies our subsequent implementation of the
manager’s contract through financial securities.
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By (1.11), a feasible contract for the manager can be described by the quadruple
(a, b, η, k) where a is the manager’s cash compensation process, b determines her equity
compensation over time, η is her effort process, and k is the capital investment process.
1.3.4 Incentive Feasible Contracts
In any period [i, i+ 1] for i < Tb, the after-tax earnings flow is
cAi = (1− τ)Qi+1 + τd. (1.12)
The payoff to bondholders during the period is the long-term debt coupon payment
cDi = d. (1.13)
The total payoff to the blockholder and shareholders is the after-tax earnings net of payments
to the manager as well as bondholders.
cSi = c
A
i − cMi − cDi . (1.14)
We now describe the constraints that must be satisfied by incentive feasible contracts.
At any date i < Tb, the manager’s conditional expected utility from a contract Γ = (a, b, η, k)
is
M(i) := EMi
[
− exp
(
− λ
( Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(cMj − kηγj )
))]
, (1.15)
where EMi denotes the expectation with respect to the manager’s beliefs at date i.
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The manager’s contract must be incentive compatible, that is, it must be optimal for
the manager to exert the effort η specified by the contract given her compensation structure.
Therefore,
η = arg max
η′
EMi
[
− exp
(
− λ
( Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(cMj − κη
′
j
γ
)
))]
. (1.16)
The contract must also satisfy the manager’s participation constraint in each period. Let
φ > 0 denote the manager’s reservation wage in each period, which could also be interpreted
as a measure of the manager’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the blockholder. The contract
(a, b, η, k) is feasible if and only if the manager’s continuation expected utility at each date
i is at least as great as her continuation expected utility if she received the payoff φ in each
period, that is,
EMi
[
− exp
(
− λ
( Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(cMj − κηjγ)
))]
≥ EMi
[
− exp
(
− λ
( Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)φ
))]
, ∀i < Tb. (1.17)
1.3.5 Financing and Contract Choices
The firm’s shareholders are competitive, while the blockholder enjoys significant bar-
gaining power vis-a-vis the manager that allows it to extract additional pecuniary private
benefits that are not enjoyed by shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). As mentioned
earlier, major decisions such as capital structure and managerial contract choices must be
approved by a firm’s board of directors. Due to their significant equity stakes, large share-
holders have substantial bargaining power and representation on corporate boards (Shleifer
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and Vishny (1997)). Accordingly, the firm’s capital structure and the manager’s contract are
chosen to maximize the blockholder’s value, while ensuring that the competitive shareholders
receive fair returns on their capital investments.
We now describe the division of earnings between the blockholder and shareholders.
The total after-tax payout flow to the blockholder and shareholders in any period [i, i + 1]
is cSi given by (1.14). Let c
B
i and c
E
i denote the payout flows to the blockholder and the
shareholders, respectively, over the period so that
cSi = c
B
i + c
E
i . (1.18)
By (1.1), the firm’s total earnings flow in the absence of any actions by the manager
is simply the base earnings flow. By (1.8) and (1.12), therefore, the after-tax payout flow
without any actions by the manager over period [i, i+1] is (1−τ)(1−ν)(Θ+Ni+1)+τd. After
the long-term debt coupon payment is made, the after-tax payout flow to the blockholder
and shareholders without any actions by the manager is (1−τ)
(
(1−ν)(Θ+Ni+1)−d
)
. Since
shareholders are competitive, the blockholder and the manager share the surplus generated
by the manager, that is, the firm’s discretionary earnings. In other words, only the base
earnings flow is “pledgeable” to shareholders. Given that shareholders hold an equity stake
1 − g, while the blockholder holds a stake g, the payout flows to shareholders must satisfy
the following constraints at each date i :
ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)cEj
]
≥ (1− g)ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)
(
kj + (1− τ)
(
(1− ν)(Θ +Nj+1)− d
))]
.
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The above can be rewritten as follows:
public equity value︷ ︸︸ ︷
ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)
(
cEj − (1− g)kj
)] ≥ (1−g)
present value of after-tax base earnings flow︷ ︸︸ ︷
ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(1− τ)
(
(1− ν)(Θ +Nj+1)− d
)]
.
(1.19)
As indicated above, the payout flow must compensate shareholders for their share (1−g)kj of
the capital investment, kj. By (1.18), the blockholder obtains the firm’s remaining earnings
net of the manager’s contractual compensation payments. Because it holds an equity stake
g, the blockholder obtains (in expectation) a proportion g of the base earnings flow plus a
portion of the discretionary earnings. The latter component of the payout flow constitutes
the private benefits that accrue to the blockholder, which cause block equity to trade at a
premium relative to public equity (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
The blockholder chooses the firm’s long-term debt at date zero and the manager’s
contract to maximize its value. The long-term debt value, LD(0), blockholder value, B(0),
and public equity value, E(0), at date zero are respectively given by
Long-Term Debt Value = LD(0) = ES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ricDi + e
−rTbLD(Tb)
]
. (1.20)
Blockholder Value = B(0)
=
share of proceeds from long-term debt issuance︷ ︸︸ ︷
gLD(0) −
share of initial investment︷︸︸︷
gK
+
NPV of payout flows net of periodic investments︷ ︸︸ ︷
ES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri(cBi − gki)
]
(1.21)
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Public Equity Value = E(0)
=
share of proceeds from long-term debt issuance︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− g)LD(0) −
share of initial investment︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− g)K
+
NPV of payout flows net of periodic investments︷ ︸︸ ︷
ES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri(cEi − (1− g)ki)
]
(1.22)
The block and public equity values include their respective shares of the surplus generated
from financing the project at date zero. The right hand sides of the expressions (1.21) and
(1.22) for the block equity and public equity values, respectively, incorporate their respective
shares of the initial and subsequent capital investments.
The optimal long-term debt coupon, d∗, and the manager’s contract, Γ∗, maximize the
block equity value:
(d∗,Γ∗) = arg max
(d,Γ)
B(0). (1.23)
1.4 Managerial Contract and Capital Structure
We proceed in two steps. In step one, for a given long-term debt structure d, we derive
the manager’s optimal contract, which specifies the manager’s effort choices, the incremental
capital investments by equity holders, payoffs to both parties, and the bankruptcy time. In
step two, we derive the optimal choice of long-term debt d∗.
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1.4.1 Optimal Contract for a Given Long-Term Debt Structure
The following proposition characterizes the manager’s optimal contract for a given long-
term debt structure d.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Contract)
In any period [i, i+ 1] for i < Tb, the manager’s optimal contract for a given long-term debt
structure d is characterized as follows:
(a) The manager’s pay-performance sensitivity, b∗i , solves
max
bi≥0
Fi(bi), (1.24)
where
Fi(bi)= (1− τ)(1− ν)∆ibi − 0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b2i +
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k(bi).
(1.25)
(b) The incremental capital investment is
k∗i = k(b
∗
i ) =
[
αγ
γ − βψ(b
∗
i )
] γ−β
(1−α)γ−β
, (1.26)
where
ψ(b∗i )=
(
A(1− τ)(1− ν)) γγ−β(1
κ
) β
γ−β
(βb∗i
γ
) β
γ−β
(
1− βb
∗
i
γ
)
.
xlii
(c) The manager’s effort is
η∗i = η(b
∗
i , k
∗
i ) =
[
A(1− τ)(1− ν)βk∗i αb∗i
γκ
] 1
γ−β
. (1.27)
(d) The manager’s cash compensation is
a∗i = a(b
∗
i , k
∗
i , η
∗
i ) = φ+ κ(η
∗
i )
γ + 0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(b∗i )2(σ2i + s2)
−b∗i (1− τ)
[
(1− ν) (µMi + A(k∗i )α(η∗i )β)− d] . (1.28)
(e) The endogenous bankruptcy time solves the following optimal stopping problem:
Tb = arg max
t≤T
ES0
[
t−1∑
j=0
e−rj
(
(1− τ) ((1− ν)µSj − d) )
]
, (1.29)
where the maximization is over all {Fi}-stopping times t ≤ T .
(f) The public equity value and blockholder value are, respectively,
E(0) = (1− g)(LD(0)−K) + (1− g)ES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri
(
(1− τ)
(
(1− ν)µSi − d
))]
,
(1.30)
B(0) =
market value of equity stake︷ ︸︸ ︷
g
1− gE(0) +
NPV of private benefits︷ ︸︸ ︷
ES0
[ Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri(Fi(b∗i )− φ)
]
. (1.31)
Proof. See Appendix A
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Given the manager’s and investors’ beliefs about the project’s quality, N(µMi , σ
2
i ) and
N(µSi , σ
2
i ), respectively, and conditional upon the firm’s solvency at the beginning of period
[i, i + 1], the optimal contractual parameters for this period, (a∗i , b
∗
i , η
∗
i , k
∗
i ), are described
in Proposition 1. The equilibrium values for the pay-performance sensitivity, effort, and
investment at each point in time are deterministic. The cash component of the manager’s
compensation a∗i is, however, stochastic and depends on the firm’s earnings history through
its effect on the manager’s posterior mean assessment µMi of the project’s quality.
Comparing (1.30) and (1.31), we see that the block equity value is the sum of two
components. The first component is the present value of the payout flows to the blockholder
from its equity stake in the firm. We refer to this component as the “outside” or market
value of the blockholder’s equity stake because this is what the blockholder would receive if
it were to sell its stake to dispersed atomistic buyers. The second is the present value of the
private benefits that accrue to the blockholder, but not to shareholders.
In (1.24) and (1.25), the optimal pay-performance sensitivity in each period maximizes
an objective function that has three components; the rents from managerial optimism, the
costs of risk-sharing, and the return on investment:
b∗i = arg max
bi≥0
Fi(bi) =
rents from managerial optimism︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− τ)(1− ν)∆ibi −
costs of risk-sharing︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b2i +
return on investment︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k(bi).
(1.32)
The following proposition describes the effects of optimism and risk on the manager’s optimal
pay-performance sensitivity at any date.
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Proposition 2 (Optimism, Risk, and Incentives)
(a) The manager’s optimal pay-performance sensitivity b∗i at each date i < Tb increases
with the initial degree of managerial optimism ∆0.
(b) The manager’s optimal pay-performance sensitivity b∗i at each date i < Tb declines
with the initial transient risk σ20.
(c) The manager’s optimal pay-performance sensitivity also declines with the intrinsic
risk s2, provided that ∆0 ≤ 2λ(1 − τ)(1 − ν)(σ20 + s2). Otherwise, the manager’s optimal
pay-performance sensitivity could vary non-monotonically with the intrinsic risk.
Proof. See Appendix A
Because the manager is optimistic, she overvalues the firm’s future earnings relative
to investors. Consequently, as the degree of managerial optimism increases, the extent to
which she overvalues the performance-sensitive component of her compensation increases.
The optimal contract exploits this by increasing the performance-sensitive component of the
manager’s compensation, that is, her pay-performance sensitivity.
An increase in the initial transient risk or the intrinsic risk increases the costs of risk-
sharing; the second component of the objective function in (1.32). It follows from (1.7),
however, that the intrinsic and transient risks also affect the degree of managerial optimism,
∆i, at each date i and, thereby, the rents from managerial optimism; the first component of
the objective function in (1.32).
By (1.7), an increase in the initial transient risk lowers the degree of managerial optimism
because it increases the “signal to noise ratio” so that the manager learns more quickly. Both
the effect of increasing the costs of risk-sharing and that of lowering the rents from managerial
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optimism lower the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity. Consequently, the manager’s pay-
performance sensitivity declines with the initial transient risk. An increase in the intrinsic
risk, however, increases the degree of managerial optimism at each date because it decreases
the signal to noise ratio so that the manager learns more slowly. If the degree of managerial
optimism is below a threshold, the increase in the costs of risk-sharing with the intrinsic
risk dominates so that the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity declines. If the degree of
managerial optimism is above the threshold, however, the interplay between the rents from
managerial optimism and the costs of risk-sharing causes the pay-performance sensitivity to
vary in a complex, non-monotonic manner with the intrinsic risk. In our calibration of the
model in Section 1.6, the baseline level of managerial optimism is below the threshold so
that the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity also declines with the intrinsic risk.
We later implement the performance-sensitive component of the manager’s compensa-
tion through an inside equity stake. In our implementation, the results of Proposition 2
directly translate to the effects of optimism and risk on the manager’s inside equity stake.
1.4.2 Bankruptcy Time
The following proposition shows that bankruptcy occurs in any period if and only if
shareholders’ mean posterior assessment of the project’s intrinsic quality falls below an en-
dogenous trigger.
Proposition 3 (Bankruptcy Time)
There exists a trigger µ∗i for i = 0, ..., T − 1 such that bankruptcy occurs at date i if and
only if µSi ≤ µ∗i .
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Proof. See Appendix A.
As in Leland (1994), bankruptcy occurs when the public equity value falls to zero.
As one would intuitively expect, the public equity value increases with shareholders’ mean
posterior assessment of the project’s quality. Consequently, bankruptcy occurs if and only if
shareholders’ mean posterior assessment is sufficiently low.
The following proposition describes the effects of project characteristics—shareholders’
initial mean assessment of project quality or the project’s expected profitability, the intrinsic
risk, and the transient risk—on the timing of bankruptcy.
Proposition 4 (Project Characteristics and Bankruptcy)
The bankruptcy time Tb increases with shareholders’ initial mean assessment of the project’s
intrinsic quality µS0 , increases with the initial transient risk σ
2
0, and decreases with the in-
trinsic risk s2.
Proof. See Appendix A
The bankruptcy time maximizes the public equity value, which depends on shareholders’
beliefs. An increase in shareholders’ initial mean assessment of the project’s intrinsic quality
also increases their posterior assessment in each subsequent period and, therefore, the public
equity value at each date. Accordingly, an increase in shareholders’ initial mean assessment
reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy.
The two types of risk have opposite effects on the evolution of shareholders’ mean
assessments of the project’s intrinsic quality, and, therefore, the bankruptcy time. More
precisely, by (1.5) and (1.6), the variance of the evolution of shareholders’ mean assessments
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over period [i, i+ 1] is
(σµi )
2 := V ari[µ
S
i+1 − µSi ] =
s2
[(s/σ0)2 + i+ 1][(s/σ0)2 + i]
. (1.33)
By (1.33), we see that an increase in the initial transient risk increases the variance of
the evolution of the mean assessments of the project’s intrinsic quality. Roughly, an increase
in the initial transient risk increases the “signal to noise ratio” so that intermediate signals
are more informative about the project’s quality. Since the public equity value is convex in
shareholders’ mean assessments of the project’s quality, an increase in the initial transient risk
increases the “option value” of continuing to service debt payments and delaying bankruptcy.
On the other hand, we also see by (1.33) that the intrinsic risk decreases the variance of
the evolution of mean assessments of project quality because it decreases the signal to noise
ratio so that intermediate signals are less informative. Hence an increase in the intrinsic risk
decreases the option value of delaying the firm’s bankruptcy.
As we show later, the differing effects of the intrinsic and transient risks on the likelihood
of bankruptcy cause them to have sharply contrasting effects on the firm’s capital structure.
1.4.3 Optimal Long-Term Debt Structure
The optimal long-term debt structure d∗ solves (1.23), where the manager’s contractual
parameters for a given debt structure are described by Proposition 1. As a closed-form
analytical characterization of the long-term debt structure is not available, we numerically
derive it in Section 1.6.
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As shown by (1.23), the optimal long-term debt structure maximizes the blockholder
value at date zero. The first component of the blockholder value—the market value of
the blockholder’s stake—depends only on the public equity value, E(0). The second is the
present value of the blockholder’s private benefits flow. By (1.29), the bankruptcy time does
not depend on the manager’s beliefs or actions. For a given long-term debt structure d, the
market value of debt at date zero—the net present value of coupon payments to debtholders
plus the bankruptcy payoff—is also unaffected by the manager’s beliefs or actions because
the bankruptcy time and bondholders’ bankruptcy payoff only depend on the firm’s base
earnings flow and the beliefs of investors (see (1.10) and Proposition 3). Consequently,
it follows from (1.30) that the public equity value at date zero does not depend on the
manager’s actions. The manager’s actions only affect the NPV of the blockholder’s private
benefits through the term Fi(b
∗
i ) (see (1.25)).
As in standard dynamic tradeoff models of capital structure, the firm has an incentive
to issue long-term debt because of the presence of tax shields on debt coupon payments. By
(1.30), debt tax shields only affect the market value of the blockholder’s stake. The NPV
of the blockholder’s private benefits is negatively affected by long-term debt because of the
possibility of bankruptcy. In choosing the firm’s long-term debt, the blockholder trades off
the potentially positive effect of long-term debt on the market value of its stake due to debt
tax shields against its negative effect on the NPV of its private benefits flow due to the
possibility of bankruptcy. If the blockholder’s equity stake g is significantly less than one (as
is typically the case in publicly traded corporations), the incentive to issue long-term debt
is much lower because the blockholder does not internalize the positive effects of debt tax
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shields on all shareholders. In contrast, in traditional dynamic tradeoff models (e.g. Leland
(1994)), long-term debt maximizes total shareholder value. The fact that the blockholder
drives capital structure decisions, therefore, leads to significantly lower long-term debt levels
that are consistent with those observed in reality. The incorporation of blockholders in the
model, therefore, plays an important role in its calibration to data.
1.4.4 Implementation of Manager’s Contract and Dynamic Capital Struc-
ture
As in studies such as DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and Bhagat et al. (2011), we imple-
ment the manager’s contract through financial securities. By (1.8), (1.13), and Proposition 1,
we can rewrite the manager’s compensation payment in any pre-bankruptcy period [i, i+ 1],
(1.11), as
cMi = b
∗
i
[
cTOTi − cDi − cSDi
]
, (1.34)
where
cTOTi = (1− τ)Ei+1 + τd∗, cDi = d∗,
cSDi = (1− τ)νEi+1 − a¯i, and a¯i = a∗i /b∗i . (1.35)
In the above, Ei+1 is the firm’s total earnings flow over the period described by (1.1). In
(1.34), cTOTi is the firm’s total after-tax earnings from the project, c
D
i is the long-term
debt coupon payment, and cSDi represents the firm’s total short-term debt payments over
the period. Note that, by (1.35), the total payout flow to short-term debt cSDi reflects the
lfinancing of the firm’s working capital and the manager’s cash compensation. In other words,
consistent with what we observe in reality, short-term debt reflects the financing of working
capital requirements (inventories, accounts receivable and payable, employee wages, etc.)
and the cash compensation of the manager (more generally, insiders).
By the above discussion, the expression cTOTi − cDi − cSDi in (1.34) represents the total
payout flow to all equity holders—the blockholder and shareholders—over the period. Since
the manager’s compensation is a proportion b∗i of the total payout flow to equity in (1.34),
her compensation contract is implemented through an inside equity stake, b∗i (that evolves
over time), and dynamic short-term lending or borrowing represented by the short-term debt
payments cSDi . In this implementation, the values of long-term debt, short-term debt and
outside equity (the value of total equity less the manager’s stake) at any date i < Tb are as
follows:
Long-Term Debt Value,LD(i) = ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)cDj + e
−r(Tb−i)LD(Tb)
]
,
Short-Term Debt Value,SD(i) = ESi
[
cSDi
]
,
Outside Equity Value,S(i) =
blockholder value︷︸︸︷
B(i) +
public equity value︷︸︸︷
E(i)
= ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(1− b∗j)
(
cTOTj − cDj − cSDj
)]
.(1.36)
As indicated above, the equity value above is the sum of the blockholder and public
equity values. The above-described implementation of the manager’s contract through fi-
nancial securities leads to a dynamic capital structure for the firm that comprise of inside
li
equity, outside equity, long-term debt, and dynamic short-term (risk-free) debt that reflects
the financing of the firm’s working capital and the manager’s cash compensation. As in
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), the implementation of the manager’s contract is not unique.
Similar to their study, the above implementation is intuitive and also captures the main
components of financial structure in the real world: long-term debt, short-term debt, inside
equity and outside equity, where outside equity includes block equity and public, dispersed
equity held by small shareholders.
1.5 Asymmetric Beliefs, Risk-Sharing, and Capital Structure
In this section, we analytically explore some properties of the firm’s capital structure
that is described in Section 1.4.4. Given that the focus of this paper is on the impact of
asymmetric beliefs on capital structure, the effects of key underlying parameters—the degree
of managerial optimism, intrinsic risk, and transient risk—on the manager’s cash and equity
compensation are specifically pertinent to our analysis. By (1.34), the manager’s inside eq-
uity stake at any date is her pay-performance sensitivity. Proposition 2, therefore, describes
the effects of optimism and project risks on the equity component of the manager’s com-
pensation. The manager’s cash compensation (and, therefore, the firm’s short-term debt)
described in (1.28) cannot be unambiguously characterized analytically because conflicting
effects could cause it to vary non-monotonically (in general) with the underlying parame-
ters. We calibrate the model to data in Section 1.6 to obtain quantitative assessments of
these potentially conflicting forces. Our numerical analysis of the calibrated model yields
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clear predictions for the variations of the manager’s cash compensation with the underlying
parameters.
The following proposition analytically describes the effects of managerial optimism on
long-term debt.
Proposition 5 (Optimism and Long-Term Debt)
Long-term debt declines with the initial degree of managerial optimism ∆0.
Proof. See Appendix A
As discussed in Section 1.4.3, the manager’s beliefs and actions only affect the second
component of blockholder value in (1.31); the NPV of its private benefits. As shown by
Proposition 2, an increase in managerial optimism increases the power of incentives that
can be provided to the manager and, therefore, the discretionary earnings she generates in
each period. The blockholder’s private benefits increase with discretionary earnings. At
the margin, therefore, as managerial optimism increases, the blockholder assigns relatively
more weight to the value of its private benefits than the market value of its equity stake
in choosing the firm’s long-term debt. Consequently, an increase in managerial optimism
induces the blockholder to choose lower long-term debt to lower the likelihood of bankruptcy
and, thereby, increase the value of its private benefits.
The effects of intrinsic and transient risks on long-term debt are ambiguous for gen-
eral parameter values. As shown in Proposition 4, these risks have opposing effects on the
option value of continuing to service long-term debt coupon payments and, therefore, the
bankruptcy time. Moreover, these risks also affect the manager’s incentives, the discretionary
earnings she generates in each period and, therefore, the blockholder’s private benefits. Be-
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cause the interactions between these forces are complex, an analytical characterization of
their net effects for general parameter values cannot be obtained. We numerically explore
the effects of the intrinsic and transient risks after calibrating the model to data in the next
section.
1.6 Numerical Analysis
The key parameters of the model—the degree of managerial optimism, the expected
profitability, the intrinsic risk, the transient risk, and the technology parameters—are com-
parable across firms in the same industry, but are likely to vary significantly across industries.
Consequently, it is more appropriate to calibrate the model “industry by industry.” Although
we have calibrated the model to several industries, we report the results for three representa-
tive industries—food, software, and entertainment—where the model parameters are likely
to vary significantly.
1.6.1 Model Calibration
Basic Economic Parameter Values: We set the risk-free rate r to 4.65% and the effective
corporate tax rate τ to 0.15, which is consistent with the estimates of Graham (2000).3 The
time horizon T is set to 10 years and the length of each period is one year.
Calibration Strategy: Table 1.1 lists the remaining parameters of the model that we group
into “technology,” “belief,” “preference,” and “other” categories. We calibrate the baseline
values of these parameters by matching key relevant moments predicted by the model to
3An “effective” corporate tax rate of 0.15 also incorporates the effects of personal taxes that are not
explicitly modeled in our framework.
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Table 1.1. Parameters of the Model
Parameters Description
A total factor productivity
Technology Parameters α the share of capital in production
s the intrinsic risk
µS0 investors’ initial mean assessment of project quality
Belief Parameters ∆0 the degree of asymmetric beliefs (managerial optimism)
σ0 the initial transient risk
λ the manager’s risk aversion
Preference Parameters κ; γ/β the manager’s disutility of effort parameters
φ the manager’s reservation wage
ν the sensitivity of working capital to total earnings
Other Parameters ρ the proportion of bankruptcy cost
g the blockholder’s equity stake
their corresponding values in the data. Appendix B describes the numerical implementation
of the model and the calibration procedure in detail.
It is likely that “new” or “young” firms are more likely to be characterized by asymmetric
beliefs about their prospects. Accordingly, we calibrate the model using data for a sample of
firms within three years of their initial public offerings (IPOs). We construct separate empir-
ical samples for the three representative industries—food, software, and entertainment—and
calibrate our model separately to each sample.
Given the focus of our study, we calibrate the model to match moments of the capital
structure distribution of young firms in each industry. Specifically, for a candidate set of
parameter values, we simulate the distributions of (i) the ratio of long-term debt value to asset
value, (ii) the ratio of short-term debt value to asset value, and (iii) the ratio of firm value to
asset value. The moments that we aim to match are the quintiles of the distributions of the
long-term debt to asset value ratio, short-term debt to asset value ratio, and the firm value
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to asset value ratio. The baseline parameter values are those that minimize the “distance”
between the model-predicted and empirical moments (see Appendix B).
Definitions of the Statistics: We now define the model proxies for the statistics that we
use in our calibration. Our proxy for the asset value is the value of the hypothetically un-
levered (all-equity) firm in the absence of the manager’s human capital inputs. Consequently,
the asset value at any date i, AV(i), is the present value (with respect to investors’ beliefs)
of the stream of the firm’s base earnings net of corporate taxes, that is,
AV(i) = ESi
[
T−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)(1− τ)(Θ +Nj+1)
]
. (1.37)
We set the initial investment outlay K to the asset value at date zero.
We define the long-term debt and short-term debt values at any date i by the first and
second equations in (1.36). We define the firm value at any date i < Tb, FV(i), as the sum of
the present value of the stream of the total after-tax earnings from the project cTOTi , which
is specified in (1.35), and the present value of the bankruptcy payoff to bondholders, that is,
FV(i) = ESi
[(
Tb−1∑
j=i
e−r(j−i)cTOTj
)
+ e−r(Tb−i)LD(Tb)
]
. (1.38)
By (1.10), the total payoff to bondholders upon bankruptcy LD(Tb) is equal to a fraction
(1− ρ) of the asset value at that date, AV(Tb).
Data Description: We obtain firm-year observations over the period 1992-2009 from the
Standard and Poor’s Compustat Fundamentals Annual database except for those with miss-
ing variables or with nonpositive assets or investment. As mentioned earlier, we construct
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separate samples of firms within three years of their IPOs in the food, software, and enter-
tainment industries.4
We use Compustat item DLTT and CAPXV for long-term debt and investment and
calculate short-term debt as debt in current liabilities (item DLC ) minus debt due in one
year (item DD1 ) minus cash (item CHE ). We measure firm value by the sum of equity value,
which is the closing stock price (item PRCCF ) multiplied by the number of common shares
outstanding (item CSHO), and total debt value, which is long-term debt (item DLTT ) plus
debt in current liabilities (item DLC ) minus cash (item CHE ). These variables are all divided
by asset value (item AT ) to eliminate scale differences between firms and then winsorized at
the respective 2nd and 98th percentiles. Table 1.2 shows that there are substantial differences
in the values of the statistics across the three industries. In particular, software firms typically
have lower debt ratios and higher firm value ratios than firms in the other two industries.
Baseline Parameter Values: We calibrate the baseline values of the model parameters
listed in Table 1.1 by matching the observed and model-predicted moments as closely as
possible. Table 1.2 (Panels A, B and C) compares the observed values with the predicted
values of the statistics for the different industries. The model is able to match the observed
statistics reasonably well. We report the baseline values of the parameters in Table 1.3.
The calibrated parameters suggest that managers are significantly optimistic relative
to investors in the three industries. It is worth noting that the relative level of managerial
optimism (compared to the expected profitability µS0 by outside investors) is higher in the
software and entertainment industries as one would expect from anecdotal evidence.
4We use the Fama-French 48-industry classification to obtain the separate samples.
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Table 1.2. Observed and Predicted Statistics for the Food, Software, and Entertainment Industries
The table displays our calibration results for three samples of firms that belong to the food, software, and entertainment industries, respectively. Each sample consists
of the observations within 3 years of their IPO from the Compustat database. Their long-term and short-term debt values and firm value are scaled by asset value and
winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. We use the quintiles of these ratios, denoted by Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5, as the moments to be matched in the calibration.
Panel A: Food Industry
Long-term Debt Ratio Short-term Debt Ratio Firm Value Ratio
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Observed 0.0264 0.1456 0.2394 0.3913 0.7172 -0.1770 -0.0333 -0.0072 0.0228 0.2101 0.7288 0.9443 1.3261 1.7970 5.4598
Predicted 0.0222 0.0432 0.3744 0.4477 0.6658 -0.1497 -0.0433 -0.0067 0 0 0.4477 1.1700 1.2992 1.6611 6.0539
Panel B: Software Industry
Long-term Debt Ratio Short-term Debt Ratio Firm Value Ratio
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Observed 0 0 0.0043 0.0384 0.6238 -0.6972 -0.5357 -0.3633 -0.1592 0.2581 0.6131 1.3749 2.4884 4.8699 24.0403
Predicted 0.0012 0.0018 0.0034 0.0522 0.3401 -0.9254 -0.4213 -0.2576 -0.1687 0 1.4817 1.7028 2.0724 3.2538 23.7778
Panel C: Entertainment Industry
Long-term Debt Ratio Short-term Debt Ratio Firm Value Ratio
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Observed 0.0066 0.0705 0.2571 0.4751 0.9710 -0.2731 -0.1145 -0.0445 -0.0145 0.7308 0.7212 1.0730 1.6107 2.9274 11.1078
Predicted 0.0070 0.0144 0.2576 0.5528 0.5782 -0.2740 -0.0931 -0.0353 0 0 0.5528 1.1932 1.3548 1.8095 9.06105
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Table 1.3. Baseline Parameter Values for the Food, Software, and Entertainment Industries
Panel A: Food Industry
Technology Parameters Belief Parameters Preference Parameters Other Parameters
A α s µS0 ∆0 σ0 λ κ γ/β φ ν ρ g
85.552 0.358 66.209 68.437 256.779 103.539 1.625 83.669 5.708 21.673 0.005 0.552 0.466
Panel B: Software Industry
A α s µS0 ∆0 σ0 λ κ γ/β φ ν ρ g
569.190 0.132 51.537 223.541 964.185 110.332 12.436 42.643 21.169 80.451 -0.002 0.660 0.494
Panel C: Entertainment Industry
A α s µS0 ∆0 σ0 λ κ γ/β φ ν ρ g
85.720 0.358 70.144 54.293 310.431 91.363 2.046 70.332 5.697 25.905 0.013 0.447 0.452
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To compare the relative levels of managerial optimism across the three industries, we
compute the “market to book ratio” under the manager’s beliefs and under the investors’
beliefs, respectively, for each of the industries. More precisely, we compute the firm value
at date zero, as specified in (1.38), under the manager’s and investors’ beliefs, respectively.
We then divide each by the initial investment outlay which is assumed to be the asset value
under investors’ beliefs at date zero. We observe that the average manager in the sample of
young firms in the food industry overestimates the “market to book ratio” by 159% relative
to investors. In contrast, the average managers in the sample of young firms in the software
and the entertainment industries overestimate the market to book ratio by 175% and by
211%, respectively. We also find that the ratios of the baseline value of the initial transient
risk to that of the intrinsic risk for the food and the entertainment industries are 2.45 and
1.70 respectively, while the ratio is 4.58 for the software industry, which suggests that there is
more significant uncertainty about project quality for software firms. Further, as one would
expect from anecdotal evidence, the total factor productivity and the reservation wage of
managers are higher for software firms.
1.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We now explore the effects of managerial optimism ∆0, the transient risk σ
2
0, the intrinsic
risk s2, and investors’ initial mean assessments µS0 (or the expected profitability of the
project) on capital structure by varying these parameters about their baseline values for
each of the industries. We investigate the effects of varying these parameters on the median
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values of the long-term debt ratio, short-term debt ratio, and the inside equity stake that
we calculate by simulating the model over 3 years as described in Appendix B.
Effects of Managerial Optimism: Figure 1.1 (Panels A, B and C) displays the variations
of the median values of the long-term debt ratio and the short-term debt ratio with the initial
degree of managerial optimism ∆0 for the three industries. Consistent with Proposition 5,
long-term debt declines with the degree of optimism. By contrast, the short-term debt ratio
increases with managerial optimism. Interestingly, while the qualitative effects of managerial
optimism are similar for the two industries, the quantitative effects are very different. Long-
term debt declines only slightly with managerial optimism in the software industry, but
declines significantly in the food and entertainment industries.
To understand the effects of optimism on short-term debt, consider the definition of
short-term debt in (1.35). By Proposition 2, an increase in managerial optimism increases
the manager’s inside equity stake in each period that, in turn, lowers her cash compensation
relative to her equity compensation. Second, because the manager receives more powerful
incentives and thus exerts greater effort, the firm’s discretionary earnings increase so that
the short-term debt payments associated with its working capital requirements increase.
Consequently, short-term debt increases with managerial optimism. In unreported results,
we also find that outside equity declines with managerial optimism, while the leverage ratio
increases.
Our results are broadly consistent with empirical evidence. Landier and Thesmar (2009)
empirically show that more optimistic managers prefer short-term debt over long-term debt.
Using various measures of agreement about project payoffs between managers and investors,
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Dittmar and Thakor (2007) find that managers tend to use debt rather than equity in the
presence of disagreement.
Effects of Transient Risk and Intrinsic Risk: Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the effects of
the initial transient risk and the intrinsic risk on capital structure in the two industries.
The figures show that the two risks have contrasting effects on long-term debt and short-
term debt. Long-term debt varies non-monotonically in a U-shaped manner with transient
risk, but increases with intrinsic risk. Short-term debt increases with the transient risk, but
decreases with the intrinsic risk.
The intuition for the contrasting effects of the project’s intrinsic and transient risks on
long-term debt hinges on their differing effects on the probability of bankruptcy. As shown
by Proposition 4, the transient risk lowers the probability of bankruptcy and, thereby, has
a positive impact on the present value of blockholders’ private benefits. An increase in the
transient risk, however, also increases the costs of risk-sharing and lowers the discretionary
earnings the manager generates in each period, which negatively affects the blockholders’
private benefits. At low transient risk levels, the “bankruptcy” effect dominates the “risk-
sharing” effect so that blockholders choose lower long-term debt to increase the value of their
private benefits. At high transient risk levels, the costs of risk-sharing are so high that the
value of blockholders’ private benefits is very low. Consequently, they increase long-term
debt to exploit its tax advantages. An increase in the intrinsic risk, however, increases the
costs of risk-sharing and also hastens bankruptcy by Proposition 4. Both of these effects
work in the same direction to lower the value of blockholders’ private benefits. Consequently,
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the marginal impact of blockholders’ private benefits on their long-term choice is lowered so
that they choose greater long-term debt to exploit debt tax shields.
The intuition for the contrasting effects of the transient and intrinsic risks on short-term
debt is as follows. An increase in the intrinsic risk increases the probability of bankruptcy.
It also increases the costs of risk-sharing and, therefore, the manager’s cash compensation
relative to her equity compensation. Both forces have a negative impact on the short-term
debt value. An increase in transient risk, however, lowers the probability of bankruptcy that
has a positive impact on the short-term debt value. Consequently, short-term debt increases
with the transient risk.
To the best of our knowledge, the contrasting effects of the intrinsic and transient risks
on long-term debt and short-term debt are novel implications of our study that have not
been explored by previous studies that examine the effects of asymmetric beliefs on capital
structure.
Effects of Expected Profitability: Figure 1.4 shows the effects of investors’ initial mean
assessment of the project’s profitability µS0 on the firm’s capital structure. We see from
the figure that long-term debt increases with the expected profitability, but the effect on
short-term debt varies by industry. Further, the impact on long-term debt is relatively more
pronounced than that on short-term debt.
The effects of the expected profitability on blockholders’ long-term debt choice are
subtle because it affects both components of blockholder value in (1.31). An increase in the
expected profitability increases the public equity value and, therefore, the first component of
blockholder value. However, an increase in the expected profitability also delays bankruptcy
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Figure 1.1. Effects of Managerial Optimism
Figure 1.2. Effects of Transient Risk
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Figure 1.3. Effects of Intrinsic Risk
Figure 1.4. Effects of Expected Profitability
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by Proposition 4 and, therefore, also increases the second component. For the calibrated
model, the former effect dominates the latter. Blockholders, therefore, chooses greater long-
term debt to increase the market value of their equity stake.
An increase in the expected profitability increases the firm’s expected base earnings and,
therefore, the firm’s working capital requirements. As mentioned above, a higher expected
profitability also lowers the probability of bankruptcy. However, since short-term debt is also
negatively affected by the long-term debt coupon payment, the effect of slightly decreasing
the firm’s short-term debt is observed for the food industry.
1.7 Conclusion
We examine the effects of heterogeneous beliefs on capital structure in a dynamic frame-
work. The manager of a firm that has large and small shareholders receives dynamic incen-
tives through explicit contracts. Managers and investors have imperfect information and
differing beliefs about the project’s profitability. We derive the manager’s contracts and
implement them through financial securities, which leads to a dynamic capital structure
that reflects the effects of external imperfections arising from taxes and bankruptcy costs
as well as internal imperfections arising from asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts. The
theoretical and numerical analyses of the model generate novel testable implications that
link project characteristics—the degree of managerial optimism, intrinsic risk, transient risk,
and expected profitability—to different components of capital structure. In particular, our
results show that managerial optimism has contrasting effects on long-term debt and short-
term debt. The intrinsic and transient risks have conflicting effects on debt structure. The
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interplay among imperfect information, asymmetric beliefs, and agency conflicts plays a
central role in generating these predictions.
We calibrate the model parameters to different industries. While the qualitative effects
of optimism and risk on capital structure are similar across industries, their quantitative
effects are significantly different Broadly, our study shows that asymmetric beliefs are impor-
tant determinants of firms’ financial policies and could potentially reconcile the substantial
inter-industry variation in capital structure observed in the data.
1.8 Appendix A: Proofs
1.8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We use backward induction to solve the manager’s optimal contracting problem for a
given long-term debt structure d. We normalize the interest rate to zero to simplify notation
in this proof as well as subsequent proofs.
We first derive the optimal contractual parameters in period [T − 1, T ]. Suppose that
the firm is solvent as of date i = T − 1. The manager’s conditional expected utility derived
from her compensation including her disutility of effort over this period is
M(i) := EMi
[
− exp
(
− λ(cMi − κηγi ))] = − exp(− λΛ (ai, bi, ki, ηi)), (1.39)
where
Λ(ai, bi, ki, ηi) = ai+(1−τ)(1−ν)
(
µMi + Ak
α
i η
β
i
)
bi−κηγi −(1−τ)dbi−0.5λ(1−τ)2(1−ν)2(σ2i +s2)b2i .
(1.40)
Equations (1.39) and (1.40) are followed from (1.1), (1.8), (1.11), and the fact that Θ+Ni+1 ∼
N(µMi , σ
2
i + s
2) under the manager’s beliefs.
A feasible contract must be incentive compatible, that is, it is optimal for the manager
to exert the specified effort in the contract given the other contractual variables (ai, bi, ki).
We assume that
(1− α)γ/β > 2, (1.41)
which guarantees a unique optimal effort choice. The manager’s optimal effort ηi as a function
of the other variables is given by
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ηi = η(bi, ki) =
[
A(1− τ)(1− ν)βkαi bi
γκ
] 1
γ−β
. (1.42)
In addition, shareholders’ participation constraint (1.19) must be satisfied by the remaining
contractual variables (ai, bi, ki):
CVi = E
S
i
[
cEi − (1− g)ki
]
≥ (1− g)ESi
[
(1− τ)
(
(1− ν)(Θ +Ni+1)− d
)]
. (1.43)
It is evident that the participation constraint (1.43) and the manager’s participation con-
straint (1.17) must be satisfied with equality to maximize the blockholder value. By the
equality of (1.17), the contractual parameter ai is derived as a function of the other vari-
ables:
ai = a(bi, ki, ηi) = φ+ κη
γ
i + 0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2b2i (σ2i + s2)
−bi(1− τ)
[
(1− ν)
(
µMi + Ak
α
i η
β
i
)
− d
]
. (1.44)
By (1.18), (1.43), which must be satisfied with equality, and (1.44), the blockholder’s
objective function to determine the manager’s contract at date i is
Π(bi, ki) = E
S
i
[
cBi − gki
]
= g(1− τ) [(1− ν)µSi − d]− φ+ (1− τ)(1− ν)∆ibi + ψ(bi)k αγγ−βi
−ki − 0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b2i , (1.45)
where
ψ(bi) :=
(
A(1− τ)(1− ν)) γγ−β(1
κ
) β
γ−β
(βbi
γ
) β
γ−β
(
1− βbi
γ
)
. (1.46)
It now remains to determine the incremental capital investment and the manager’s pay-
performance sensitivity that maximize (1.45). For bi ≥ γ/β, it follows from (1.45) that the
optimal investment is zero. For bi ∈ [0, γ/β), the optimal capital investment as a function
of the manager’s pay-performance sensitivity is
k(bi) =
[
αγ
γ − βψ(bi)
] γ−β
(1−α)γ−β
. (1.47)
By (1.47), the optimal contract choice problem reduces to the optimal choice of the manager’s
pay-performance sensitivity
b∗i = arg max
bi≥0
Π(bi, k(bi)) = arg max
bi≥0
Fi(bi), (1.48)
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where
Fi(bi) = (1− τ)(1− ν)∆ibi +Bk(bi)− 0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b2i (1.49)
and B = (1−α)γ−β
αγ
.
In sum, the optimal contracting problem for period [T − 1, T ], conditional on the firm’s
solvency at the beginning of this period, is completely specified by b∗i . The optimal capital
investment, k∗i , is k(b
∗
i ), the manager’s optimal effort, η
∗
i , is η(b
∗
i , k
∗
i ), and her cash compen-
sation, a∗i , is a(b
∗
i , k
∗
i , η
∗
i ). Note that the contract exists in period [T − 1, T ] if and only if
the firm is solvent at date i = T − 1. If the public equity value at this date is non-positive,
bankruptcy is declared and the relationship is terminated, that is, Tb = T − 1.
We now set i = T − 2 and consider the optimal contracting problem for period [i, i+ 1].
Suppose that the firm is still solvent at date i. By the law of iterated expectations, the
manager’s conditional expected utility can be written as
M(i) = EMi
[
− exp
(
− λ
( Tb−1∑
j=i
(cMj − κηγj )
))]
= − exp
(
− λΛ (ai, bi, ki, ηi)
)(
− M̂∗(i+ 1)
)
, (1.50)
where Λ (ai, bi, ki, ηi) is given by (1.40). The last term −M̂∗(i+ 1) equals one if bankruptcy
occurs at date i+ 1 because the manager’s future payoffs will be zero. If bankruptcy is not
declared at date i + 1, the term is the conditional expected utility at date i + 1, which was
determined by the contracting problem for period [T − 1, T ] above. In either case, the term
is unaffected by the contractual variables for the current period.
Consequently, as in the analysis of period [T − 1, T ], the incentive compatibility of
the manager’s contract requires that her effort maximize Λ (ai, bi, ki, ηi) for given (ai, bi, ki).
Moreover, the dynamic participation constraint (1.19) for shareholders is now given by
CVi = E
S
i
[
cEi − (1− g)ki + max
{
CVi+1, 0
}]
≥ (1− g)ESi
[
Tb−1∑
j=i
(1− τ)
(
(1− ν)(Θ +Nj+1)− d
)]
. (1.51)
If CVi+1 > 0 so that Tb > i+ 1, then it follows from the analysis of period [T − 1, T ] that
CVi+1 = (1− g)ESi+1
[
Tb−1∑
j=i+1
(1− τ)
(
(1− ν)(Θ +Nj+1)− d
)]
.
It immediately follows from the above that, regardless of whether bankruptcy is declared at
date i+ 1, shareholders’ participation constraint (1.51) is equivalent to the following:
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ESi
[
cEi − (1− g)ki
]
≥ (1− g)ESi
[
(1− τ)
(
(1− ν)(Θ +Ni+1)− d
)]
,
which is identical in form to (1.43). Using similar arguments, the manager’s participation
constraint (1.17) is also identical in form to the participation constraint in the last period.
Consequently, the optimization problem is identical to the one for period [T − 1, T ]. Hence
optimal contractual variables for period [T − 2, T − 1] are determined in the same manner
as in the contracting problem for period [T − 1, T ]. This argument can clearly be extended
by backward induction to any period [i, i+ 1] for i < T − 2. Q.E.D.
1.8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By (1.48) and (1.49),
b∗i = arg max
bi≥0
Fi(bi) = (1− τ)(1− ν)∆ibi− 0.5λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b2i+
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k(bi).
(1.52)
We first establish some properties of the “optimal investment function” k(bi) since they
determine the properties of the optimal contract. By (1.46) and (1.47),
k′(b) ∝
(1
κ
) 1
(1−α)γ−β
bt(γ/β − b)u(1− b), (1.53)
where
t :=
2− (1− α)(γ/β)
(1− α)(γ/β)− 1 and u :=
αγ
(1− α)γ − β ,
and where the symbol ∝ means “equal up to a positive multiplicative constant.” Under
Assumption (1.41), the parameter t is negative and the parameter u is positive. Since
γ/β > 1 (Assumption (1.41)), it follows from (1.53) that the function k(·) is strictly quasi-
concave. Since k(0) = k(γ/β) = 0 and k′(0) = +∞, it also follows from (1.53) that k(·)
achieves its maximum at b = 1.
Next, we observe that
k′′(b) ∝ bt−1(γ/β − b)u−1[t(γ/β − b)(1− b)− ub(1− b)− b(γ/β − b)]. (1.54)
The expression inside the brackets is a strictly convex quadratic function whose value at 1
is negative, whose value at γ/β > 1 is positive, and whose value at 0 is negative, since t < 0.
Consequently, there is exactly one root bM of the quadratic in the interval (1, γ/β) such that
k′′(bM) = 0. At bM the marginal investment is at its minimum. Moreover, since k′′(·) is
negative on [0, bM) and is positive on (bM , γ/β), the optimal investment function is strictly
concave on [0, bM ] and strictly convex on [bM , γ/β].
We henceforth assume that
∆0
λ(1− τ)(1− ν)(σ20 + s2)
≤ bM . (1.55)
lxx
(a) We write Fi(b; ∆i) to make explicit the functional dependence of Fi on the parameter ∆i,
and write F
′
i ( · ; ∆i) to denote its derivative with respect to b. Let b(∆i) denote the optimal
pay-performance sensitivity when the degree of managerial optimism is ∆i.
We first show that
b(∆i) ≤ max
(
∆i
pi
, 1
)
. (1.56)
where
pi = λ(1− τ)(1− ν)(σ2i + s2). (1.57)
Obviously the result immediately follows if b(∆i) ≤ 1, so suppose that b(∆i) ≥ 1. It remains
to show that b(∆i) ≤ ∆i/pi. Since by assumption b(∆i) ≥ 1, it follows from the properties of
the optimal investment function established earlier that k′(b(∆i)) ≤ 0. Since F ′i (b(∆i)) = 0,
it follows from (1.52) that ∆i−pib(∆i) ≥ 0, which establishes that b(∆i) ≤ ∆i/pi, as required.
Next, observe that
∆i
pi
=
∆0
λ(1− τ)(1− ν)(s2 + (i+ 1)σ20)
≤ ∆0
p0
≤ bM (1.58)
by Assumption (1.55). Hence,
b(∆i) ≤ bM . (1.59)
Pick two values ∆1i and ∆
2
i such that ∆
1
i < ∆
2
i . We must show that b(∆
1
i ) < b(∆
2
i ).
Since b(∆1i ) maximizes Fi( · ; ∆1i ), and since ∆1i < ∆2i , it follows that
0 = (1− τ)(1− ν)∆1i − λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b(∆1i ) +
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k′(b(∆1i ))
< (1− τ)(1− ν)∆2i − λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2(σ2i + s2)b(∆1i ) +
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k′(b(∆1i )) = F
′
i (b(∆
1
i ); ∆
2
i ).
It follows from (1.59) and the properties of the optimal investment function that Fi( · ,∆2i )
is strictly concave over the range of possible values of b(∆1i ). Consequently, its deriva-
tive can only be positive at values below the unique maximizer b(∆2i ), which proves that
b(∆1i ) < b(∆
2
i ), as required.
(b) We note that
F
′
i (b, σ0) =
(1− τ)(1− ν)∆0s2
s2 + iσ20
− λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2bs2 s
2+(i+1)σ20
s2 + iσ20
+
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k′(b),
which is decreasing in σ0. bi(σ0) denote the optimal pay-performance sensitivity when the
initial transient risk is σ0. Consider two values σ
1 < σ2 of σ0. By definition,
0 = F ′i (bi(σ
2), σ2) = F ′i (bi(σ
1), σ1) > F ′i (bi(σ
1), σ2),
which immediately implies bi(σ
1) > bi(σ
2) by the strict quasi-concavity of Fi(·).
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(c) We note that
F
′
i (b, s) =
(1− τ)(1− ν)∆0s2
s2 + iσ20
− λ(1− τ)2(1− ν)2bs2 s
2+(i+1)σ20
s2 + iσ20
+
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k′(b).
By arguments similar to those used in parts (a) and (b), it suffices to show that F
′
i (b, s) is
decreasing in s.
Clearly, F
′
0(b, s) is decreasing in s. Now suppose i ≥ 1. The sign of the derivative of
F
′
i (b, s) with respect to s
2 coincides with the sign of
−
(
bλ(1− τ)(1− ν)s4 + iσ20
[
bλ(1− τ)(1− ν)(2s2 + (i+1)σ20)−∆0
])
,
and therefore the result will follow if we can establish that
b∗iλ(1− τ)(1− ν)(2s2+(i+1)σ20)≥∆0
and b∗i > 0. To this end, let
bˆi :=
∆0
λ(1− τ)(1− ν)(2s2 + (i+1)σ20)
.
Since ∆0 ≤ 2p0 by the assumption in part (c) of the proposition, bˆi ≤ 1, which implies k′(bˆi)
is nonnegative. Therefore,
F ′i (bˆi, s
2) =
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
k′(bˆi) +
(1− τ)(1− ν)∆0s2
s2 + iσ20
[
1− s
2 + (i+1)σ20
2s2 + (i+1)σ20
]
≥ 0.
Hence, we may conclude that b∗i ≥ bˆi > 0 since Fi(·) is strictly quasi-concave and b∗i ∈ [0, bM ].
Thus,
b∗iλ(1− τ)(1− ν)(2s2 + (i+1)σ20) ≥ bˆiλ(1− τ)(1− ν)(2s2 + (i+1)σ20) = ∆0
as required. Q.E.D.
1.8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
As mentioned earlier, the bankruptcy time is endogenously determined by the optimal
stopping problem (1.29). The continuation value of shareholders at date i ≤ T−1 is given by
(1.51), which must be satisfied with equality. We denote the continuation value as CVi(µ
S
i )
to make explicit its dependence on shareholders’ mean posterior assessment of project quality
at each date i. Let Z denote a standard normal random variable. By (1.4), (1.5), and (1.6),
the continuation value can be expressed as
CVi(µ
S
i ) = (1− τ)
(
(1− ν)µSi − d
)
+ ESi
[
max
{
CVi+1(µ
S
i + σ
µ
i Z), 0
}]
, (1.60)
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where we replace µSi+1 with µ
S
i +σ
µ
i Z, and σ
µ
i is defined in (1.33). We first need to show that
the continuation value CVi(·) is a continuous, non-decreasing function of µSi for 0 ≤ i ≤ T−1.
To do so, we use backward induction. For the proof of its continuity, we show that there
exist positive constants κ1i , κ
2
i such that
CVi(µ
S
i ) ≤ κ1i + κ2i max{µSi , 0}. (1.61)
The assertions of monotonicity and continuity for date T − 1 immediately follow because
CVT−1(µST−1)
= (1− τ)
(
(1− ν)µST−1− d
)
. Suppose the assertions are true for dates i+ 1, . . . , T − 2. Then
we only need to demonstrate that the assertions also hold for date i.
The monotonicity of CVi(·) is a direct consequence on the fact that the expectation on
the right-hand side of (1.60) is taken with respect to the standard normal density, and the
monotonicity of CVi+1(·) by the inductive assumption.
The proof of continuity of CVi(·) will be accomplished by (1.60) if the limit and expec-
tation operators can be interchanged because CVi+1(·) is continuous in µSi+1 by the inductive
assumption and, therefore, in µSi . Due to the assumed continuity for date i+ 1, the function
CVi+1(·) is bounded by a positive function whose expectation,
ESi
[
κ1i+1 + κ
2
i+1 max{µSi+1, 0}
]
= κ1i+1 + κ
2
i+1
[
σµi√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(
µSi
σµi
)2]
+ µSi P
(
Z > −µ
S
i
σµi
)]
,
(1.62)
is finite, and thus the interchange is justified by the dominated convergence theorem. Further,
by (1.62), we can see that the expectation on the right-hand side of (1.60) is bounded above
by (
κ1i+1 + κ
2
i+1
σµi√
2pi
)
+ κ2i+1 max{µSi , 0}. (1.63)
Hence it is possible to define positive constants κ1i and κ
2
i for which (1.61) holds for date i,
as required.
So far, we have proved that each function CVi(·) is continuous and non-decreasing.
By (1.60), each CVi(·) is negative for sufficiently small µSi . Since each CVi(·) is obviously
positive for sufficiently high µSi , there exists a unique value µ
∗
i for which CVi(µ
∗
i ) = 0. By
the dynamic programming principle of optimality, bankruptcy is declared at date i if and
only if µSi ≤ µ∗i . Q.E.D.
1.8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
From the proof of Proposition 3, we know that CVi(·) is a continuous, non-decreasing
function of µSi and, therefore, of µ
S
0 because of its linear relation with µ
S
i as shown in (1.6).
We now demonstrate that CVi(·) increases with the initial transient risk σ20, but decreases
with the intrinsic risk s2. By backward induction, we first show that each CVi(·) is convex
in µSi . It obviously holds for date T − 1 because it is a linear function of µST−1. Suppose the
assertion is true for dates i + 1, . . . , T − 2. Based on the assumption, we need to establish
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the assertion for date i. By the definition of a convex function, we need to show that, for
any two points x and y in the domain of CVi(·) and any t ∈ [0, 1],
CVi(tx+ (1− t)y) ≤ tCVi(x) + (1− t)CVi(y). (1.64)
Using (1.60) and the inductive assumption that CVi+1(·) is convex in µSi+1, we can see that
the left hand side of (1.64) is less than or equal to (1 − τ)
(
(1 − ν)(tx + (1 − t)y) − d
)
+
ESi
[
max
{
tCVi+1(x+ σ
µ
i Z) + (1− t)CVi+1(y+ σµi Z), 0
}]
, which is also less than or equal to
the right hand side of (1.64). Hence the inequality is satisfied for date i, which completes
the proof of the convexity of CVi(·).
By (1.60), we notice that the risk parameters, σ20 and s
2, affect each CVi(·) only through
σµi . It is straightforward to show that σ
µ
i defined in (1.33) increases with σ
2
0 but declines with
s2. Let µ˜Si+1 denote a normal random variable with the same mean µ
S
i but a greater variance
(σ˜µi )
2 attributed to an increase in σ20 or a decrease in s
2. Then the distribution of µSi+1
second-order stochastically dominates that of µ˜Si+1. By the convexity of max{CVi+1(·), 0}, it
follows that
ESi
[
max
{
CVi+1(µ˜
S
i+1), 0
}] ≥ ESi [max{CVi+1(µSi+1), 0}], (1.65)
which implies that each CVi(·) increases with σ20, but declines with s2.
As shown by Proposition 3, the optimal bankruptcy trigger µ∗i is uniquely determined by
the condition CVi(µ
∗
i ) = 0. Since CVi(·) increases with µS0 by (1.60), increases with σ20, and
decreases with s2, the bankruptcy time increases with µS0 , increases with σ
2
0, and decreases
with s2. Q.E.D.
1.8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
By (1.23), (1.30) and (1.31), the optimization program for the determination of the
long-term debt coupon payment is
G(d∗(∆0),∆0) := max
d
g(LD(0)−K) + gES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri
(
(1− τ)((1− ν)µSi − d)
)]
+ES0
[ Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri(Fi(b∗i )− φ)
]
. (1.66)
We denote the indirect objective function by G and indicate the dependence of G on the
degree of managerial optimism ∆0. Due to the implicit function theorem, we have
∂d∗
∂∆0
= −∂
2G/∂d∂∆0
∂2G/∂d2
|d=d∗ . (1.67)
Note that ∂2G/∂d2|d=d∗ < 0 by the second order condition for d∗. Consequently, the sign of
∂d∗
∂∆0
is the same as that of ∂2G/∂d∂∆0. The first two terms in the objective function on the
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right hand side of (1.66) do not depend on ∆0. Consequently,
∂2G/∂d∂∆0 =
∂2PB(0)
∂d∂∆0
, (1.68)
where
PB(0) = ES0
[ Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri(Fi(b∗i )− φ)
]
, (1.69)
is the net present value of the blockholder’s future private benefits at date zero.
By Proposition 1, PB(0) depends on d only through the bankruptcy time Tb that
decreases monotonically with d. Further, it can be easily shown by (1.46), (1.47), and (1.49)
that Fi(b
∗
i ) increases with ∆0. Consequently, the sign of (1.68) is non-positive. By (1.67),
∂d∗
∂∆0
≤ 0; that is, long-term debt decreases monotonically with the initial degree of managerial
optimism. Q.E.D.
1.9 Appendix B: Numerical Implementation and Calibration Procedure
In this appendix, we describe our numerical implementation and calibration of the
model. The parameters that we need to calibrate are given by
pi = (A,α, s, µS0 ,∆0, σ0, λ, κ, γ/β, φ, ν, ρ, g). (1.70)
Table 1.1 describes these parameters. The parameters β and γ cannot be separately identified
because all economic variables in the model only depend on their ratio, γ/β. For a given
candidate parameter vector pi, we determine the optimal level d∗ of the long-term debt coupon
payment. We then simulate the distributions of long-term debt and short-term debt values,
capital investment, inside equity stake, asset value, and firm value. Using these simulated
distributions, we obtain the vector V (pi) of model-predicted values of the statistics reported
in Table 1.2. The vector pi∗ of baseline parameter values solves
pi∗ = arg min
pi
(V (pi)− Vˆ )TW (V (pi)− Vˆ ), (1.71)
where Vˆ is the vector of observed values of the corresponding statistics from the empirical
data and W is a diagonal matrix whose respective entries are the reciprocals of the observed
values.
We now describe how we determine the vector V (pi) of model-predicted values of the
statistics for a given candidate parameter vector pi. By the results of Section 2.4, all output
statistics can be expressed as functions of the date, i, and investors’ current mean assessment
of project quality, µSi . In other words, the state vector is
State Vector ≡ (i, µSi ). (1.72)
We compute the vector V (pi) of model-predicted values of the calibration statistics by sim-
ulating the evolution of µSi using (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6).
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Our computation of the vector V (pi) proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, we ap-
proximate the evolution of µSi over T = 10 time periods using a discrete lattice. Each node
of the lattice corresponds to a possible realization of µSi . We use the discrete lattice to deter-
mine the optimal bankruptcy trigger at each date i for a given long-term debt structure d as
described by Proposition 3. In the second stage, we determine the optimal long-term debt
structure by numerically solving (1.23) using Monte-Carlo simulation. In the third stage,
we estimate the model-predicted statistics again using Monte Carlo simulation starting from
each node of the discrete lattice that we build in the first stage. We now describe each step
of our numerical analysis in more detail.
Construction of discrete-state stochastic process: We first approximate the evolution
of µS using a discrete lattice. At date 0, investors’ mean assessment of the project’s prof-
itability is µS0 . Let n(i) denote the number of nodes on the lattice at date i > 0. We set
n(i) = Mi with M = 30. Let µSi,j denote investors’ mean assessment in the j
th state at date
i where j = 1, . . . , n(i). We design the lattice such that the minimal and maximal states at
date i, µSi,1 and µ
S
i,n(i), respectively, are 2.5 standard deviations below and above the minimal
and maximal states at date i − 1. The values for the remaining n(i) − 2 states are equally
spaced between the minimum and maximum states.
Let pi+1,ki,j denote the transition probability that investors’ mean assessment transitions
from state µSi,j at date i to state µ
S
i+1,k at date i + 1. Using (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), we
approximate the transition probability as
pi+1,ki,j = Φ
[(1
2
(µSi+1,k + µ
S
i+1,k+1)− µSi,j
) 1
σµi
]
−Φ
[(1
2
(µSi+1,k + µ
S
i+1,k−1)− µSi,j
) 1
σµi
]
, (1.73)
if µSi+1,k is within ±2.5σµi from µSi,j. In the above, Φ(·) denotes the cdf of the standard normal
distribution. If
∣∣µSi+1,k − µSi,j∣∣ > 2.5σµi , we set the transition probability to zero.
We now describe the determination of the bankruptcy triggers for a given long-term
debt structure d. By Proposition 3, bankruptcy occurs at date i if and only if investors’
mean assessment at date i is less than a trigger µ∗i (d), where the argument explicitly denotes
the fact that the bankruptcy trigger depends on the long-term debt coupon. To determine
µ∗i (d), we compute the continuation value CVi,j of shareholders at state µ
S
i,j. We obtain the
continuation values on the nodes of the lattice by backward induction. To do so, we first
define a terminal condition that specifies the firm’s going concern value at date T as follows:
CVT,j =
(1− τ)µST,j
(1− e−r) , if µ
S
T,j > 0,
CVT,j = 0, otherwise.
We compute the continuation values at earlier dates i < T as described in (1.60), that is,
CVi,j = (1− τ)
(
(1− ν)µSi,j − d
)
+ e−r
n(i+1)∑
k=1
pi+1,ki,j max{CVi+1,k, 0} ,
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where pi+1,ki,j is the transition probability described in (1.73). Starting from i = T − 1 and
working backwards through time, we compute the continuation values for all states and
dates. Since the true continuation value function is continuous and non-decreasing as shown
in the proof of Proposition 3, we complete the approximation to CVi(·) by linear interpola-
tion. We then determine the optimal trigger µ∗i (d) at date i that solves CVi(µ
∗
i (d)) = 0.
Determination of Optimal Long-Term Debt Structure: Next, we determine the block-
holder’s optimal long-term debt choice, d∗, at date zero for the candidate vector pi of pa-
rameter values. To compute the long-term debt choice, we simulate the total earnings flow
described in (1.1) N = 10, 000 times starting from date zero. By (1.1), the total earnings in
each period is the sum of the base earnings and the discretionary earnings. From Proposition
1, the discretionary earnings, Akαi η
β
i , is deterministic and, therefore, can be pre-computed
for each date i. The base earnings, Θ+Ni+1, is the sum of two normal random variables that
are drawn from N(µS0 , σ0) and N(0, s), respectively. We generate a sample path identified
by a vector of T + 1 independent standard normal random variables, (θˆ, Nˆ1, Nˆ2, . . . , NˆT ),
so that the base earnings at date i is given by µS0 + σ0θˆ + sNˆi. We use (1.6) to compute
investors’ mean posterior assessments µSi of Θ as the earnings are realized over time along
the sample path. We then determine the optimal bankruptcy time Tb using the bankruptcy
trigger µ∗i that we obtained from the discrete lattice as described earlier. We carry out the
above procedure for each of the N = 10, 000 sample paths.
By (1.23), (1.21), and (1.18), the blockholder’s objective function for a given long-term
debt structure d can be rewritten as
B(0) = g
(
ES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri
(
(1− τ)(1− ν)(Θ +Ni+1) + τd
)
+ e−rTbLD(Tb)
]
−K
)
+ES0
[
Tb−1∑
i=0
e−ri(Fi(bi)− φ)
]
. (1.74)
In the above, we set K to the asset value AV (0) at date zero, which is given by
AV(0) = ES0
[
T−1∑
i=0
e−ri(1− τ)(Θ +Ni+1) + e−rT (1− τ) max{0,Θ}/(1− e−r)
]
, (1.75)
where the last term represent the firm’s going concern value at date T as mentioned earlier.
The expectation terms in (1.74) can be computed for a given d using the set of sample paths
simulated at date zero. Especially, ES0
[
e−rTbLD(Tb)
]
can be calculated by the law of iterated
expectations. We evaluate the blockholder’s value for different values of d. We use Matlab’s
Nelder-Meade optimization algorithm to determine the value d∗ that maximizes blockholder
value.
Determination of the model-predicted statistics: In the final stage of the implemen-
tation, we use the optimal solution d∗ obtained in the previous step to compute the asset
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value, long-term and short-term debt values, and firm value at each node of the discrete
lattice for dates 0, 1, 2, 3. We use these values to construct the simulated distributions of
the calibration statistics.
We use Monte-Carlo simulation starting from each node (i, j); i ≤ 3 of the discrete
lattice to compute the statistics at the node. We simulate a set of N = 10, 000 sample paths
over T − i periods from date i to date T. By (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), the project’s profitability,
Θ, is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µSi,j (µ
S
0 at date 0) and standard deviation
σi. We estimate the asset value AV(i, j), long-term debt value LD(i, j), short-term debt
value SD(i, j), and firm value FV(i, j) at node (i, j) as follows:
AV(i, j) = ESi,j
[
T−1∑
t=i
e−r(t−i)(1− τ)(Θ +Nt+1) + e−r(T−i)(1− τ) max{0,Θ}/(1− e−r)
]
,
LD(i, j) = ESi,j
[
Tb−1∑
t=i
e−r(t−i)d∗ + e−r(Tb−i)LD(Tb)
]
,
SD(i, j) = ESi,j
[
(1− τ)ν(Θ +Ni+1 + Akαi ηβi )− ai/bi
]
,
FV(i, j) = ESi,j
[
Tb−1∑
t=i
e−r(t−i)
(
(1− τ)(Θ +Nt+1 + Akαt ηβt ) + τd
)
+ e−r(Tb−i)LD(Tb)
]
.
After collecting the simulated values of long-term debt and short-term debt ratios and
firm value ratios over the first three periods, we obtain the quartiles of these ratios as the
model-predicted statistics. In addition, we also calculate the median ratio of the incremental
capital investment k∗i to asset value and the median value of the manager’s equity stake b
∗
i .
Using the vector, V (pi), of model-predicted statistics, and the vector of observed values,
V̂ , we determine the baseline parameter values by numerically solving (1.71). We use the
Nelder-Meade optimization routine in MATLAB to perform the minimization. To avoid a
local minimum solution, we repeat the optimization routine multiple times by randomizing
the initial seed.
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Chapter 2
CEO TALENT, CEO COMPENSATION AND PRODUCT MARKET
COMPETITION
2.1 Introduction
In 2005, the average (median) CEOs in the energy and telecom industries earned $10.22
(4.72) million and $7.48 (3.86) million, respectively, whereas the average (median) CEO in
the consumer durable goods industry earned only $3.24 (2.68) million (based on data on S&P
1500 firms). The difference between the maximum and minimum CEO pay levels within an
industry ranges from $12.63 million in the consumer durable goods industry to $92.20 million
in the business equipment industry. Why do the levels and distributions of CEO pay vary so
dramatically across industries? Are variations in industry characteristics largely responsible
for the variations in the distributions of CEO pay or do inter-industry variations in the
distributions of managerial ability/talent play an important role in explaining these findings?
How important is managerial talent when industry characteristics and, more generally, the
product market environment in which firms operate are considered? To what extent do
product market characteristics affect the levels and distributions of CEO compensation and
firm value across industries?
We address these questions by developing a market equilibrium model in which the
competitive assignment of CEOs to firms and imperfect product market competition among
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firms interact to determine the distributions of firm value and managerial compensation.
Managers of different talent levels are matched to firms of different qualities, and their
match quality determines firm productivity. There exists a unique, stationary equilibrium
of the model in which CEO-firm matches and the distributions of firm market value and
managerial compensation are endogenously determined. We calibrate the structural model
using the distributions of firm value and CEO pay in each of twelve Fama-French industries.
In addition to the key structural parameters of the model, we also indirectly infer the un-
observed distributions of CEO talent and firm quality in each of the industries. We then
conduct counterfactual experiments using the calibrated models corresponding to each of
the industries to explore the quantitative effects of managerial talent and product market
characteristics.
First, we show that there is substantial variation not only in the distributions of firm
quality and managerial talent across industries, but also in their relative contributions to firm
value. The dispersions of these attributes are much larger in high-tech industries—including
business equipment, health care, and telecom—relative to traditional manufacturing indus-
tries. Second, in contrast with the strikingly small estimate obtained by Gabaix and Landier
(2008), we find that, when product market characteristics are taken into account, CEO tal-
ent has a much more significant impact on firm value. Our estimates of the impact of CEO
talent are roughly two orders of magnitude higher than that of Gabaix and Landier (2008).
Our results show that the incorporation of product market characteristics and intra-industry
competition among firms plays a central role in generating the significantly different esti-
mates. Third, again in contrast with the findings of Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio¨
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(2008), our estimates of the impact of CEO talent on firm value are of the same order of
magnitude as the ratio of CEO compensation to firm value. The compensation of CEOs is,
therefore, quantitatively in line with their marginal productivity. Fourth, we analytically
derive a number of novel implications for the effects of product market characteristics on the
number of active firms in an industry as well as the distributions of managerial compensation
and firm value.
We build a discrete time, infinite horizon model of an industry in which there is
a continuum of heterogeneous firms engaging in imperfect product market—specifically,
monopolistic—competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). We explicitly incorporate heterogene-
ity in manager and firm attributes as well as the endogenous matching of CEOs to firms.
Managers are characterized by a variable referred to as talent, and firms are also character-
ized by a single variable, namely firm quality. Firms are established by entrepreneurs who
make an initial sunk investment. Firm quality, which is a random variable drawn from a
known distribution, is realized after entry. Consequently, firms are identical ex ante (i.e.
prior to entry), but differentiated ex post. Each firm then hires a manager. Firm qualities
and managerial talents are observable to market participants. Similar to Tervio¨ (2008), the
match quality is a multiplicative function of CEO talent and firm quality. The match quality
determines the firm’s productivity in each period. Firms are monopolistically competitive
in that they take the aggregate price index—the weighted average of the prices charged by
all firms in the market—as given when they make their output and pricing decisions. A firm
produces in each period unless it faces an exogenous shock that forces it to exit the market
(Melitz, 2003).
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We derive the unique, stationary equilibrium with free entry in which the matching of
CEOs to firms as well as the distributions of firm value and CEO pay are endogenously de-
termined. The equilibrium satisfies several conditions. First, the free entry condition implies
that the value of an entering firm—which rationally anticipates the outcome of the matching
process between firms and managers—equals the entry cost. Second, in the stationary equi-
librium, exiting firms are exactly replaced by new entrants so that the mass of firms remains
constant through time. Third, the market clearing condition is satisfied in equilibrium, that
is, the aggregate revenue of firms equals the aggregate payoffs to entrepreneurs, managers
and workers. The equilibrium of the model depends on product market characteristics—the
entry cost, the elasticity of substitution between products, the market size, and the exit
probability of firms—as well as the distributions of managerial talent and firm quality.
Our structural approach requires the identification of the distributions of firm quality
and managerial talent (that are unobservable to the econometrician) as well as the estimation
of unknown model parameters such as the exit probability and the elasticity of substitution
between products that determine the product market structure. We treat a sample of firm-
CEO observations that belong to an industry as a market equilibrium outcome. We choose
quantiles of the observed distributions of firm value and CEO pay as the moments to be
matched to the corresponding model-predicted statistics. In addition, we use the observed
distributions of firm value and CEO pay to identify the unobserved distributions of firm
quality and CEO talent—the factor distributions—as in the analysis of Tervio¨ (2003, 2008).
There is significant variation in the inferred distributions of firm quality and managerial
talent across industries. Consistent with what casual empiricism might suggest, the disper-
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sions of CEO talent and firm quality are much larger in high-tech industries, such as business
equipment, health care, and telecom, relative to traditional manufacturing industries. Sec-
ond, in line with anecdotal and empirical evidence (e.g., Daines, Nair, and Kornhauser, 2005;
Pan, 2010; Falato, Li and Milbourn, 2011), we show that managerial talent is, indeed, an
important factor in the production process as differences in managerial talent could make a
significant difference to firm value. Following Gabaix and Landier (2008), we measure the
impact of talent as the benefit the median firm could obtain from the replacement of the
current CEO with the best one in the same industry. Our estimates for different industries
in our sample, which are obtained by explicitly incorporating product market influences, are
largely two orders of magnitude higher than the estimate of Gabaix and Landier (2008), who
abstract away from product market effects. For example, the median firm in the business
equipment industry could obtain an about 2.9% increase in its market value if its CEO were
replaced with the best CEO. It should also be noted that, while the ratio of extra compen-
sation payments to be incurred if the firm had to provide the best CEO with his current
level of compensation is larger than the CEO’s impact on the firm’s value, it is not orders of
magnitude higher as in Gabaix and Landier (2008). For instance, for the median firm in the
business equipment industry, the ratio of additional future compensation payments to firm
value is 10.7%. For other industries too, the costs are about three or four times greater than
the benefits. This finding suggests that the remunerations of CEOs are roughly in line with
their relative contributions to firms. Moreover, we find that the impact of CEO talent varies
dramatically across industries. The median firm in the business equipment and health care
industries could increase its market value by about 2.9% and 2.5%, respectively, whereas the
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sizes of the impact in the chemical, consumer durable goods, and manufacturing industries
are only 0.85%, 1.15% and 1.16%, respectively.
Finally, we analytically derive the effects of product market characteristics on firm value,
CEO compensation, and the mass of active firms. A decline in the entry cost and/or the exit
probability leads to more firms in the market and, therefore, tougher price competition, which
in turn lowers firm value and CEO pay. While the effects of a marginal increase in product
substitutability are ambiguous in general because they depend on the values of other product
market parameters, our analysis of the calibrated model yields clear predictions. An increase
in the product substitutability induces less firms to enter the market, which in turn lessens
price competition. Since the marginal return to managerial talent decreases (on average) with
the product substitutability, so does the average managerial compensation. Furthermore,
the effects of product market characteristics vary quantitatively across industries. Taken
together, our results suggest that industry-related factors, including those linked to the
CEO labor market and those linked to the product market, are very critical determinants of
the levels and distributions of CEO compensation.
Our work revisits the fundamental question of how important managerial talent is if
competition for CEO talent in an efficient labor market exists, which is raised and explored
by the seminal studies of Tervio¨ (2003, 2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008). Both studies
conclude that differences in CEO talent are very small and have little influence on shareholder
value that is largely driven by firm-specific factors. Recent empirical studies, however, show
that managers matter to firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Daines, Nair, and
Kornhauser, 2005; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2006; Graham, Li, and Qiu,
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2010; Pan, 2010; Falato, Li and Milbourn, 2011; Leverty and Grace, 2010). These studies
find both statistically and economically significant impact of CEO characteristics, which are
especially narrowed down to CEO talent for some studies, on CEO pay and firm performance,
controlling for firm characteristics.
To reconcile the results from the competitive assignment models with the empirical
evidence, we conjecture that industry structures matter in determining the level of CEO pay
and in identifying the importance of CEO talent. There are three channels through which
industry structures could affect the assignment process of CEOs to firms and, thereby, the
distribution of CEO pay. First, the fundamental economics of an industry, that is, the
nature of the product market, varies across industries. Specifically, different product market
structures could imply different marginal returns to CEO talent and, therefore, CEO pay.
Second, different industries might be characterized by different degrees of firm heterogeneity,
and the sources of firm heterogeneity could also be different across industries. Third, to
the extent that markets for CEO talent are segmented by industry, industry-level talent
distributions might differ, which suggests that the CEO talent distribution and the effects of
CEO talent on firm value should be estimated at the industry level rather than at the entire
economy level.
Tervio¨ (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) abstract away from industry and product
market effects in their models. They estimate their models using a full sample of the largest
firms in different industries, that is, they aggregate firms across industries in their estimation
exercises. By contrast, given the discussion above, we develop a single market equilibrium
framework in which the competitive assignment of CEOs to firms is incorporated and then
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estimate the structural model “industry by industry.” In the literature on CEO turnover,
Parrino (1997) and Cremers and Grinstein (2010) report that a dominant portion of new
CEOs are insiders of hiring firms or come from other firms in the same industry and that
most of those from outside their industry still have some relevant industry experience such as
business relationships. The latter study further documents cross-industry differences in CEO
selection practices and their explanatory power when examining different CEO compensation
practices, thereby providing the evidence of fragmented CEO talent pools across industries.
These studies in part support our premise that there are CEO labor markets composed of
senior managers within or outside firms in the same industry who have industry-specific
skills.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature in more
detail. In Section 3, we present the model. In Section 4, we characterize the equilibrium and
analytically derive implications of the model for the qualitative effects of product market
characteristics on firm value and CEO pay. In Section 5, we describe our data and estimation
procedure. Section 6 presents the results of the model calibration, including the structural
parameter estimates and the factor distributions implied by the data. Section 7 contains
counterfactual exercises using the calibrated models. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
As discussed earlier, our work contributes to the recent literature initiated by Tervio¨
(2003) that studies CEO pay levels in a competitive assignment framework. In Tervio¨ (2003,
2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008), the underlying idea is that, in a competitive and fric-
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tionless labor market for CEO talent, CEOs with different talents are competitively matched
to heterogeneous firms at different pay levels. Both studies mainly argue that while talent
differences between CEOs are very small, significant differences in firm quality, which is com-
plementary to CEO talent and thus affects the marginal return to talent, can explain large
pay dispersions for such small talent differences. In this study, we argue that when product
market/industry characteristics are taken into account, differences in CEO talent are much
more significant and can justify a substantial portion of the difference in CEO pay levels.
Our research is related to the literature that addresses how the distributions of firm size
and CEO compensation change in response to economic conditions. The literature includes
the studies of Raith (2003), Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2007), Baranchuk, MacDonald, and
Yang (2010), Subramanian, Plehn-Dujowich and Li (2011), and Wu (2011). These studies
mainly look at the effects of product market characteristics on optimal managerial incentives
by incorporating agency conflicts arising from moral hazard in a market equilibrium frame-
work. As in our study, Wu (2011) employs a standard monopolistic competition framework
with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences to address the role of the product market. However, he bases
his analysis on the early job assignment model, which considers the allocation of hetero-
geneous managers across ex ante identical firms, so that ex post firm size and CEO pay
differences across firms are solely attributed to the heterogeneity in managerial skills. By
changing the degree of complementarity between firm and managerial attributes in a business
cycle model, rather than stressing product market effects, Alder (2009) shows that manage-
rial attributes actually play an important role in the determination of firm size and CEO
pay.
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Recently, several studies have empirically examined the association between managerial
characteristics —especially, managerial talent—and CEO pay and firm performance. Falato,
Li, and Milbourn (2011) study the effects of CEO talent on firm performance using a media-
based measure of CEO talent, the age of the executive when he took his first CEO job,
and the selectivity of his undergraduate college. They document that replacing the CEO of
median talent with the most talented CEO in their sample would improve firm operating
performance by between 1.3% and 2.3%, which is two orders of magnitude greater than
the estimate of Gabaix and Landier (2008) but largely consistent with our estimates for
the industries in our sample. Daines, Nair, and Kornhauser (2005) define CEO skill as the
persistence of positive performance and the reversal of poor performance and find a positive
link between CEO skill and pay especially when pay is performance based and when there are
large shareholders. Also, the link between skill and pay appears to be stronger in industries
where pay dispersion is large, which supports our conjecture that CEO talent may matter
more for firms in some industries than those in other industries. Focusing on the U.S.
property-liability insurance industry, Leverty and Grace (2010) use several firm efficiency
variables obtained from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as proxies for managerial
ability and find that managerial ability plays an important role in reducing the duration
of regulatory scrutiny, the likelihood of failure, and the cost of failure. Finally, Pan (2010)
estimates an executive-firm matching model incorporating three matching dimensions, one
of which is the usual complementarity between firm size and managerial talent, and finds
that higher matching quality is associated with better subsequent firm performance.
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2.3 The Model
We develop a discrete-time, infinite horizon model of an industry with dates t =
0, 1, 2, .... The industry consists of a continuum of heterogeneous operating firms, hetero-
geneous managers, and identical production workers. The firms engage in Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition with a constant elasticity of product substitution. Production re-
quires raw labor supplied by production workers and specialized human capital provided by
managers.
There are three stages of the model as follows:
• Stage 1: (Entry) A group of (identical) entrepreneurs drawn from the pool of workers
establish a firm at date t by making an initial sunk investment. Subsequent to entry,
the firm’s quality is realized. Firm quality is a random variable that is drawn from
a known distribution and then remains constant through time. Firms are, therefore,
identical ex ante, but differentiated ex post.
• Stage 2: (Manager-Firm Matching) The owners (entrepreneurs) of each firm hire a
manager from a continuum of potential managers of various talent levels in a compet-
itive executive labor market. Managerial talent is observable and is constant through
time.
• Stage 3: (Production and Exit) In each period, each firm produces its good, generates
profit, and pays its manager. It continues over an infinite time horizon unless it faces
an exogenous negative shock that forces it to exit the market (Melitz, 2003).
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Since each firm’s quality is realized ex post after entry, there is two-sided heterogeneity
in the assignment process between firms and managers. We focus on a stationary equilibrium
with free entry in which exiting firms are exactly replaced by new entrants. Consequently,
the equilibrium distributions of managerial talent and firm quality among active firms, and
the equilibrium distributions of firm market value and CEO pay are stationary.
We solve the model by backward induction. We first analyze an active firm’s (that
is, a firm that successfully matches with a manager) profit maximization problem in each
period. Next, we study the competitive assignment process between heterogeneous firms and
managers. Finally, we examine firms’ entry decisions into the market.
2.3.1 Preferences, Market Demand and Production
The representative consumer has preferences for consumption of a continuum of goods
in each period that are described by the utility function
U =
[∫
Ω
q(ω)ρdω
] 1
ρ
; 0 < ρ < 1, (2.1)
where Ω is the set of available goods and ω is a finite measure on the Borel σ-algebra of Ω.
If p(ω) is the price of good ω, the consumer’s demand q(ω) for good ω solves the following
utility maximization problem:
max
q(ω)
U =
[ ∫
Ω
q(ω)ρdω
] 1
ρ
subject to
∫
Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω = R. (2.2)
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In the above, R represents the total expenditure of the representative consumer on goods
produced by the industry. It is natural to interpret R as the size of the industry.
As shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the optimal consumption of each good is
q(ω) = U
[
P
p(ω)
]1/(1−ρ)
, (2.3)
where P is the aggregate price index that is given by
P =
[ ∫
Ω
p(ω)
ρ
ρ−1dω
] ρ−1
ρ
. (2.4)
Further,
R = PU. (2.5)
The optimal consumption (2.3) of each good represents the market demand that the firm
producing this particular good faces in the market. From (2.3), we see that
q(ω)
q(ω′)
=
[
p(ω′)
p(ω)
]1/(1−ρ)
, (2.6)
which implies that any two products in the market are substitutes, and the elasticity of
substitution between these products is
σ =
1
1− ρ > 1. (2.7)
This is also the constant price elasticity of demand for each good as seen in (2.3).
xci
We now turn to the production decision of each firm for any period after it has matched
with a manager. The assignment process of managers to firms is described in the next section.
Production is driven by production labor supplied by production workers. We denote the
labor wage rate by w. The firm’s quality and the manager’s talent together determine the
firm’s productivity.
More precisely, suppose that the firm has quality x ∈ R+ and its manager has talent
y ∈ R+. As in Tervio (2008), there is complementarity between firm quality and managerial
talent. Specifically, the match quality θ takes the multiplicative form
θ(x, y) = xy. (2.8)
The firm’s productivity equals the match quality θ(x, y), that is, the inverse of the match
quality is the firm’s marginal cost of production measured in units of labor. As discussed by
Tervio (2008), the key, substantive property of (2.8) is the complementarity of firm quality
and managerial talent. There is actually little loss of generality in assuming the particular
form (2.8). We could alternatively assume that θ(x, y) = f(x)g(y) for strictly increasing and
nonnegative functions f(.) and g(.). In this case, we could simply “redefine” firm quality as
x′ = f(x) and managerial talent as y′ = g(y).
At the beginning of each period, the firm chooses its price in order to maximize its
net profit, that is, revenue net of variable production costs and managerial compensation.
Suppose the manager’s compensation is u (note that this is endogenously determined as the
outcome of the matching process between firms and managers). The firm’s net profit is
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pi(x, y, u) = max
p
pq(p)− w q(p)
θ(x, y)
− u, (2.9)
where the market demand curve, q(p), is given by (2.3) (We omit the argument ω to simplify
the notation). Since there is a continuum of firms, each firm takes the aggregate variables
U and P as given when it chooses its price and output quantity. The second term on the
right hand side of (2.9) represents total labor wages received by production workers who are
employed by the firm. The profit maximization condition equates the marginal revenue with
the marginal cost of production, thereby yielding the firm’s optimal price,
p(x, y) =
w
ρxy
. (2.10)
Consequently, the firm produces the following level of its good,
q(x, y) = q(p(x, y)) = RP σ−1
(ρxy
w
)σ
, (2.11)
and its resulting revenue is given by
r(x, y) = p(x, y)q(x, y) = R((P/w)ρxy)σ−1. (2.12)
The firm’s gross profit (profit inclusive of managerial compensation) is
Π(x, y) = p(x, y)q(x, y)− q(x, y)
θ(x, y)
=
R((P/w)ρxy)σ−1
σ
. (2.13)
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The firm’s net profit—the gross profit less managerial compensation—is
pi(x, y, u) = Π(x, y)− u = R((P/w)ρxy)
σ−1
σ
− u. (2.14)
2.3.2 Manager-Firm Matching
We now describe the assignment of managers of different abilities to firms of different
qualities and the determination of managerial compensation. Managerial abilities and firm
qualities are constant through time as in Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008).
Since the distributions of CEO talent and firm quality are stationary, each firm continues
to hire the same type of manager and pays the same remuneration. Hence, its productivity
level remains constant over time, and so does its net profit. More specifically, if a firm of
quality x hires a manager of talent y whose compensation is u, the firm will earn net profit
pi(x, y, u), given by (2.14), in each period until it has to exit the market for some exogenous
reasons. Denoting the probability of staying in the market for another period by δ, the firm’s
market value—the present value of future earnings net of payoffs to the manager—is
φ(x, y, u) =
∞∑
t=0
δtpi(x, y, u) =
pi(x, y, u)
1− δ =
1
1− δ
[
R((P/w)ρxy)σ−1
σ
− u
]
. (2.15)
Following Legros and Newman (2007b), we refer to the function φ(x, y, u) as the bar-
gaining frontier for the firm, which implies its maximum payoff when it pays the manager
u, and denote the quasi-inverse function of φ(x, y, u) by ψ(x, y, v) : φ(x, y, ψ(x, y, v)) = v,
where ψ(x, y, v) is the bargaining frontier for the manager. Let S(x, y) be the total surplus
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generated by this firm-manager pair, which is the first term of φ(x, y, u),
S(x, y) =
R((P/w)ρxy)σ−1
(1− δ)σ . (2.16)
We easily see that S(x, y) satisfies the supermodularity condition
∂2S
∂x∂y
> 0. (2.17)
It follows from the results of Legros and Newman (2007b) that the matching equilibrium is
unique, and is characterized by positive assortative matching (PAM), that is, higher quality
firms are matched to managers with higher talents.
We now derive the equilibrium payoffs to firms and managers. Let FX(·) and FY (·) be
the cumulative distribution functions of firm quality and managerial talent, respectively. As
in Tervio¨ (2008), we work with the quantiles of the distribution functions. Specifically, for
each i ∈ [0, 1], define
x[i] = x if FX(x) = i,
y[i] = y if FY (y) = i. (2.18)
Consequently, x′[i] > 0 and y′[i] > 0 where i ∈ [0, 1], that is, higher i denotes a higher
quality firm and a more talented manager. By PAM, we can restrict attention to matches
where firm i is matched with manager i. In other words, we can use the index i to denote a
matched manager-firm pair.
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The total surplus, S(x[i], y[i]) in (2.16), must be apportioned to the manager and the
firm in a way that ensures the stability of the matching correspondence. Let u[i] be the
equilibrium compensation of manager i for each period and v[i] be the equilibrium payoff
to firm i, that is, its market value. To begin with, we consider the participation constraints
for both parties. The payoff to each party must be on its frontier given its partner’s payoff,
φ(x, y, ·) and ψ(x, y, ·), respectively, and can never be less than their outside payoffs, v0 and
u0, which are assumed to be identical for all types, that is,
v[i] = φ(x[i], y[i], u[i]); v[i] ≥ v0, (2.19)
u[i] = ψ(x[i], y[i], v[i]); u[i] ≥ u0. (2.20)
Note that, by (2.15), (2.16), and (2.19), the relation between v[i] and u[i] is given by
S(x[i], y[i]) = v[i] +
u[i]
1− δ =
R((P/w)ρx[i]y[i])σ−1
(1− δ)σ , (2.21)
and that the outside payoffs, by definition, imply the payoffs of the lowest active firm-manager
pair in the market:
S(x[0], y[0]) = v0 +
u0
(1− δ) =
R((P/w)ρx[0]y[0])σ−1
(1− δ)σ . (2.22)
The next set of constraints to be considered are the incentive compatibility constraints.
Each party chooses its best matching partner. If m(i) denote firm i’s choice of its manager
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and n(i) denotes manager i’s choice of his firm, then the incentive constraints are
v[i] = max
m(i)
φ(x[i], y[m(i)], u[m(i)]), (2.23)
u[i] = max
n(i)
ψ(x[n(i)], y[i], v[n(i)]). (2.24)
As in a usual screening problem, a “single crossing” property holds in the framework analyzed
here so that the set of incentive constraints above is equivalent to the following two sets of
constraints: (i) Monotonicity and (ii) Local incentive compatibility (Bolton and Dewatripont,
2005). We describe the procedure for the firm’s constraint (2.23) because it is analogous to
the procedure for the manager’s constraint (2.24). Firm i faces a set of choices that can
be described as
(
m,u[m]
)
and needs to choose the best one. From (2.15) and (2.23), it is
easy to check the single crossing property that the indifference curve for a higher type has
a greater slope, that is, the marginal payoff of partner type m relative to that of payment u
rises with firm type i:
∂
∂i
[
−∂v/∂m
∂v/∂u
]
> 0. (2.25)
As a consequence, the set of incentive constraints can be replaced by the monotonicity
condition,
dm(i)
di
≥ 0, (2.26)
and the local incentive condition,
dφ(x[i], y[m(i)], u[m(i)])
dm
∣∣∣
m(i)=i
= 0. (2.27)
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Since the monotonicity condition holds due to PAM , the firm’s global incentive com-
patibility is equivalent to the local incentive condition above. The same argument applies to
the incentive compatibility for the manager. From the local incentive conditions, we derive
the following differential equations in u[i] and v[i]:
u′(i) = −φ2
φ3
y′[i] = R(P/w)σ−1ρσx[i]σ−1y[i]σ−2y′[i], (2.28)
v′(i) = −ψ1
ψ3
x′[i] =
R(P/w)σ−1ρσx[i]σ−2y[i]σ−1x′[i]
1− δ , (2.29)
where the second equation can also be obtained from (2.21). Integrating the above, we
obtain
u(i) = u0 +
∫ i
0
R(P/w)σ−1ρσx[j]σ−1y[j]σ−2y′[j]dj, (2.30)
v(i) = v0 +
∫ i
0
R(P/w)σ−1ρσx[j]σ−2y[j]σ−1x′[j]
1− δ dj. (2.31)
2.3.3 Market Entry
Given the distributions of managerial talent and firm quality, we have derived the dis-
tributions of firm value and managerial compensation for active firms in the market. These
distributions are rationally anticipated by prospective entrants (a group of entrepreneurs)
into the market. Entry into the market requires a fixed sunk investment of fe > 0. Since
the quality x of a newly established firm is determined only after it enters the market, the
quality of the firm is an unknown random variable with cdf X at the “market entry” stage.
By (2.18), it can be shown that its rank, compared with incumbent firms, is also a random
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variable. Free entry ensures that the expected firm value equals the entry cost, that is,
E[v[i]] =
∫ 1
0
v[i]di = fe, (2.32)
where v[i] is given by (2.31).
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is characterized by a mass N∗ of active firms, a distribution
x[i] of firm quality, a distribution y[i] of managerial talent, an aggregate price index P ∗, and
payoff profiles—managerial compensation u[i] and firm value v[i]—such that the following
conditions hold:
1. Firm Profit Maximization: In any period, each active firm i produces q(i) units of its
good at price p(i) per unit to maximize its net profit as described in (2.9), where
p(i) =
w
ρx[i]y[i]
; q(i) = R(P ∗/w)σ−1(ρx[i]y[i])σ. (2.33)
2. Manager-Firm Matching and Payoffs : A manager ranked i is assigned to the equally
ranked firm i. The equilibrium payoff profiles satisfy
v[i] =
1
1− δ
[
R((P ∗/w)ρx[i]y[i])σ−1
σ
− u[i]
]
, (2.34)
u[i] = u0 +
∫ i
0
(
R(P ∗/w)σ−1ρσx[j]σ−1y[j]σ−2y′[j]
)
dj. (2.35)
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3. Free Entry of Firms and Aggregate Price Index : The free entry condition determines
the aggregate price index P ∗ as follows:
R(P ∗/w)σ−1
[
(ρx[0]y[0])σ−1
σ
+ ρσ
∫ 1
0
[ ∫ i
0
x[j]σ−2y[j]σ−1x′[j]dj
]
di
]
= u0 + (1− δ)fe.
(2.36)
4. Market Clearing and Mass of Firms : In any period, the aggregate revenue of active
firms must equal the aggregate expenditure R by the representative consumer, that is,
R =
∫ 1
0
r(x[i], y[i])N∗di ⇒ N∗ =
[ ∫ 1
0
((P ∗/w)ρx[i]y[i])σ−1di
]−1
, (2.37)
which is derived from the revenue function given by (2.12) and determines the equilib-
rium mass N∗ of producing firms.
It immediately follows from the above that there exists a unique, stationary equilibrium
in which the aggregate price index P ∗ and the mass N∗ of active firms are determined
by (2.36) and (2.37), respectively. Further, they remain constant over time so that the
distributions of firm value and managerial compensation are also invariant over time.
Using the above equilibrium characterization, we analytically explore the effects of prod-
uct market characteristics—the entry cost, the likelihood of exit, the market size, and the
elasticity of substitution—on the mass of active firms, firm value and CEO compensation.
We begin by deriving the effects of the product market characteristics on the aggregate price
index because the other equilibrium variables depend on it.
cProposition 6 (Product Market Characteristics and Aggregate Price Index)
• The aggregate price index P ∗ increases with the entry cost fe and the likelihood of exit
1− δ, while it decreases with the market size R.
• There exist threshold levels f¯e(σ) and 1−δ¯(σ) of the entry cost and the exit probability,
respectively, such that the aggregate price index increases with a marginal increase in
the elasticity of substitution σ if the entry cost fe or the likelihood of exit 1 − δ is
below its threshold, and decreases if it is above.
Before discussing the intuition for the above proposition, we derive the effects of product
market characteristics on the mass of firms.
Proposition 7 (Product Market Characteristics and the Mass of Firms)
• The mass of active firms declines with the entry cost fe and the likelihood of exit 1−δ,
but increases with the market size R.
• The mass of active firms may decrease or increase with a marginal increase in the
elasticity of substitution σ.
The intuitions for Propositions 6 and 7 are as follows. An increase in either the entry
cost fe or the exit probability 1− δ deters potential firms from entering the market because
the expected payoff from entry declines. Accordingly, there are fewer firms operating in the
market. Few active firms reduces competition so that the aggregate price index increases.
An increase in the market size R attracts more entrants due to the expectation of a higher
profitability. The larger mass of active firms intensifies competition so that the aggregate
price index declines. Contrary to the entry cost, the exit probability and the market size,
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the effects of the elasticity of substitution σ are more complex. For a fixed aggregate price
index, one can show that the left-hand side of (2.36) increases with a marginal increase in σ
when the price index is above a threshold P (σ) and decreases otherwise. This observation in
turn implies that, to satisfy the free entry condition, the aggregate price index must decrease
with a marginal increase in σ in the former case, but increase in the latter case. Since the
aggregate price index increases with the entry cost fe and the exit probability 1 − δ, there
exist threshold levels of the entry cost and the exit probability, respectively, such that the
aggregate price index is greater than P (σ) if the entry cost or the exit probability exceeds
their respective thresholds, and is less than P (σ) otherwise. Consequently, the variation of
the aggregate price index with the product elasticity depends on the entry cost and the exit
probability. By (2.37), the differential effects of the product elasticity on the equilibrium
aggregate price cause the former to have an ambiguous effect on the mass of active firms.
Proposition 8 (Product Market Characteristics, Firm Value, and CEO Pay)
• Managerial compensation increases with the entry cost fe and the likelihood of exit
1− δ, but is not affected by the market size R.
• Firm value increases with the entry cost fe, but does not change with the market size
R. However, the effect of the exit probability 1− δ is ambiguous.
• There exists a trigger ı¯ such that managerial compensation increases with a marginal
increase in the elasticity of substitution σ if i > ı¯, but decreases if i < ı¯.
An increase in the market size R decreases the aggregate price index. While the former
has a positive effect on firm value and CEO pay, the latter has a negative effect. To ensure
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that the free entry condition (2.36) is satisfied, these effects exactly cancel out so that an
individual firm’s market value and its manager’s compensation do not change in response to
the increase in the market size. An increase in the entry cost or the exit probability increases
the aggregate price index so that CEO pay increases. The effect of the exit probability on
firm value is, however, ambiguous. This is because the increase in the aggregate price index
with the exit probability has a positive effect on firm value, whereas an increase in the exit
probability also has a direct, negative effect on the present value of firm profits by (2.34).
The effects of product substitutability on CEO pay depend on the rank of the firm in
the industry. A more elastic product market has differential effects on firms with larger firms
benefiting more in terms of greater gross earnings but smaller firms experiencing a decline.
Consequently, CEO pay increases with product substitutability if the rank is above a trigger,
and decreases if it is below. Because firm value depends on the firm’s net earnings (gross
earnings less CEO pay), the effects of product substitutability on firm value are ambiguous,
in general. As we see in the next section, some of the ambiguous effects of product market
characteristics on firm value and CEO pay can be pinned down when we calibrate the model
to data.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
To quantitatively investigate the extent to which managerial talent and product market
characteristics affect firm size and managerial compensation, we calibrate the model to U.S.
data. Because the model is one of competing firms in the same industry, we calibrate the
model “industry by industry.” We then compare the calibrated models across industries.
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2.5.1 Data
Our sample includes S&P 1500 firms from the ExecuComp database. We obtain firm-
specific variables from the Compustat annual database, and the Fama-French “twelve indus-
try” classification as well as industry portfolio returns from Kenneth French’s website. We
collect firm-CEO observations over the period 1992-2009 except for those in which sales or
book value of equity are nonpositive. We partition the entire sample into different industry
sectors. Among the twelve sectors, we exclude financial firms (SIC = 6000-6999) because the
model is strictly applicable to conventional firms producing goods and services and selling
them to consumers instead of financial intermediaries. In addition, because our model is one
of unregulated firms, we do not include regulated firms (SIC = 481 and 4900-4949) based on
Loughran and Ritter (1997). Further, we do not consider firms in miscellaneous industries
that are classified as “Other” in the Fama-French classification. Accordingly, the final sample
consists of 2,049 publicly traded U.S. companies and 20,635 firm-year observations, which
are grouped into nine different industry sectors labeled as Consumer Nondurables, Con-
sumer Durables, Manufacturing, Energy, Chemicals, Business Equipment, Telecom, Shops,
and Health Care.1
We now describe the variables used in the analysis. We compute total firm value (debt
plus equity) as the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book
1List of industry sectors: (1) Consumer Nondurables — Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys
(2) Consumer Durables — Cars, TV’s, Furniture, Household Appliances (3) Manufacturing — Machinery,
Trucks, Planes, Off Furnishing, Paper, Commercial Printing (4) Energy — Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and
Products (5) Chemicals — Chemicals and Allied Products (6) Business Equipment — Computers, Software,
and Electronic Equipment (7) Telecom — Telephone and Television Transmission (except for Telephone
communications, SIC:481) (8) Shops — Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) (9)
Health Care — Medical Equipment and Drugs
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value of equity.2 Our measure of CEO compensation is “total compensation,” which includes
salary, bonus, other annual, restricted stock grants, stock options (using the Black-Scholes
formula), and long-term incentives. For the purpose of comparison, we also carry out tests
using only CEO “cash compensation” (the sum of salary and annual bonus). In our analysis,
we indirectly infer the product substitutability of each industry by calibrating the model to
match moments of the distributions of CEO compensation and firm value in the data. To
validate and evaluate our indirect estimates of the industry product substitutabilities, we also
compute the price-cost margin for each industry. The “negative” price-cost margin is often
used as an empirical proxy for product substitutability (see Nevo, 2001). We compute the
price-cost margin as industry sales divided by industry operating costs. In particular, a firm’s
operating costs include costs of goods sold, selling, general and administrative expenses, and
depreciation, depletion, and amortization. We measure all variables in 2005 U.S. dollars
using the GDP deflator provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Since the model’s implications are cross-sectional, we take the averages of the variables
for each firm over the time period during which it was operating. Importantly, rather than
using the actual CEO pay variables, we employ a Lowess (locally weighted regression scatter
plot smoothing) curve to capture a smoothed pattern between CEO pay and firm value from
the actual noisy relation. As Tervio¨ (2008) points out, it facilitates the calibration of the
assignment model that involves a monotone matching correspondence. For each industry,
we rank firms by firm value and then perform a Lowess smoothing (bandwidth, 0.7) of
2Tervio¨ (2003, 2008) uses market capitalization that is common shares outstanding multiplied by the
share price (Compustat item MKVALT ) as firm market value.
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the relation between CEO compensation levels and firm ranks. Hereafter, the observed
distribution of CEO compensation refers to the smoothed levels.
Table 2.1 provides the cross-industry summary statistics for the variables in our analysis.
There is wide variation across industries. First, the business equipment industry contains the
largest number of firms. Given that this measure counts the number of firms that appeared
in the sample even for a short time period, it could be because many new dot-com companies
went public especially around the dot-com bubble period even though many of them failed
shortly. Second, the mean value of CEO total compensation is much higher in the energy,
business equipment, and telecom industries, relative to the manufacturing industry. Third,
differences in CEO pay levels across industries do not necessarily correspond to firm size
differences across industries. For instance, the total market value of the average firm in the
business equipment industry is $5.65 billion and that in the consumer durable goods industry
is $12.10 billion, whereas the average CEO earned $4.88 million in the former industry but
earned only $3.33 million in the latter industry. These preliminary findings suggest that CEO
pay does not increase with firm size across industries, and that product market/industry
characteristics are key determinants of CEO pay and firm size. Our subsequent analysis, in
which we calibrate our model to “industry by industry” data on the distributions of CEO
compensation and firm value, provides further support for these preliminary findings.
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Table 2.1. Cross-Industry Summary Statistics
We extract firm-specific variables and CEO compensation variables for 1992-2009 from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database and ExecuComp database,
respectively. CEO Total Compensation is ExecuComp item TDC1, which represents the total compensation comprised of salary, bonus, other annual, total value of
restricted stock granted, total value of stock-options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total, whereas CEO Cash Compensation
(ExecuComp item TOTAL CURR) is comprised of only salary and bonus. Total Firm Value (market value of common equity plus book value of debt) is computed as
common stock price (item PRCCF ) times shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year (item CSHO) plus total assets (item AT ) minus book value of equity, which is
computed as common equity (item CEQ) plus balance sheet deferred taxes (item TXDB). Total Assets is item AT, and Net Sales is item SALE. Operating Costs contains
costs of goods sold (item COGS), selling, general and administrative expenses (item XGAS), and depreciation, depletion, and amortization (item DP ). All nominal
variables are converted to 2005 U.S. dollars (in millions) using the GDP deflator provided by the BEA. We take the averages of all of the above variables for each firm over
the time period during which it was operating to construct a cross-sectional sample, and then group them into Fama-French’s 12 industries (except for finance, regulated,
and other miscellaneous groups). CEO total compensation variables below are not the actual variables, but smoothed ones obtained by performing a Lowess (bandwidth,
0.7) on the relation between the actual compensation levels and the ranks of the firms in terms of total firm value. In this table, We report the means and standard
deviations (in parentheses) of the variables by industry.
Industry Number of CEO Total CEO Cash Total Firm Total Net Operating
Sector Firms Compensation Compensation Value Assets Sales Costs
All 2,049 4.158 1.093 6,656.87 3,568.24 3,523.28 3,184.76
(3.183) (0.575) (20,878.71) (12,479.35) (11,341.15) (10,410.12)
Consumer Nondurables 179 4.519 1.391 7,733.62 3,826.24 3,797.87 3,270.09
(3.277) (0.610) (19,706.46) (8,719.88) (7,107.49) (5,864.65)
Consumer Durables 79 3.332 1.276 12,101.22 10,560.74 7,955.60 7,463.66
(2.413) (0.741) (48,959.69) (46,190.00) (28,532.65) (26,869.93)
Manufacturing 344 3.247 1.101 4,800.97 3,093.20 3,011.03 2,724.85
(2.120) (0.505) (9,333.92) (5,633.12) (5,439.08) (4,961.03)
Energy 129 4.901 1.484 11,112.22 7,308.58 7,307.09 6,571.67
(3.215) (0.896) (32,476.72) (17,860.30) (23,211.10) (20,722.15)
Chemicals 81 3.803 1.289 7,811.80 4,139.14 3,871.18 3,400.54
(2.330) (0.562) (19,369.27) (8,998.54) (7,518.10) (6,447.83)
Business Equipment 570 4.878 0.854 5,650.21 2,190.35 1,825.21 1,627.05
(4.197) (0.425) (19,557.22) (6,704.69) (5,951.96) (5,276.70)
Telecom 47 9.427 2.051 19,090.18 13,465.62 4,712.52 4,042.46
(8.435) (1.666) (22,914.43) (18,590.19) (7,080.78) (6,028.28)
Shops 351 3.355 1.100 4,858.26 2,667.92 5,423.12 5,146.80
(2.195) (0.454) (14,937.68) (6,774.00) (14,390.24) (13,699.57)
Health Care 269 3.674 0.917 6,538.02 2,350.04 1,686.00 1,361.08
(2.758) (0.466) (19,934.36) (6,439.36) (4,300.51) (3,291.66)
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2.5.2 Calibration
We estimate the structural parameters of the model by matching moments of the dis-
tributions of CEO pay and firm value in a given industry. The calibration strategy is as
follows:
1. By (2.34) and (2.35), the distributions of firm value and CEO pay depend on the
distributions of firm quality, x[i], and CEO talent, y[i], that are unobserved by the
econometrician. We hereafter refer to the latter distributions as factor distributions.
For a given candidate vector of model parameter values—that is, the “deep” structural
parameters of the model—we indirectly infer the factor distributions from the observed
distributions of firm value and CEO pay in the industry using (2.28) and (2.29).
2. In the second step, we employ the indirectly inferred factor distributions obtained from
step 1 to generate the model-predicted distributions of CEO pay and firm value using
(2.34) and (2.35).
3. In the third step, we compare some statistics from the model-predicted distributions
of CEO pay and firm value with the corresponding observed statistics.
4. We repeat steps 1-3 until we obtain the baseline set of model parameters as those that
minimize the distance (in a suitable metric) between the observed moments and the
predicted moments.
We now describe the calibration procedure in more detail. The set of parameters to be
calibrated is
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∆ = {δ, R, σ, u0}. (2.38)
Each of the above parameters is determined as follows. As Melitz (2003) notes, δ can be
viewed either as the likelihood that each operating firm will stay in the market for another
period or as the time discount rate for the industry. The industry discount rate is usually
calculated using the industry cost of capital, r, assuming annual compounding:
δ = 1/(1 + r). (2.39)
The cost of capital r is computed as the weighted average of the cost of equity and after-
tax cost of debt, weighted by the market values of equity and debt (see the Data Page of
Damodaran Online for details). Because R is the aggregate revenue of all operating firms in
the market, we set it equal to industry sales, that is, the sum of net sales for firms operating
in the industry.
We determine the remaining two parameters—the elasticity of product substitution σ
and the wage of the lowest ability manager, u0—by matching several moments from the
model-predicted distributions of firm value and managerial compensation with the corre-
sponding observed moments. More specifically, we match mean values, minimum and maxi-
mum values, and deciles of the distributions of firm value and CEO pay. Let Obsi and Predi
be the observed and predicted values of each selected statistic; then the baseline values of σ
and u0 solve
(σ, u0) = arg min
σ˜,u˜0
Σi
(Predi(σ˜, u˜0)−Obsi
Obsi
)2
. (2.40)
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As indicated above, the baseline values of σ and u0 minimize the sum of the squared per-
centage deviations of the predicted statistics from the observed ones.
We now describe how we generate the model-predicted distributions of firm value and
CEO pay for a candidate parameter vector ∆, that is, steps 1 and 2 of our calibration strategy
described earlier. We first identify the unobserved factor distributions following Tervio¨ (2003,
2008). Recall that the slopes of the payoff functions must follow (2.28) and (2.29), which
guarantees matching stability. Dividing these slopes by the equation for the total surplus
(2.21), respectively, yields the following equations for the rates of increase of the factors.
x′[i]
x[i]
=
v′(i)
(σ − 1)[v(i) + u(i)/(1− δ)] , (2.41)
y′[i]
y[i]
=
u′(i)
(1− δ)(σ − 1)[v(i) + u(i)/(1− δ)] . (2.42)
We can then obtain the profiles of the unobserved factors relative to the lowest type by
integrating these equations, respectively.
x[i]
x[0]
= exp
{∫ i
0
x′[j]
x[j]
dj
}
= exp
{
1
σ − 1
∫ i
0
v′(j)
v(j) + u(j)/(1− δ)dj
}
, (2.43)
y[i]
y[0]
= exp
{∫ i
0
y′[j]
y[j]
dj
}
= exp
{
1
(1− δ)(σ − 1)
∫ i
0
u′(j)
v(j) + u(j)/(1− δ)dj
}
. (2.44)
We calculate the relative factor values by numerically integrating the right-hand sides of
equations (2.43) and (2.44). As in Tervio¨ (2003, 2008), the constants x[0] and y[0] cannot be
identified and are not required for our calibration, that is, we only need the relative factor
distributions, x[i]/x[0] and y[i]/y[0].
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Next, we use the indirectly inferred relative factor distributions to generate the model-
predicted distributions of firm value and CEO pay from (2.34) and (2.35). Note that the
equilibrium aggregate price index P ∗ enters both (2.34) and (2.35). We determine the equi-
librium aggregate price index as follows. Treating the observed number of firms in the
industry as the equilibrium mass N∗ of firms in the model, the equilibrium condition (2.37)
can be rewritten as
(P ∗/w) =
1
ρ
[∫ 1
0
(x[i]y[i])σ−1N∗di
] 1
1−σ
. (2.45)
Since x[0] and y[0] are undetermined, we can only compute the relative aggregate price index,
P0, which is defined as
P0 = (P
∗/w)ρx[0]y[0] =
[∫ 1
0
( x[i]
x[0]
y[i]
y[0]
)σ−1
N∗di
] 1
1−σ
. (2.46)
Third, we generate the predicted distributions of firm value and CEO pay by plugging
the given parameter values, the inferred relative factor values x[i]/x[0] and y[i]/y[0], and the
relative aggregate price index P0 into (2.34) and (2.35).
We compare the selected statistics from the predicted distributions with their observed
counterparts. We minimize the sum of squared percentage differences between the model-
predicted and observed values of the statistics as described in (2.40) to obtain the baseline
values of σ and u0.
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2.5.3 Calibration Results
Through the calibration procedure illustrated in the previous section, we obtain the
baseline parameter values and the factor distributions for each of the nine industries in
our sample. Table 2.2 reports the estimates of the parameters in the first four columns.
The first two parameters δ and R are obtained directly from the data as described earlier.
The other two parameter values—σ and u0—are obtained by matching moments of the
predicted distributions of firm value and CEO compensation to their observed values. There
are significant differences in the calibrated values of the product substitutability σ across
industries. The product substitutability is lower in the business equipment, health care, and
telecom industries, whereas it is higher in the industries of consumer durable goods and shops.
This result is intuitive given that, in high-technology-intensity sectors, product innovation
plays a critical role and products tend to display a high degree of product differentiation
(Ioannidis and Schreyer, 1997; Anderton, 1999). Moreover, because σ can also be interpreted
as the price elasticity for each good, the finding of Tellis (1988) also supports our result. By
reviewing econometric studies that estimate price elasticities of different brands and markets,
he documents that price elasticity for pharmaceutical products is lower than all other product
categories and the difference is particularly significant and large for detergents and durable
goods in comparison with pharmaceutical products.3
Previous empirical literature uses the negative price-cost margin of the industry as a
proxy for product substitutability (e.g. Nevo, 2001; Karuna, 2007). The underlying
3The very high value of σ for the consumer durable goods industry is, in fact, consistent with a general
consensus in the literature on industrial organization that in any durable good industry, competition will be
more intense than in a non-durable good industry (e.g., Coase, 1972).
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Table 2.2. Parameter Estimates, Relative Factor Values, and Price-Cost Margin
Industry Sector δ R σ u0 x[1]/x[0] y[1]/y[0] PCM
Consumer Nondurables 0.9301 679,818.9 7.6894 0.9473 2.5822 1.0105 1.1614
Consumer Durables 0.9295 628,492.7 15.5667 0.6806 1.5280 1.0028 1.0659
Manufacturing 0.9125 1,035,794 11.8989 1.4094 1.8379 1.0033 1.1050
Energy 0.9265 942,614.6 10.3864 2.1119 1.9014 1.0017 1.1119
Chemicals 0.9190 313,565.5 7.7124 0.6533 2.3079 1.0059 1.1384
Business Equipment 0.9010 1,040,368 3.5215 0.8246 22.5727 1.0282 1.1218
Telecom 0.9450 221,488.3 4.9714 0.9281 4.1659 1.0200 1.1658
Shops 0.9254 1,903,514 14.6211 0.8163 1.6698 1.0039 1.0537
Health Care 0.9207 453,534.7 3.6899 0.8390 13.7848 1.0244 1.2387
Figure 2.1. Inferred Distributions of Firm Quality and Managerial Talent
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motivation for this proxy is that the higher is the extent of product substitutability in an
industry, the greater is the price elasticity of demand, and the lower is the price-cost margin.
To further validate our estimates of the parameter σ, we compare the ranking of industries
with respect to our estimates of σ with the corresponding ranking obtained by using the
industry negative price-cost margin estimates.
We calculate the industry price cost margin as industry sales divided by industry oper-
ating costs. We show the estimates of the measure in the last column of the table shows the
estimates of the measure. Note that the numbers should only be interpreted in an ordinal
sense, that is, the ranking of the industries according to the measure is more meaningful for
our purposes than the actual numbers themselves. Note that the higher the product substi-
tutability of an industry, the lower is the price-cost margin. We observe that the health care
and telecom industries have relatively high price-cost margins, whereas shops and consumer
durable goods industries have low values. Except for the business equipment industry, the
ranking of industries by our estimated values of σ are consistent with the ranking by the
negative price-cost margin. Because our estimates of σ are indirectly inferred from data
on the distributions of firm value and CEO pay, the close correspondence between the two
rankings provides additional support for the model.
In addition to the model parameter values, we indirectly infer the unobserved factor
distributions in our calibration exercise. The two middle columns of Table 2.2 report the
highest values of firm quality and managerial talent relative to their lowest ones. For any
industry, it is obvious that differences in firm quality between the highest and lowest ranking
firms are greater than those in managerial talent, which implies that the relative impact of
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firm quality on the resulting payoffs is higher than that of managerial talent as concluded
by Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio¨ (2003, 2008). However, more importantly, intra-
industry dispersions of the factors vary significantly across industries. Compared to other
industries, the business equipment, health care, and telecom industries have higher relative
values of firm quality and managerial talent.
In Figure 2.1, we report the entire factor distributions for the business equipment,
health care, telecom, and manufacturing industries. The first two industries have much
more widely dispersed firm and managerial characteristics across firms. In particular, the
distributions of firm quality tend to be highly skewed to the right (convex), whereas those
of managerial talent tend to be monotonically increasing (concave). The telecom industry
shows a similar pattern (albeit higher) of firm heterogeneity to that of the manufacturing
industry, whereas its talent distribution is closer to the first two industries even though
there is little dispersion at the top of the distribution. Finally, firms and managers are very
homogeneous in the manufacturing industry, which is also true for the other industries not
reported in the graph.
Although our main focus is on the implications of managerial talent, we first discuss
how to interpret the exogenous firm quality given that there are significant inter-industry
variations in the inferred distributions of firm quality. The three industries with higher
firm heterogeneity (business equipment, health care, and telecom industries) are usually
referred to as high-tech industries (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Moreover, in the first two
industries, there are a small mass of firms that are much more significantly differentiated
from other firms in the same industry. Tervio¨ (2008) broadly interprets the dimension of
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firm heterogeneity that is complementary to CEO talent as the natural scale of a firm, that
is, all exogenous determinants of the scope (niches) of a firm’s operations that are linked to
technology and consumer preferences. The strategy literature also attributes intra-industry
firm heterogeneity to the establishment of unique product market positions (e.g., Caves and
Porter, 1977). Such an interpretation is enhanced by our finding that variations in the firm-
side dimension appear to be much greater in high-tech industries that are characterized by
a greater variety of business ideas and technological innovations (Andersson et al., 2009).
We now discuss the implications of the inferred distributions of managerial talent. In
Figure 2.1, compared to the manufacturing and other unreported industries, we observe
greater intra-industry differences in CEO talent in high-tech industries. This finding, which
is obtained by conducting the same procedure for each industry without any a priori as-
sumption, suggests differences in CEO talent pools across industries. Although our analysis
cannot compare the absolute levels of managerial talent between industries because the low-
est levels are undetermined, a higher degree of CEO talent dispersion within an industry
implies higher competition for CEO talent among firms. In other words, firms put greater
emphasis on CEO human capital in those industries with greater heterogeneity in manage-
rial talent. It is intuitive in the sense that the success of high-tech firms, which need to
continuously develop new products and manage technological innovation in a highly com-
petitive environment with very low barriers to entry and very high risk, is very closely tied
to the talents of the workforce (Andersson et al., 2009). Further, “managerial rents” models
in the management literature argue that managerial human capital is more emphasized in
industries in the early stages of the product-life cycle (e.g., early biotechnology companies),
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relative to that in more mature industries, and in industries with characteristics that allow
greater managerial discretion than industries with less latitude for managerial discretion
(Castanias and Helfat, 2001). Given that industries producing a differentiable product or
service and high-growth industries tend to provide more managerial discretion (Hambrick
and Abrahamson, 1995), our finding of larger talent dispersions in high-tech industries is in
line with these arguments.
One may argue that this finding might mainly be induced by the prevalence of equity-
based compensation of CEOs in high-tech industries. To examine that possibility, we perform
the same analysis using CEO cash compensation, containing only salary and annual bonus.
Figure 2.2 shows that greater differences in CEO talent are still observed in high-tech indus-
tries, relative to other traditional industries, even though the relative talent levels are overall
lower than those are in Figure 2.1. As another robustness check, we also test an extension
in which the impact of management team (top senior executives) is taken into account. As
a caveat on firm-CEO matching models, it is often pointed out that, upon CEO turnover,
the top management team usually tends to be replaced together. An easier way to deal
with this extension would be to assume that the quality of the management team is simply
characterized by a one-dimensional variable and keep the current framework as it is except
that the observed CEO compensation distribution should be replaced by the distribution of
the average compensation of non-CEO executives. In Figure 2.3, one can observe similar
patterns of firm quality and managerial talent distributions.
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Figure 2.2. Inferred Distributions of Firm Quality and Managerial Talent (CEO Cash Compensation)
Figure 2.3. Inferred Distributions of Firm Quality and Managerial Talent (Non-CEO Total Compensation)
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2.5.4 Counterfactual Experiments
We now conduct counterfactual experiments using the respective calibrated models that
consist of the estimated baseline parameter values and the implied distributions of firm
quality and CEO talent. First, we examine the quantitative impact of CEO talent in each
industry. Second, we examine how product market characteristics affect firm value and CEO
pay.
Impact of CEO Talent
We consider the experiment of Gabaix and Landier (2008) that examines the impact of
CEO talent at the median-sized firm among the largest 500 firms. Suppose that the reference
firm indexed by i = 1/2 could replace its manager by the best CEO indexed by i = 1 in
the same industry. We assume that the aggregate market structure, such as the aggregate
price index P ∗ and the equilibrium mass N∗ of firms, remains unchanged with this event
associated with only one firm. To begin with, using (2.21), we calculate the rate of increase
in the total surplus S at this reference firm as
∆S
S[1/2]
=
S(x[1/2], y[1])− S(x[1/2], y[1/2])
S(x[1/2], y[1/2])
=
( y[1]/y[0]
y[1/2]/y[0]
)σ−1
− 1. (2.47)
Next, we estimate how much the firm’s market value v would change due to this event by
using (2.15). In fact, this measure captures the gross benefit from hiring the best CEO, that
is, the present value of additional future gross earnings relative to the current market value
as shown below:
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∆v
v[1/2]
=
φ(x[1/2], y[1], u[1/2])− φ(x[1/2], y[1/2], u[1/2])
φ(x[1/2], y[1/2], u[1/2])
=
R(P ∗ρx[1/2])σ−1
(1−δ)σ (y[1]
σ−1 − y[1/2]σ−1)
v[1/2]
.
(2.48)
For the purpose of comparison, we also consider the cost to be incurred if the firm was
required to pay the best CEO his current compensation at the largest firm. We compute
this as the ratio of the present value of future additional compensation payments relative to
the current market value, that is,
∆u/(1− δ)
v[1/2]
=
(u[1]− u[1/2])/(1− δ)
v[1/2]
. (2.49)
Table 2.3 shows the results of this counterfactual experiment. Note that, since CEO
compensation is relatively small compared to the firm’s gross profit, changes in surplus and
those in firm value are very similar. The percentage changes in firm value in the second
column should be compared to the result of Gabaix and Landier (2008), whose sample is the
largest 500 firms among S&P 1500 firms in different industries. In their estimation, replacing
the median CEO by the number one CEO at no extra compensation payment increases
firm value by only 0.016%. Our estimates, by contrast, are almost two orders of magnitude
greater than their estimate in most sectors.
More importantly, there is considerable variation across industries. The impact of better
CEOs is, indeed, much more quantitatively significant in the business equipment and health
care industries (about 2.9% and 2.5%, respectively), whereas the size of the impact in the
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Table 2.3. Impact of CEO Talent at the Median-Sized Firm
Industry Sector ∆S
S[1/2]
(%) ∆v
v[1/2]
(%) ∆u/(1−δ)
v[1/2]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 1.723 1.762 6.945
Consumer Durables 1.134 1.151 4.017
Manufacturing 1.134 1.163 3.944
Energy 1.229 1.246 3.147
Chemicals 0.841 0.852 2.157
Business Equipment 2.841 2.909 10.719
Telecom 1.179 1.195 3.985
Shops 1.575 1.608 5.353
Health Care 2.465 2.532 8.693
chemical industry (0.85%) is the lowest. In particular, notice that industries with lower
impact of managerial talent are the chemical, consumer durable goods, and manufacturing
industries which are often viewed as old economy industries in contrast with new economy or
high-tech industries. Since there is no much difference in talent between the highest and the
median ranking CEOs in the telecom industry as shown in Figure 2.1, this industry shows
a somewhat low impact of managerial talent, which might be different if the replacement of
the lowest ranking CEO with the best one was considered.
Further, these ratios of the benefit from hiring the best CEO should be compared with
the ratios of additional compensation payments relative to firm market value that we re-
port in the last column. Higher costs than benefits is a natural result of the competitive
assignment process because otherwise the matching of the median firm-manager pair would
not be sustained. As one can expect, the size of the additional cost is higher in the busi-
ness equipment and health care industries (10.72% and 8.69%, respectively) in which the
marginal returns to managerial talent are higher than in other industries. However, it is
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worth emphasizing that, for any industry, the size of the cost is roughly of the same order
of magnitude as the size of the benefit. More precisely, the cost is about three or four times
greater than the benefit.
This result also contrasts sharply with the findings of Gabaix and Landier (2008). They
document that the talent difference resulting in a mere 0.016% increase in firm market value
implies 530% difference in CEO pay, which might be mainly attributed to the huge difference
in firm size between the highest and median ranking firms, possibly, from different industries.
For the purpose of comparison, we compute the cost measure from their calibration results,4
and obtain the estimate of 1.77% if the discount rate is 0.9 (based on the estimated values of
δ in our analysis). This cost measure is two orders of magnitude higher than their estimate
of the rate of increase in firm market value, 0.016%. Overall, our results show that when
different industries are characterized by different structures of CEO talent and product
markets, the impact of managerial talent is not negligible at all, and the compensation of
CEOs is quantitatively in line with their contributions to firms.
In addition to the effects of the hypothetical employment only at a reference firm, we
now estimate the effects of counterfactual distributions, which is similar to the approach
used by Tervio¨ (2008). More specifically, we look at three cases in which all managers
hypothetically have the same level of talent y[I] with I = 0, 1/2, and 1, respectively, while
the existing distribution of firm quality is kept in place. Since there is no heterogeneity on the
side of managers, the current levels of compensation (2.35) from the competitive assignment
process cannot be applied. Following Tervio¨ (2008), we assume that all the managers would
4According to their notation, it is measured as the present value of additional future compensation
payments, w(1)− w(n∗), divided by S(n∗), where n∗ is 250.
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Table 2.4. Effects of Hypothetical Talent Distributions
I=0 I=1/2 I=1 I=0 I=1/2 I=1 I=0 I=1/2 I=1
Industry Sector ∆U
I
U
(%) ∆N
I
N
(%) ∆E[S]
I
E[S]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -0.866 -0.154 -0.200 0.728 0.240 -1.765 -0.720 -0.239 1.815
Consumer Durables -0.228 -0.046 -0.058 0.507 0.142 -1.149 -0.505 -0.142 1.227
Manufacturing -0.251 -0.059 -0.082 0.504 0.155 -1.223 -0.500 -0.154 1.243
Energy -0.096 -0.080 -0.076 0.396 0.174 -1.004 -0.380 -0.173 1.040
Chemicals -0.440 -0.060 -0.103 0.623 0.094 -1.024 -0.598 -0.094 1.078
Business Equipment -2.224 -0.743 -0.661 0.784 0.354 -2.216 -0.769 -0.348 2.297
Telecom -1.662 -0.119 -0.286 0.777 0.265 -1.561 -0.771 -0.264 1.581
Shops -0.305 -0.068 -0.087 0.693 0.193 -1.616 -0.682 -0.190 1.668
Health Care -2.009 -0.663 -0.432 0.627 0.241 -1.558 -0.611 -0.234 1.609
earn the same level of compensation that manager I receives in the original equilibrium with
managerial heterogeneity, u[I]. All the product market characteristics are assumed to be the
same, and we set the fixed entry cost fe to the value of E[v[i]] in the current equilibrium,
following the free entry condition (2.32). We derive a new equilibrium under this structure,
that is, a new set of the relative aggregate price index, P I0 , and the mass of firms, N
I , using
(2.36) and (2.37):
R
σ
(
P I0
)σ−1 ∫ 1
0
( x[i]
x[0]
y[I]
y[0]
)σ−1
di = u[I] + (1− δ)fe, (2.50)
N I =
R/σ
u[I] + (1− δ)fe , (2.51)
S([x[i], y[I]) =
R
(1− δ)σ
(
P I0
x[i]
x[0]
y[I]
y[0]
)σ−1
, (2.52)
and then compare the results of each counterfactual with the original equilibrium outcome.
Table 2.4 displays the percentage differences in consumer welfare, the mass of firms, and
the mean value of the surplus. Note that consumer welfare is measured by the equilibrium
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utility level of the representative consumer, U∗ = R/P ∗, by (2.5), which is inversely related
to the aggregate price index.
First, consumer welfare in each counterfactual is worse than in the original economy.
The integral on the left-hand side of (2.50) represents the industry-wide productivity and
has a greater value if I is bigger. u[I] on the right-hand side is also larger if I is bigger.
When the hypothetical talent level of all managers is the lowest one, y[0], the former effect
is larger than the latter effect, resulting in a higher aggregate price and thus negatively
affecting consumer welfare. Interestingly, even when all managers are of the highest type
with y[1], that is, the industry-wide productivity in this counterfactual is higher than in the
original equilibrium, consumer welfare is still worse than the original equilibrium because
of the high value of u[1]. Note that the mass of firms would decrease in this counterfactual.
In other words, the high managerial compensation might attract less firms in the market
and dampen market competition, thereby causing a deterioration in consumer welfare. In
particular, industries with higher levels of CEO compensation show greater consumer welfare
losses.
Impact of Product Market Characteristics
We now examine the effects of different product market characteristics on the equi-
librium outcome. In the monopolistically competitive product market, there are several
dimensions influencing the market structure: the elasticity of product substitution σ, the
exit probability 1−δ, the entry cost fe, and the market size R. We explore how each of these
dimensions alters the equilibrium outcome, including consumer welfare (due to a change in
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the aggregate price index), the mass of firms, and the levels and distributions of CEO pay
and firm market value, by varying that specific parameter over its plausible range.
Effects of Product Substitutability:
Table 2.5 shows the effects of the elasticity of product substitution across industries. To
begin with, it is observed that, for any industry, the aggregate price index increases and the
mass of firms declines as product substitutability increases. According to Proposition 6, this
observation implies that the entry cost and the exit probability are below their respective
thresholds. In this case, at the current equilibrium aggregate price, a marginal increase in
product substitutability implies more intense price competition and therefore lowers firms’
gross and net profits, which, in turn, adjusts the aggregate price upward to a new level for
the free entry condition (2.36) to be met again. While the percentage change in the mass
of firms seems to be similar across industries, the change in the aggregate price index varies
significantly across industries. In particular, the aggregate price index is more sensitive to
the elasticity of product substitution especially in the business equipment and health care
industries, for which the baseline value of the parameter is relatively lower as shown in
Table 2.2. Hence, the observation implies that these industries are not only heterogeneous
in terms of product substitutability but also more vulnerable to some exogenous factors that
would affect the degree of product substitutability. In contrast, the consumer durable goods
industry has the least sensitivity of the aggregate price index. In fact, its least change in
the consumer durable goods industry is also observed when any of other product market
characteristics changes. This result might be explained by the argument of the price rigidity
in this industry (Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1986, 1988; Leith and Malley, 2007).
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Table 2.5. Effects of Product Substitutability σ
(Change in σ) -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10%
Industry Sector ∆U
U
(%) ∆N
N
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%) ∆E[v]
E[v]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 10.63 4.77 -4.01 -7.37 11.30 5.08 -4.52 -9.04 10.73 5.45 -5.03 -9.99 0.09 0.17 0.29 0.42
Consumer Durables 3.69 1.68 -1.44 -2.66 11.69 5.19 -5.19 -9.09 10.12 5.23 -5.20 -10.49 -0.18 0.04 0.33 0.43
Manufacturing 7.01 3.20 -2.75 -5.09 11.01 5.22 -4.93 -9.28 4.28 2.23 -2.21 -4.52 -0.01 0.04 0.21 0.27
Energy 6.91 3.15 -2.66 -4.93 11.02 4.72 -5.51 -10.24 1.05 0.77 -1.18 -2.73 -0.36 -0.13 0.36 0.64
Chemicals 9.60 4.33 -3.64 -6.70 11.39 6.33 -5.06 -8.86 6.05 3.19 -3.30 -6.84 -0.28 -0.06 0.48 0.80
Business Equipment 47.11 19.15 -13.68 -23.77 11.39 5.34 -4.98 -9.43 15.13 7.78 -7.89 -15.66 -0.40 -0.18 0.32 0.57
Telecom 16.07 7.09 -5.84 -10.61 10.64 6.38 -4.26 -8.51 6.54 3.26 -2.41 -4.74 0.45 0.33 0.08 -0.03
Shops 5.43 2.49 -2.14 -3.98 11.21 5.46 -4.89 -9.48 8.23 4.22 -4.31 -8.67 -0.23 -0.09 0.23 0.41
Health Care 35.95 14.95 -11.06 -19.45 11.41 5.32 -4.94 -9.51 17.27 8.70 -8.40 -16.38 -0.44 -0.18 0.35 0.65
Figure 2.4. Shifts in CEO Pay Distributions due to Changes in σ (Business Equipment and Telecom)
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Next, we examine the effects of product substitutability for the equilibrium distributions
of CEO pay and firm market value. CEO pay levels, measured by their mean values, decline
with this dimension of market competition. In particular, CEO pay levels in the health care
and business equipment industries are affected most by a change in this parameter. Roughly
speaking, the average CEOs in these industries would face an about 8% pay cut in response
to a 5% increase in product substitutability in the market.
In addition to the mean values of CEO pay, we further examine the shifts in CEO pay
distributions in response to a 10% increase and a 10% decrease in product substitutability
for the business equipment and telecom industries. Figure 2.4 displays the shifts in CEO pay
distribution for these industries. As noted in the comparison of the mean values of CEO pay,
the shifts in CEO pay distributions in the former industry are more noticeable than those
in the latter industry. More importantly, the figure confirms the analytical result presented
in Proposition 8 that an increase in the elasticity of product substitution affects managerial
compensation differently across firms. That is, there is a certain rank such that managers
below the rank get paid less than currently, whereas managers above that rank get paid
more. While the trigger rank in the former industry is almost the highest one, it is lower
(¯ı = 0.9) in the latter industry. This result implies that a change in product substitutability
may induce a larger CEO pay dispersion within an industry.
Finally, while firms would face a more price-elastic demand in the market in response to
an increase in product substitutability, they could also reduce CEO pay levels. It is shown in
Table 2.5 that, due to these contrasting effects, product substitutability has a less significant
quantitative effect on firm market value than it does on CEO pay.
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Effects of the Exit Probability and Entry Cost:
The exit probability 1 − δ and the entry cost fe affect the equilibrium outcome mainly
through the aggregate price index determined by the free entry condition (2.36). As either
of them increases, the free entry condition implies that the aggregate price index also must
increase. The other equilibrium condition (2.37) implies that this market change lowers the
mass of firms in the market. The intuition is that an increase in the exit probability or the
entry cost induces fewer firms to enter the market and, therefore, reduces price competition,
resulting in a higher aggregate price index. Consequently, the marginal returns to talent,
the integrand in (2.35), increase so that managers would get paid more.
Table 2.6 displays the effects of the industry discount rate δ instead of the exit prob-
ability 1 − δ, and the effects of the fixed entry cost fe are reported in Table 2.7. Notice
that we consider smaller percentage changes in δ because of its upper limit, 0 < δ < 1. The
exit probability has a much more significant quantitative impact on the equilibrium outcome
than any other parameters do. Since the parameter can be viewed as being negatively as-
sociated with industry risk that active firms face in the market, this observation suggests
the important role of risk in determining the market equilibrium outcome. In particular, the
telecom industry is overall most sensitive to this factor. Specifically, a 5% increase in risk
leads to a 65.3% increase in the mean value of CEO pay in the telecom industry. Moreover,
one can observe that the changes in firm value are relatively smaller than those in CEO pay
and that their signs vary across industries, which in fact confirms the ambiguous effect of
the discount rate on firm market value in Proposition 8. In contrast with the influence of the
exit probability, that of the entry cost seems to be uniform across industries. Nonetheless,
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Table 2.6. Effects of Discount Rate δ
(Change in δ) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆U
U
(%) ∆N
N
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%) ∆E[v]
E[v]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -6.71 -3.81 5.27 13.94 -37.29 -22.60 41.24 140.11 47.45 23.70 -23.12 -46.24 0.91 0.57 -0.09 -0.42
Consumer Durables -2.38 -1.29 1.62 3.81 -29.87 -18.18 25.97 72.73 34.00 16.85 -16.74 -33.64 0.97 0.66 -0.16 -0.80
Manufacturing -3.21 -1.76 2.20 5.19 -30.14 -17.68 26.67 73.33 20.25 10.14 -10.02 -20.10 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.16
Energy -4.47 -2.50 3.45 8.71 -36.22 -22.05 37.01 118.11 30.77 15.43 -15.63 -31.12 0.97 0.54 -0.30 -0.81
Chemicals -5.80 -3.23 4.28 10.56 -32.91 -20.25 32.91 97.47 41.59 20.75 -20.53 -40.92 1.06 0.77 -0.25 -0.76
Business Equipment -13.05 -7.35 9.87 24.20 -29.89 -17.62 26.69 72.60 35.28 17.71 -17.60 -35.08 0.67 0.39 -0.22 -0.52
Telecom -12.37 -7.17 11.12 34.00 -40.43 -25.53 53.19 221.28 65.31 32.33 -30.96 -61.54 0.16 0.10 0.35 0.53
Shops -2.95 -1.63 2.16 5.30 -33.91 -20.40 33.91 102.30 38.40 19.17 -19.26 -38.41 0.44 0.25 -0.11 -0.31
Health Care -15.13 -8.62 12.55 33.78 -35.74 -21.67 37.64 119.01 43.38 21.43 -21.20 -42.21 1.16 0.63 -0.50 -1.10
Table 2.7. Effects of Entry Cost fe
(Change in fe) -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10%
Industry Sector ∆U
U
(%) ∆N
N
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%) ∆E[v]
E[v]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 1.56 0.74 -0.76 -1.47 11.30 5.08 -4.52 -9.04 -7.83 -3.84 4.19 8.29 -9.86 -4.82 5.29 10.44
Consumer Durables 0.72 0.34 -0.34 -0.65 10.39 5.19 -5.19 -9.09 -7.96 -3.92 4.06 8.01 -9.93 -4.86 5.30 10.4
Manufacturing 0.95 0.46 -0.45 -0.87 10.72 4.93 -4.93 -9.28 -4.67 -2.31 2.41 4.76 -9.87 -4.88 5.12 10.12
Energy 1.14 0.55 -0.52 -1.01 11.02 4.72 -5.51 -9.45 -5.79 -2.87 2.88 5.72 -10.05 -4.97 5.20 10.27
Chemicals 1.58 0.76 -0.74 -1.43 11.39 5.06 -5.06 -8.86 -8.41 -4.17 4.32 8.50 -9.94 -4.85 5.32 10.45
Business Equipment 4.30 2.07 -1.94 -3.76 11.21 5.16 -4.98 -9.25 -8.40 -4.20 4.23 8.46 -10.06 -5.00 5.14 10.22
Telecom 2.61 1.24 -1.27 -2.40 10.64 6.38 -4.26 -8.51 -8.66 -4.25 4.85 9.56 -9.77 -4.77 5.19 10.18
Shops 0.78 0.38 -0.36 -0.70 11.21 5.17 -4.89 -9.20 -7.63 -3.81 3.82 7.62 -10.01 -4.97 5.10 10.15
Health Care 4.05 1.94 -1.84 -3.55 11.41 5.32 -4.94 -9.13 -7.88 -3.92 4.00 7.97 -10.11 -5.02 5.20 10.33
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Table 2.8. Effects of Market Size R
(Change in R) -10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10%
Industry Sector ∆U
U
(%) ∆N
N
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -1.62 -0.80 0.71 1.41 -10.17 -5.08 5.08 10.17
Consumer Durables -0.72 -0.35 0.33 0.65 -10.39 -5.19 5.19 10.39
Manufacturing -0.97 -0.48 0.44 0.87 -10.14 -5.22 4.64 9.86
Energy -1.11 -0.55 0.53 1.03 -10.24 -5.51 4.72 9.45
Chemicals -1.58 -0.78 0.72 1.43 -10.13 -5.06 5.06 10.13
Business Equipment -4.15 -2.04 1.97 3.89 -10.14 -5.16 4.98 9.96
Telecom -2.65 -1.33 1.17 2.36 -8.51 -4.26 6.38 10.64
Shops -0.77 -0.38 0.36 0.70 -10.06 -5.17 4.89 10.06
Health Care -3.92 -1.94 1.85 3.66 -10.27 -4.94 5.32 10.27
the price rigidity of the consumer durable goods industry still holds in response to a change
in the exit probability and the entry cost.
Effects of the Market Size:
Table 2.8 confirms the effects of the market size R discussed in Section 2.4. At the current
aggregate price, as the market size increases, the market demand each firm faces increases,
and so does its profitability, which attracts more firms to the market. A greater mass of
firms in the market induces more intense price competition, thereby driving the aggregate
price index down. As discussed in Proposition 8, we also empirically observe that a firm’s
market value and managerial compensation are not affected by the market size R (therefore,
unreported).
2.6 Conclusion
We study how the distributions of CEO talent and compensation vary across industries,
and how product market characteristics affect these distributions. We develop a market equi-
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librium model that incorporates the competitive assignment of CEOs to firms in a framework
in which firms engage in imperfect product market—specifically, monopolistic—competition.
The model enables the simultaneous analysis of the effects of managerial talent and product
market characteristics on the determination of firm value and CEO pay distributions. We
characterize the unique, stationary equilibrium of the model and then calibrate the model to
a sample of firm-CEO observations in each of the nine industry sectors based on the twelve
Fama-French industry classification. Using the respective calibrated models for different
industries, we perform several counterfactual experiments to investigate the quantitative
effects of managerial talent and those of product market characteristics.
There are several main results obtained from the analysis of the paper. First, we find
that there is much variation in the distributions of firm quality and managerial talent across
industries. As compared with other industries, high-tech industries are characterized by
higher heterogeneity both in firm quality and in managerial talent. Second, contrary to the
conclusions of Tervio¨ (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008), the impact of CEO talent on
shareholder value is, indeed, significant, and it is roughly of the same order of magnitude
as CEO pay. The explicit incorporation of the product market environment in which firms
operate plays a key role in generating these findings. Third, the contribution of CEO talent
varies significantly across industries. As one may expect from the inferred talent distri-
butions, managerial talent is more important to firm value in high-tech industries so that
more intense competition for CEO talent in those industries leads to higher pay dispersions.
Fourth, we analytically derive the effects of different product market characteristics on firm
value and CEO pay. In particular, either the entry cost or the exit probability shifts the
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entire CEO pay distribution upward or downward, whereas the elasticity of product sub-
stitution may affect large and small firms differently, which leads to higher pay differences
between CEOs in the same industry. Overall, our study shows that industry structures as-
sociated with CEO labor markets and product markets help explain the variations in the
levels and distributions of CEO pay across industries.
In this paper, we abstract away from asymmetric information, risk and incentive pro-
visions as in Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008). However, since a large body of
research on CEO compensation is based upon agency problems, a natural next step would
be to introduce asymmetric information stemming from moral hazard. Such an analysis
could explore the importance of risk and moral hazard in the endogenous matching of CEOs
to firms and the determination of CEO compensation levels and incentives. We could esti-
mate agency costs arising from moral hazard across industries and obtain qualitative as well
as quantitative implications for the effects of product market characteristics on managerial
incentives and the inefficiencies arising from agency problems.
2.7 Appendix: Proofs
2.7.1 Proof of Proposition 6
As the entry cost fe or the likelihood of exit 1−δ increases, the right-hand side of (2.36)
increases. Since the left-hand side of (2.36) is an increasing function of the aggregate price
index, it follows that the equilibrium aggregate price must increase with fe or 1−δ to satisfy
the equilibrium condition (2.36). The market size R has an opposite effect because R is on
the left-hand side of (2.36).
The result above is used to show the second result about the effect of a marginal increase
in σ. Here, we only prove the result with the threshold of the entry cost, f¯e(σ) because the
result with the threshold of the exit probability, 1 − δ¯(σ) can be similarly shown. First,
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define from (2.36)
f(σ, P ) =
RP σ−1
1− δ
[
(ρx[0]y[0])σ−1
σ
+ ρσ
∫ 1
0
[ ∫ i
0
x[j]σ−2y[j]σ−1x′[j]dj
]
di
]
− u0
1− δ . (2.53)
If P ∗(σ) denotes the equilibrium aggregate price index when the elasticity of substitution is
σ,
f(σ, P ∗(σ)) = fe. (2.54)
By taking the derivative of f with respect to σ, one can observe that ∂f
∂σ
is greater than zero
if P exceeds a threshold P¯ (σ) and is less than zero otherwise. In addition, note that ∂f
∂P
> 0.
By (2.54) and the implicit function theorem, we can write
dP ∗(σ)
dσ
= − ∂f/∂σ
∂f/∂P
|P=P ∗(σ) . (2.55)
In the proof of the first result of this proposition, the aggregate price index P ∗(σ) has been
shown to increase with the entry cost fe. It then follows that there exists a threshold level
f¯e(σ) of the entry cost such that P
∗(σ) > P¯ (σ) if fe > f¯e(σ) and P ∗(σ) < P¯ (σ) if fe < f¯e(σ),
which determines the sign of ∂f/∂σ. Taken together, dP
∗(σ)
dσ
< 0 if fe > f¯e(σ) and
dP ∗(σ)
dσ
> 0
if fe < f¯e(σ). Q.E.D.
2.7.2 Proof of Proposition 7
In the proof of Proosition 6, we have showed that the equilibrium aggregate price in-
creases with the entry cost fe or the exit probability 1− δ, whereas it decreases with R. By
the observation and (2.37), we immediately have the first result of this proposition. On the
other hand, the impact of a marginal increase in σ cannot be unambiguously determined
because the mass of firms, given by (2.37), depends on the factor distributions as well as
other product market characteristics. Hence, we empirically explore the effect of σ after
calibrating the model to data. Q.E.D.
2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Equation (2.36) can be rewritten as an equation for RP ∗σ−1. Plugging that equation into
(2.35) shows that CEO compensation increases with the the entry cost fe and the likelihood
of exit 1− δ, whereas it does not change with the market size R. To prove the effects on firm
market value, we plug the equation for RP ∗σ−1 and (2.35) into (2.34) and perform a partial
integration, which provides the following equation:
v[i] = Qfe +
(Q− 1)u0
1− δ , (2.56)
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where Q =
(ρx[0]y[0])σ−1
σ
+ρσ
∫ i
0 x[j]
σ−2y[j]σ−1x′[j]dj
(ρx[0]y[0])σ−1
σ
+ρσ
∫ 1
0
∫ i
0 x[j]
σ−2y[j]σ−1x′[j]djdi
> 0. In the above, one can see that firm
market value increases with the entry cost fe, but is not affected by the market size R. It
is also shown that firm market value increases with the exit probability 1− δ if Q < 1, but
decreases if Q > 1. However, since the value of Q depends on the factor distributions, the
effect of the exit probability should be empirically tested after the factor distributions are
implied by data.
Finally, we show the effect of product substitutability on CEO pay. We first differentiate
equation (2.35) with respect to σ as follows:
∂u[i]
∂σ
=
∫ i
0
(
∂h(j, σ)
∂σ
)
dj =
∫ i
0
(
h(j, σ)
∂ lnh(j, σ)
∂σ
)
dj, (2.57)
where h(j, σ) = RP ∗(σ)σ−1ρσx[j]σ−1y[j]σ−2y′[j] and P ∗(σ) is the equilibrium aggregate price
index when the elasticity of substitution is σ. Taking the derivative of lnh(j, σ), we obtain
∂
∂σ
lnh(j, σ) = lnP ∗(σ) + (σ − 1) ∂
∂σ
lnP ∗(σ) + ln ρ+
1
σ − 1 + ln(x[j]y[j]). (2.58)
It then follows that there exists a trigger level j¯ of firm rank such that ∂ lnh(j,σ)
∂σ
> 0 for j > j¯
and ∂ lnh(j,σ)
∂σ
< 0 for j < j¯. Since h(j, σ) is positive, the integrand in (2.57) has the same sign
as that of ∂ lnh(j,σ)
∂σ
. Accordingly, it is evident that the right-hand side of (2.57) is negative
unless i is sufficiently high. Note that the threshold for i, to be denoted by ı¯, is different
from j¯ at which ∂ lnh(j,σ)
∂σ
= 0. Therefore, CEO pay level increases (decreases) with σ when
the rank of a firm is above (below) ı¯. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 3
CEO-FIRM MATCHING AND PRODUCT MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we generalize the model developed in chapter 2 by allowing for the
possibility that the mass of potential managers exceeds the mass of managers who successfully
match with active firms.1 We hope to achieve two broad objectives in this chapter. First,
we provide a market equilibrium framework in which the CEO-firm matching process is
affected by the product market. In the previous chapter, we take an agnostic view towards
the underlying mechanism that endogenizes the equilibrium distributions of firm quality and
managerial talent, but attempt to empirically infer those distributions. In this chapter, on
the other hand, we show that, under some reasonable assumptions, there exists a unique
equilibrium cutoff level of talent such that only managers with ability above the level match
with firms. The distribution of active managers who succeed in matching with firms is
affected by the cutoff level. Because the cutoff level is determined by the market equilibrium
conditions, not only do product market characteristics affect the endogenous determination
of the distribution of active managers, but the total mass of potential managers and their
distribution affect the market equilibrium outcome.
1We thank Volker Nocke for this suggestion.
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Second, we pursue a parametric approach in the empirical analysis that assumes spe-
cific forms for the distributions of the factors. Although this methodology is necessary to
fully implement our extended model, it is also worthwhile to compare the results from a
parametric approach with those of Gabaix and Landier (2008) who evaluate differences in
talent by assuming talent follows the extreme value distribution. In particular, since our
calibration considers the ex-ante distribution of potential managers in addition to the ex-
post distribution of active managers, we can perform counterfactual experiments using both
distributions.
3.2 The Model
We consider a discrete-time, infinite horizon framework of a single industry. The econ-
omy has a continuum of people who are divided into two groups depending on whether or not
the agent possesses specialized human capital (or managerial talent). In each period, there
is a mass M of potential managers who have specialized human capital and an unbounded
mass of people who do not have managerial skills but only supply one unit of labor each
inelastically. Managerial talent y is drawn from the cumulative distribution function G(y)
over [ymin, ymax] which represents the ex-ante talent distribution. A group of agents in the
latter group—hereafter, “entrepreneurs,” establish a firm by supplying “investment” labor.
Since we assume an inelastic supply of labor, there is an unbounded pool of prospective
entrants (firms) into the industry. Firms are identical prior to entry, whereas their quality
is randomly realized upon entry from the cumulative distribution FX(x) over [xmin, xmax].
cxxxvi
Once realized, firm qualities and managerial talents are observable and remain constant over
time.
We are particularly interested in the case in which insufficiently talented managers
cannot be hired by a firm, that is, the mass of active managers is less than the total mass M of
potential managers. In what follows, we show that, under certain reasonable conditions, there
exists a unique cutoff talent level such that all managers with ability above the cutoff level
match with firms. Especially, as we show later, the cutoff level is endogenously determined
by the equilibrium conditions.
Let y¯ be the endogenous cutoff talent level. We can then define a cumulative distribution
function for a given y¯ that represents the talent distribution only for active managers, that
is, the ex-post talent distribution of the sector, as follows:
FY (y|y¯) = Pr[Y ≤ y|Y ≥ y¯] = G(y)−G(y¯)
1−G(y¯) , for y ≥ y¯, (3.1)
which has support [0, 1]. We then index those active managers on the unit interval using
this cumulative distribution function
y[i|y¯] = y s.t. FY (y|y¯) = i, (3.2)
where we explicitly denote its dependence on y¯. The profile of firm quality is also similarly
defined as
x[i] = x s.t. FX(x) = i. (3.3)
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The product market environment and the matching process between firms and mangers
are identical to those developed in Section 2.3 except that only managers with talent above
the cutoff level are matched to firms. We consider a Dixit-Stiglitz type framework of mo-
nopolistic competition and a two-sided matching mechanism between firms and managers in
the executive labor market. As in Melitz (2003), we assume that a producing firm exits the
market in any period for exogenous reasons with probability δ ∈ (0, 1) which can be viewed
as a common time discount factor.
In the stationary equilibrium, exiting firms are exactly replaced by new entrants in each
period so that the mass N of producing firms remain the same. Once they enter the market
and learn their qualities and, therefore, their ranks indexed over the unit interval, the mass
δN of new entrants participate in the matching process in the executive market with the
mass δM of potential managers. The solution of the matching problem is exactly the same
as before. Complementarity between firm quality and managerial talent ensures positive
assortative matching between managers and firms so that manager ranked i is assigned to
the equally ranked firm i. The total surplus S that each pair i generates under monopolistic
competition in the product market, which is given by (2.21), is apportioned into both parities
in a way that neither of them can become strictly better off by matching with a new type of
partner.
As in the previous chapter, the equilibrium payoff profiles to active firms and managers
are given by
v[i] =
1
1− δ
[
R((P/w)ρx[i]y[i|y¯])σ−1
σ
− u[i]
]
, (3.4)
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u[i] = u0 +
∫ i
0
(
R(P/w)σ−1ρσx[j]σ−1y[j|y¯]σ−2y′[j|y¯]) dj, (3.5)
where P represents the aggregate price index which is taken as given by each individual firm
and u0 represents the pay level of the manager ranked the lowest among active managers,
who has talent equal to the cutoff level, from her outside opportunity.
We now describe the market equilibrium conditions. First, the equilibrium mass N
of active firms must be equal to that of active managers due to the one-to-one matching
process, that is,
N = M(1−G(y¯)), (3.6)
where 1−G(y¯) represents the fraction of managers with ability above y¯. Second, the product
market clearing condition can be rewritten as an equation for the aggregate price index P
R = N
∫ 1
0
r(x[i], y[i|y¯])di ⇒ (3.7)
(P/w)σ−1 =
[
N
∫ 1
0
(ρx[i]y[i|y¯])σ−1 di
]−1
, (3.8)
where the second equation follows from equation (2.12). The last condition is the free entry
condition which is given by (2.32). Using equations (3.4) and (3.5), we can have
E [v[i]|y¯] = R(P (y¯)/w)
σ−1
(1− δ)
[
(ρx[0]y[0|y¯])σ−1
σ
+ ρσ
∫ 1
0
[ ∫ i
0
x[j]σ−2y[j|y¯]σ−1x′[j]dj
]
di
]
− u[0|y¯]
1− δ
=
R(P (y¯)/w)σ−1
(1− δ)
[
(ρx[0]y¯)σ−1
σ
+ ρσ
∫ 1
0
[ ∫ i
0
x[j]σ−2y[j|y¯]σ−1x′[j]dj
]
di
]
− u0
1− δ ,(3.9)
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where the augment of the aggregate price index explicitly indicates its dependence on the
cutoff talent level y¯ as shown in equations (3.6) and (3.8). The free entry condition ensures
that the expected firm value equals the entry cost fe, which endogenously determines the
equilibrium cutoff talent level.
Let us now examine how the expected firm value varies with y¯. First, the term (P (y¯)/w)σ−1
varies non-monotonically with y¯ in general. By (3.6), on the one hand, N decreases with y¯
because the cumulative distribution function G(y¯) increases. On the other hand, it can be
easily shown by its definition (3.2) that the term y[i|y¯] in the integrand increases with y¯.
The combination of these terms that increase or decrease with the cutoff talent level makes
its effect on the aggregate price index ambiguous. Second, the term in the bracket of (3.9)
increases with y¯ again because y[i|y¯] in the integrand increases. As a result, the uniqueness
of the equilibrium is not guaranteed in general.
3.3 Equilibrium
To ensure that, in equilibrium, there is a unique cutoff level such that there is a positive
mass of managers who cannot succeed in matching with firms due to their talent below the
cutoff level, we impose the following assumptions on the ex-ante talent distribution G(y)
and product market characteristics.
1. The hazard rate of the talent distribution function
h(y) ≡ g(y)
1−G(y) (3.10)
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is increasing in y.
2. The elasticity of product substitution satisfies the following condition
(σ − 1) ≤ g(ymin)ymin. (3.11)
3. The fixed entry cost fe is sufficiently large so that
E [v[i]|y¯ = ymin] < fe. (3.12)
The first two conditions guarantee that the aggregate price index, and, therefore, the
expected firm value E [v[i]|y¯] monotonically increase with the cutoff talent level y¯. A non-
decreasing hazard rate is satisfied by frequently used distributions and commonly used in
the literature especially as a sufficient condition for the monotonicity constraint in standard
screening models (See Chapter 2 of Bolton and Dewatripont (2004)). The last condition
says that the expected firm value is less than the entry cost when the entire mass of poten-
tial managers match with firms, that is, the mass of firms equals M. The following lemma
establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
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Lemma 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium)
Under the assumptions stated above, there exists a unique equilibrium in which a unique
cutoff level y¯∗ ∈ (ymin, ymax) of talent satisfies the following equation
R(P (y¯∗)/w)σ−1
(1− δ)
[
(ρx[0]y¯∗)σ−1
σ
+ ρσ
∫ 1
0
[ ∫ i
0
x[j]σ−2y[j|y¯∗]σ−1x′[j]dj
]
di
]
− u0
1− δ = fe,
(3.13)
where P (y¯∗) is given by (3.6) and (3.8).
The equilibrium aggregate price index and mass of firms, denoted by P ∗ and N∗, re-
spectively, are also uniquely determined by plugging y¯∗ into equations (3.6) and (3.8). Then,
the equilibrium payoff profiles of the matched pairs, firm value v[i] and managerial com-
pensation u[i] at each rank i, are also obtained by plugging the equilibrium aggregate price
index P ∗ and cutoff level y¯∗ into equations (3.4) and (3.5). Using this characterization of the
equilibrium, we perform a comparative static analysis. We begin by deriving the effects of
different industry characteristics on the cutoff talent level which is determined by equation
(3.13).
Proposition 9 (Industry Characteristics and Cutoff Talent Level)
• The cutoff talent level y¯∗ increases with the entry cost fe, while it decreases with the
market size R.
• The cutoff talent level y¯∗ increases with the total mass M of potential managers.
• There exist a threshold level f¯e(σ) of the entry cost such that the cutoff talent level
increases with a marginal increase in the elasticity of substitution σ if the entry cost
fe is below its threshold, and decreases if it is above.
cxlii
The first argument in Proposition 9 is easily obtained from equation (3.13). Specifically,
because the left-hand side of (3.13) increases with y¯ as discussed above, an increase in each
of the market characteristics affects the new equilibrium cutoff level in a way that satisfies
the condition again. The intuition behind this first argument needs to be discussed along
with the endogenous mass of producing firms. An increase in the entry cost reduces the
incentives of potential entrants to enter the market because the expected firm value, given
by the left hand side of (3.13), decreases. It is then obvious that the mass of managers who
can be matched to firms must be smaller, thereby increasing the cutoff talent level. The
second argument in this proposition follows from (3.13), (3.6), and (3.8). At the current
cutoff level, an increase in M implies more supply of managers than demand which must be
adjusted by a new cutoff level. The effect of the elasticity of substitution can be shown in a
manner similar to that used to prove its effect on the aggregate price index in Proposition
6. The following proposition examines the effects of different industry characteristics on the
aggregate price index.
Proposition 10 (Industry Characteristics and Aggregate Price Index)
• The aggregate price index P ∗ increases with the entry cost fe, while it decreases with
the market size R.
• The aggregate price index P ∗ decreases with the total mass M of potential managers.
• There exist a threshold level f˜e(σ) of the entry cost such that the cutoff talent level
increases with a marginal increase in the elasticity of substitution σ if the entry cost
fe is below its threshold, and decreases if it is above.
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As noted before, there are two conflicting effects of y¯ on the aggregate price index
given by (3.8). An increase in y¯ implies a decline in the mass N of firms, which dampens
market competition and thus increases the aggregate price index. However, an increase in
y¯ implies a market-wise production efficiency improvement as y[i|y¯] for ∀ i increases in y¯,
thereby lowering the aggregate price index. Under mild restrictions stated in Section 3.3, the
former effect dominates the latter one, which explains the first observation in Proposition 10.
The total mass of potential managers lowers the aggregate price index because the mass of
active firms remain the same but the resulting increase in y¯ improves the overall production
efficiency.
Next, we examine the effects of industry characteristics on individual CEO compen-
sation. By (3.5), we can see that there are three terms that are affected by y¯. The term
(P/w)σ−1 increases with y¯ under our assumptions. While the ex-post talent profile y[j|y¯] in
the integrand also increases with y¯, the derivative of the talent profile y′[j|y¯] decreases with
y¯ because, by (3.2), the slope of the talent profile is given by
y′[i|y¯] = 1−G(y¯)
g(y)
=
(N/M)
g(y)
, (3.14)
where the second equation follows from (3.6). Note that the slope of the equilibrium talent
profile depends on the ratio of the mass of active firms looking for a manager to the total
mass of potential managers and the ex-ante talent density function. If the total mass of
potential managers becomes larger in the sector, then the marginal talent at each i gets
smaller, which implies that the marginal returns to talent below i in the ranking decline,
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lowering the surplus earned by each manager. In addition, if potential managers are more
likely to have a particular talent level y[i], the marginal change in the rankings gives a small
variation in talent. Due to these conflicting effects of y¯, the effects of industry characteristics
on CEO compensation are ambiguous for general parameter values. We thus numerically
explore these ambiguous effects after calibrating the model to data in the next section.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
We now move on to our quantitative analysis using the model developed in this chapter.
As in Section 2.5, this quantitative analysis includes model calibration and some counter-
factual experiments industry by industry to examine the extent to which managerial talent
and industry characteristics affect the equilibrium variables. Compared to the model of
Chapter 2, this extended model is more complicated to implement. We have an additional
equilibrium condition (3.6) for the endogenous mass of firms that involves the total mass of
potential managers and the ex-ante distribution function of managerial talent. Because the
cutoff talent level that determines the mass of active managers is endogenously determined,
it is convenient to use a parametric approach where we assume specific forms for the factor
distributions as in Gabaix and Landier (2008) instead of the semi-parametric approach we
used in Chapter 2.
3.4.1 Model Calibration
In this subsection, our calibration procedure is described in detail. The separate samples
of nine different industry sectors, which include S&P 1500 firm-CEO observations from the
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ExecuComp database, are exactly the same as before, so we do not include details here for
brevity. Instead of indirectly inferring the profiles of the factors, we directly specify their
forms as follows:
x[i] = x0 + Ai
α, (3.15)
y[i] = y0 +Bi
β, (3.16)
where y[i] ∈ [y0, y0 + B] represents the ex-ante profile of managerial talent defined over the
unit interval using the ex-ante talent distribution G(y) of potential managers. We thus derive
the specific form of G(y) from (3.16) as
G(y) =
(
y − y0
B
)1/β
, (3.17)
from which the ex-post talent distribution FY (y|y¯) is obtained by equation (3.1). We then
have the specific form for the ex post profile y[i|y¯] of managerial talent for active managers
who successfully match to firms by equation (3.2) as follows:
y[i|y¯] = y0 +B [G(y¯) + (1−G(y¯))i]β . (3.18)
Using these specific functional forms, we have a set of parameter values to be estimated
as follows:
Ψ = {R, δ, x0, A, α, y0, B, β, σ, u0,M}. (3.19)
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Among the parameters stated above, R and δ are directly estimated from the data as de-
scribed in Section 2.5.2 and the remaining parameter values are obtained by matching several
moments (mean values and decile values) from the model-predicted distributions of firm value
and managerial compensation with the corresponding observed moments. We now describe
how to generate the model-predicted distributions of firm value and CEO pay for a candidate
parameter vector Ψ.
1. Using the observed number of firms in the industry as the equilibrium mass N of active
firms, the equilibrium condition (3.6) derives the cutoff talent level y¯.
2. We then compute the equilibrium aggregate price index relative to labor wage (P/w)σ−1
by (3.8).
3. By plugging the parameter values, the cutoff talent level, the aggregate price index,
and the specific profiles of the factors, given by (3.15) and (3.18), into equations (3.4
and (3.5)), we obtain the predicted distributions of firm value and CEO pay.
Table 3.1 report the baseline values of the parameters that are obtained from our cal-
ibration. First, the variations in the estimated elasticity of product substitution σ, the key
structural parameter of the model, are largely consistent with those reported in Table 2.2. As
discussed in detail in Section 2.5.3, the observation of lower product substitutability in the
business equipment, health care, and telecom industries and higher product substitutability
in the industries of consumer durable goods and shops is no more or less than the ranking of
industries by the negative price-cost margin which is commonly used as a proxy for product
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Table 3.1. Baseline Parameter Values
Industry Sector x0 A α y0 B β σ u0
Consumer Nondurables 0.3978 0.2448 1.3697 0.0125 0.00018 0.2153 10.680 0.9299
Consumer Durables 0.5370 0.0858 1.4462 0.1021 0.00058 0.1654 29.667 0.5780
Manufacturing 1.7850 1.0731 1.4942 0.0488 0.00039 0.3139 9.523 0.7565
Energy 0.9678 0.3705 1.2124 0.0916 0.00130 0.1646 14.654 1.7031
Chemicals 1.6676 0.9094 1.0649 0.0074 0.00011 0.1191 9.874 0.4461
Business Equipment 0.4882 0.5947 1.7450 0.0335 0.00079 0.4372 6.075 0.7942
Telecom 3.8350 11.5593 0.8773 0.0015 0.00004 0.2750 5.640 1.1749
Shops 0.6218 0.1235 1.2800 0.0629 0.00079 0.1009 23.628 0.7575
Health Care 1.7196 1.6014 1.6443 0.1635 0.00350 0.3116 7.349 0.7540
substitutability in the empirical literature. Second, the calibrated values of α and β suggest
that the profile of firm quality is convex (except for the telecom industry) and ex-ante and
ex-post profiles of managerial talent are concave. Since these profiles are defined using their
respective cumulative distribution functions, the slopes of the factor profiles are inversely
related to the density functions of these variables. A concave talent distribution suggests an
increasing density function of managerial talent which is in contrast with a “square root”
distribution suggested by Gabaix and Landier (2008).2
More specifically, Figure 3.1 displays the distributions of firm quality (relative to the
lowest level) for the business equipment, health care, manufacturing, and durable goods
industries, whereas Figure 3.2 reports the relative talent distributions of potential managers
and those of active managers. It is worth noting that the first two industries still turn out to
have much more widely dispersed firm and managerial characteristics across firms compared
to the other two industries. Compared to Figure 2.1, however, inter-industry variations in
2Similar results were obtained when we performed model calibration by assuming a Pareto distribution
for firm quality and a distribution with a finite upper bound for managerial talent.
cx
lv
iii
Figure 3.1. Distribution of Firm Quality
Figure 3.2. Ex-ante and Ex-post Distributions of Managerial Talent
cxlix
Table 3.2. Impact of CEO talent at the Median-Sized Firm (ex-post dist.)
Industry Sector ∆S
S[1/2]
(%) ∆v
v[1/2]
(%) ∆u/(1−β)
v[1/2]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 1.8731 1.9175 8.2065
Consumer Durables 1.6970 1.7379 7.2694
Manufacturing 1.3010 1.3243 4.9253
Energy 1.3109 1.3309 5.0353
Chemicals 1.0183 1.0322 2.7359
Business Equipment 2.8112 2.8847 11.8834
Telecom 1.9347 1.9590 6.0721
Shops 1.7824 1.8283 6.4421
Health Care 2.4676 2.5380 10.5836
the distributions of firm quality are less significant, which might be attributed to some
differences between the indirect inference and the parametric approach.
3.4.2 Implications for CEO Talent
Following the experiment of Gabaix and Landier (2008), we now evaluate the impact
of CEO talent using the calibrated models. In addition to measuring the impact using
the ex-post talent distribution as in the previous chapter, we can also perform the same
counterfactual experiment using the ex-ante talent distribution.
We first consider the equilibrium distribution of active managers who are matched to
firms. Suppose the median-sized firm could replace its current manager by the highest talent
manager in the industry. Table 3.2 shows the rate of increase in total surplus S, the rate of
increase in firm market value v, and the ratio of additional CEO pay to firm value for different
industries. The results are very similar to those obtained using the indirectly inferred factor
distributions in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.3). Similarly, we observe the significant impact
of managerial talent which is in contrast with the result of Gabaix and Landier (2008),
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considerable variations in the size of the impact of a better manager across industries, and
differences in CEO pay that are comparable to the relative contribution of a better manager
to firm value.
We next evaluate the differences in talent using the ex-ante distribution of managers.
Suppose that all active managers hypothetically were from the ex-ante distribution with no
cutoff level, while the firm quality distribution remains the same. This hypothetical talent
distribution, in contrast with the hypothetical employment only at a reference firm, would
affect the market variables so that a new market equilibrium must be derived. First, we
compute the entry cost fe, which was not estimated from the calibration procedure, by the
free entry condition (3.13) in the current equilibrium, that is, we plug the ex-post talent
distribution into the equation. Second, given the entry cost, we use the free entry condition
again to obtain the new equilibrium aggregate price index when managers were all from the
ex-ante distribution. To do so, we plug the ex-ante talent distribution into the equation.
Third, we generate new payoff distributions by (3.4) and (3.5) at the new aggregate price
index. Fourth, we measure the changes in total surplus, firm value, and CEO pay due to the
replacement of the median manager with the top ranked manager.
As one might expect, the impact of a better manager appears more significant in Table
3.3 because the talent level of the median manager from the ex-ante distribution is lower
than that from the ex-post distribution. In sum, this counterfactual experiment suggests
that our main argument on the importance of CEO talent which justifies CEO pay is very
robust.
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Table 3.3. Impact of CEO talent at the Median-Sized Firm (ex-ante dist.)
Industry Sector ∆S
S[1/2]
(%) ∆v
v[1/2]
(%) ∆u/(1−β)
v[1/2]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 1.9013 1.9527 8.3439
Consumer Durables 1.7559 1.8128 7.5535
Manufacturing 1.3206 1.3471 5.0032
Energy 2.0831 2.1515 7.8373
Chemicals 1.0358 1.0534 2.7878
Business Equipment 3.1018 3.2077 13.1213
Telecom 2.0436 2.0723 6.3970
Shops 1.9035 1.9780 6.9212
Health Care 2.6237 2.7199 11.2795
3.4.3 Implications for Industry Characteristics
In this subsection, we explore using the calibrated models how industry characteristics
affect the equilibrium outcome. This quantitative analysis allows us to pin down some of
the ambiguous effects of industry characteristics which are discussed in Section 3.3. We
derive a new equilibrium by varying the parameter about its baseline value while keeping
the estimated factor distributions and other parameter values in place. And then we compare
the new equilibrium outcome with the original one and report the percentage changes.
Effects of Product Market Characteristics
Table 3.4 and 3.5 shows the effects of the market size R and those of the entry cost fe. The
analytical results presented in Propositions 9 and 10 are confirmed as, for any industry, the
equilibrium cutoff talent level and the aggregate price index decrease with R, whereas they
increase with fe. An increase in R or a decrease in fe increases the net value of entry, which
attracts more firms into the market. Accordingly, more managers are demanded, lowering
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the cutoff level, and there is more intense competition due to an increase in the mass of
producing firms, lowering the aggregate price index.
It is interesting to see that the mean value of CEO compensation increases with the
market size, while it decreases with the entry cost. This observation is in contrast with their
effects reported in the previous chapter, that is, no influence of the market size on individual
CEO pay and higher CEO pay in response to the entry cost. This is because of the additional
equilibrium variable, the cutoff talent level, in this modified model. By (3.14), marginal talent
which affects the marginal returns to managerial talent depends on the mass of active firms
relative to the total mass of managers, which can be viewed as demand for managers by firms
relative to supply. An increase in R or a decrease in fe increases this ratio, and this effect on
the marginal returns to managerial talent dominates other competing effects, so that such a
change in the product market increases the mean value of CEO pay. The effects of product
substitutability are presented in Table 3.6. An increase in σ increases the aggregate price
index and lowers the mean value of CEO pay, which is similar to the findings obtained in
the previous chapter. In addition, for any industry, product substitutability increases the
cutoff talent level, albeit to a small degree.
Effects of CEO Talent Market
Table 3.7 presents the effects of the population size M of potential managers. As M increases,
the cutoff talent level must go up because the mass of active firms remains the same. However,
the increased cutoff level implies an improvement in production efficiency in the market,
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Table 3.4. Effects of Market Size R
(Change in R) -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 0.199 0.098 -0.093 -0.114 0.129 0.076 -0.165 -0.536 -6.172 -3.511 6.655 10.602
Consumer Durables 0.067 0.033 -0.032 -0.064 0.030 0.017 -0.023 -0.060 -6.327 -3.453 4.479 11.418
Manufacturing 0.228 0.113 -0.109 -0.134 0.070 0.041 -0.079 -0.195 -5.926 -3.349 5.961 9.525
Energy 0.146 0.073 -0.072 -0.143 0.009 0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -1.848 -0.929 0.940 1.892
Chemicals 0.216 0.107 -0.100 -0.137 0.103 0.061 -0.127 -0.872 -9.248 -5.331 9.852 20.478
Business Equipment 0.384 0.191 -0.188 -0.374 0.074 0.038 -0.040 -0.084 -2.996 -1.527 1.595 3.273
Telecom 0.425 0.211 -0.208 -0.414 0.116 0.062 -0.073 -0.165 -3.119 -1.588 1.659 3.413
Shops 0.085 0.042 -0.042 -0.082 0.031 0.017 -0.020 -0.045 -4.974 -2.624 2.999 6.551
Health Care 0.305 0.152 -0.149 -0.296 0.090 0.048 -0.055 -0.119 -3.774 -1.963 2.166 4.622
Table 3.5. Effects of Entry Cost fe
(Change in fe) -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -0.114 -0.094 0.097 0.194 -0.536 -0.168 0.076 0.127 8.840 5.892 -2.718 -4.605
Consumer Durables -0.065 -0.033 0.033 0.066 -0.062 -0.023 0.016 0.029 9.895 3.656 -2.629 -4.694
Manufacturing -0.134 -0.109 0.112 0.223 -0.195 -0.080 0.040 0.069 7.836 5.218 -2.582 -4.410
Energy -0.145 -0.072 0.072 0.143 -0.009 -0.004 0.004 0.008 0.607 0.298 -0.286 -0.563
Chemicals -0.137 -0.101 0.105 0.211 -0.872 -0.129 0.061 0.101 18.345 9.020 -4.453 -7.521
Business Equipment -0.380 -0.190 0.188 0.376 -0.086 -0.041 0.037 0.072 1.600 0.758 -0.690 -1.323
Telecom -0.421 -0.210 0.209 0.416 -0.169 -0.074 0.061 0.114 1.665 0.784 -0.713 -1.370
Shops -0.084 -0.042 0.042 0.083 -0.045 -0.020 0.017 0.031 5.009 2.220 -1.846 -3.427
Health Care -0.301 -0.150 0.150 0.298 -0.122 -0.055 0.047 0.088 3.038 1.369 -1.167 -2.188
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Table 3.6. Effects of Product Substitutability σ
(Change in σ) -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -0.956 -0.510 0.503 0.998 -0.536 -0.165 0.075 0.127 12.285 7.391 -3.928 -6.872
Consumer Durables -0.269 -0.133 0.131 0.258 -0.061 -0.023 0.016 0.029 13.240 5.148 -3.912 -7.117
Manufacturing -1.303 -0.688 0.678 1.344 -0.195 -0.079 0.040 0.069 10.732 6.534 -3.655 -6.434
Energy -0.683 -0.338 0.330 0.653 -0.009 -0.004 0.004 0.008 2.059 1.011 -0.976 -1.920
Chemicals -0.921 -0.489 0.483 0.958 -0.872 -0.127 0.061 0.101 22.195 10.536 -5.608 -9.650
Business Equipment -2.723 -1.352 1.334 2.649 -0.085 -0.041 0.037 0.072 3.873 1.860 -1.732 -3.357
Telecom -1.745 -0.864 0.846 1.674 -0.169 -0.074 0.061 0.114 3.549 1.686 -1.553 -3.000
Shops -0.493 -0.244 0.239 0.473 -0.045 -0.020 0.017 0.031 7.685 3.466 -2.957 -5.544
Health Care -1.824 -0.904 0.888 1.761 -0.121 -0.055 0.047 0.088 5.585 2.578 -2.276 -4.324
Table 3.7. Effects of Total Mass M of Potential Managers
(Change in M) -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2% -2% -1% 1% 2%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 0.095 0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.536 -0.169 0.076 0.127 10.638 6.785 -3.482 -6.077
Consumer Durables 0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.062 -0.023 0.016 0.029 11.815 4.533 -3.422 -6.222
Manufacturing 0.103 0.008 -0.005 -0.009 -0.195 -0.080 0.040 0.069 9.560 6.070 -3.320 -5.834
Energy 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 0.004 0.008 1.931 0.950 -0.920 -1.812
Chemicals 0.091 0.012 -0.007 -0.012 -0.872 -0.129 0.061 0.101 20.521 10.022 -5.287 -9.110
Business Equipment 0.016 0.008 -0.007 -0.014 -0.086 -0.041 0.038 0.072 3.343 1.612 -1.512 -2.939
Telecom 0.013 0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.169 -0.074 0.061 0.114 3.487 1.676 -1.573 -3.060
Shops 0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.046 -0.020 0.017 0.031 6.711 3.032 -2.599 -4.886
Health Care 0.016 0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -0.122 -0.055 0.047 0.089 4.731 2.189 -1.944 -3.705
clv
which lowers the aggregate price index. With similar arguments made above, an increase in
M lowers the mean value of CEO pay due to the law of demand and supply.
Our parametric approach allows us to examine how the distribution of CEO talent
affects the market equilibrium as well as CEO pay levels. First, an increase in the minimum
talent level y0 causes an upward shift of the ex-post distribution of active managers as shown
in equation (3.18). At the current cutoff level, an increase in y0 lowers the aggregate price
index given by (3.8) because N increases with y0 and the integral term also increases due
to an increase in y[i|y¯]. Although the second term in the bracket on the left hand side of
(3.13) increases with y0, the decrease in the aggregate price index causes the left hand side
of (3.13) to be smaller than the entry cost, which reduces the mass N of operating firms
and, therefore, increases the cutoff talent level. The smaller mass of active firms lowers the
ratio N/M, and the smaller demand for managers negatively affects CEO pay.
Second, Table 3.9 shows the effects of the exponent β of the ex-ante talent distribution
which determines the shape of the distribution. More specifically, a lower β, given that it
is less than 1, implies more rapid increase in talent and flat at the top of the distribution,
which lowers marginal talent, and, therefore, CEO pay levels as discussed in Section 3.3.
Although its effects on the aggregate price index and cutoff level are small, the changes in
the mean value of CEO pay are not insignificant. Lastly, we show the effects of the coefficient
of the ex-ante distribution of talent in Table 3.10. By (3.18), an increase in B implies an
increase in the upper bound of CEO talent, which, intuitively, leads to more competition
among firms for a better manager so that the overall CEO pay level increases.
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Table 3.8. Effects of CEO Talent Distribution (y0)
(Change in y0) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 5.195 2.532 -2.410 -4.706 -4.968 -2.484 2.484 4.969 3.856 1.881 -1.795 -3.508
Consumer Durables 5.235 2.551 -2.427 -4.739 -4.984 -2.492 2.492 4.984 4.055 1.978 -1.887 -3.688
Manufacturing 5.228 2.547 -2.424 -4.733 -4.988 -2.494 2.494 4.988 3.817 1.862 -1.775 -3.469
Energy 5.190 2.529 -2.408 -4.702 -4.942 -2.471 2.471 4.942 3.298 1.608 -1.531 -2.991
Chemicals 5.190 2.529 -2.408 -4.702 -4.953 -2.477 2.477 4.953 4.260 2.079 -1.984 -3.879
Business Equipment 5.161 2.516 -2.395 -4.679 -4.959 -2.480 2.480 4.960 4.185 2.042 -1.946 -3.804
Telecom 5.145 2.508 -2.388 -4.665 -4.944 -2.472 2.472 4.944 4.414 2.153 -2.051 -4.009
Shops 5.199 2.534 -2.412 -4.710 -4.954 -2.477 2.477 4.954 3.821 1.864 -1.778 -3.476
Health Care 5.165 2.518 -2.397 -4.682 -4.956 -2.478 2.478 4.956 3.932 1.918 -1.829 -3.576
Table 3.9. Effects of CEO Talent Distribution (β)
(Change in β) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.007 0.023 0.011 -0.011 -0.022 -2.893 -1.438 1.422 2.828
Consumer Durables -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -3.191 -1.587 1.570 3.124
Manufacturing -0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -2.356 -1.167 1.146 2.272
Energy -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -2.982 -1.488 1.483 2.960
Chemicals -0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.020 0.010 -0.010 -0.020 -3.485 -1.734 1.718 3.420
Business Equipment -0.018 -0.009 0.009 0.018 0.042 0.021 -0.020 -0.040 -2.847 -1.412 1.389 2.755
Telecom -0.016 -0.008 0.008 0.016 0.045 0.022 -0.022 -0.043 -3.603 -1.793 1.777 3.538
Shops -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.013 0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -3.333 -1.661 1.650 3.288
Health Care -0.014 -0.007 0.007 0.013 0.038 0.019 -0.018 -0.036 -2.844 -1.412 1.393 2.766
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Table 3.10. Effects of CEO Talent Distribution (B)
(Change in B) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 0.062 0.031 -0.031 -0.062 -0.031 -0.016 0.016 0.032 -3.684 -1.839 1.834 3.663
Consumer Durables 0.025 0.013 -0.013 -0.025 -0.016 -0.008 0.008 0.016 -3.873 -1.934 1.929 3.853
Manufacturing 0.032 0.016 -0.016 -0.032 -0.012 -0.006 0.006 0.012 -3.643 -1.819 1.815 3.627
Energy 0.066 0.033 -0.033 -0.066 -0.058 -0.029 0.029 0.058 -3.140 -1.569 1.567 3.133
Chemicals 0.066 0.033 -0.033 -0.066 -0.047 -0.023 0.023 0.047 -4.073 -2.033 2.027 4.048
Business Equipment 0.092 0.046 -0.046 -0.092 -0.040 -0.020 0.020 0.041 -3.995 -1.995 1.991 3.977
Telecom 0.107 0.054 -0.054 -0.107 -0.056 -0.028 0.028 0.056 -4.210 -2.103 2.099 4.194
Shops 0.058 0.029 -0.029 -0.058 -0.046 -0.023 0.023 0.046 -3.650 -1.822 1.818 3.630
Health Care 0.088 0.044 -0.044 -0.088 -0.044 -0.022 0.022 0.044 -3.755 -1.875 1.870 3.736
Table 3.11. Effects of Firm Quality Distribution (x0)
(Change in x0) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 3.547 1.744 -1.688 -3.321 -0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.006 -4.671 -2.341 2.350 4.705
Consumer Durables 4.674 2.285 -2.186 -4.280 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -6.041 -3.020 3.014 6.018
Manufacturing 3.640 1.789 -1.730 -3.404 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -4.253 -2.124 2.117 4.225
Energy 4.035 1.979 -1.905 -3.742 -1.E-4 -6.E-5 6.E-5 1.E-4 -2.861 -1.426 1.417 2.823
Chemicals 3.703 1.819 -1.757 -3.456 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.004 -4.722 -2.355 2.341 4.665
Business Equipment 2.842 1.403 -1.368 -2.701 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -3.316 -1.656 1.651 3.297
Telecom 1.515 0.752 -0.742 -1.473 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -1.588 -0.796 0.798 1.599
Shops 4.550 2.225 -2.132 -4.177 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -5.074 -2.533 2.521 5.028
Health Care 3.136 1.546 -1.502 -2.963 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -3.805 -1.903 1.901 3.798
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Table 3.12. Effects of Firm Quality Distribution (α)
(Change in α) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables -0.387 -0.192 0.188 0.373 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 1.574 0.762 -0.714 -1.383
Consumer Durables -0.129 -0.064 0.062 0.123 3.E-4 1.E-4 -1.E-4 -2.E-4 1.083 0.519 -0.477 -0.913
Manufacturing -0.419 -0.207 0.203 0.403 0.001 3.E-4 -3.E-4 -5.E-4 1.043 0.502 -0.464 -0.893
Energy -0.266 -0.132 0.129 0.256 7.E-5 3.E-5 -3.E-5 -6.E-5 1.512 0.739 -0.708 -1.385
Chemicals -0.371 -0.184 0.181 0.358 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 1.455 0.703 -0.658 -1.273
Business Equipment -0.709 -0.351 0.345 0.684 0.001 5.E-4 -4.E-4 -0.001 1.500 0.728 -0.687 -1.335
Telecom -0.774 -0.384 0.379 0.752 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 3.276 1.605 -1.543 -3.027
Shops -0.157 -0.078 0.076 0.151 4.E-4 2.E-4 -2.E-4 -3.E-4 1.259 0.608 -0.567 -1.095
Health Care -0.575 -0.285 0.279 0.554 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 1.387 0.671 -0.629 -1.219
Table 3.13. Effects of Firm Quality Distribution (A)
(Change in A) -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5% -5% -2.5% 2.5% 5%
Industry Sector ∆P
P
(%) ∆y¯
y¯
(%) ∆E[u]
E[u]
(%)
Consumer Nondurables 1.589 0.790 -0.780 -1.550 0.006 0.003 -0.003 -0.006 4.953 2.410 -2.284 -4.450
Consumer Durables 0.531 0.265 -0.266 -0.531 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 6.334 3.091 -2.946 -5.753
Manufacturing 1.498 0.745 -0.737 -1.466 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 4.447 2.171 -2.072 -4.050
Energy 1.125 0.561 -0.557 -1.109 1.E-4 6.E-5 -6.E-5 -1.E-4 2.970 1.453 -1.391 -2.724
Chemicals 1.441 0.716 -0.708 -1.409 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 4.909 2.401 -2.297 -4.496
Business Equipment 2.274 1.126 -1.104 -2.187 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 3.470 1.694 -1.616 -3.158
Telecom 3.632 1.784 -1.723 -3.389 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 1.683 0.819 -0.776 -1.513
Shops 0.645 0.322 -0.322 -0.643 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 5.291 2.586 -2.471 -4.832
Health Care 1.985 0.984 -0.968 -1.921 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 3.997 1.949 -1.856 -3.624
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Effects of Firm Quality Distribution
As shown in Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13, the parameters of the firm quality distribution have
some contrasting effects, especially, on the mean value of CEO pay. First, an increase in
the minimum firm quality level increases the cutoff talent level, lowers the aggregate price
index, and increases the mean value of CEO pay. The increase in the mean value of CEO
pay is obtained because the marginal returns to CEO talent at each rank increase due to
the complementarity between firm quality and managerial talent. Second, an increase in α,
similar to an increase in β, lowers the cutoff talent level and increases the aggregate price
index, but lowers the mean value of CEO pay. Third, an increase in A lowers the cutoff
talent level, the aggregate price index, and the mean value of CEO pay.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a market equilibrium framework, which is a simple exten-
sion of the basic model in Chapter 2, in which the total mass of potential managers is larger
than the mass of firms. In equilibrium, there is a unique cutoff talent level such that only
managers with talent higher than the cutoff point can match with firms. And the cutoff
level is a joint outcome of product market and labor market characteristics. Accordingly,
this extension provides a simple mechanism on how CEO-firm matching process is affected
by the product market. The empirical analysis through a parametric approach to implement
this extended model shows that the principal implications of the basic model for CEO talent
and CEO compensation are robust both to the extension that incorporates the endogenous
determination of the distribution of talent and to a different estimation approach. In ad-
clx
dition, through the sensitivity analysis, several implications that explicitly link CEO talent
markets and product markets are obtained.
To model the connection between CEO talent markets and product markets more seri-
ously, it would be also interesting to incorporate endogenous industry selection by heteroge-
neous managers by linking product market characteristics such as market risk and growth op-
portunities to managerial characteristics such as talent and risk attitude, especially through
the effects of product market characteristics on the pay level and structure.
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